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This thesis provides a reinterpretation of J.A.G. Griffith’s lecture ‘The Political 
Constitution’—a reinterpretation that stresses the commitment Griffith expressed in that 
lecture to the normative dimension of legal positivism. I call this normative dimension 
‘normative positivism’. Identifying Griffith as a normative positivist serves to clarify a 
number of debates surrounding Griffith’s arguments in ‘The Political Constitution’ and 
serves to clarify our understanding of the concept that has come to be known in UK 
public law scholarship in recent years as ‘political constitutionalism’, of which Griffith 
is regarded as a leading exemplar. The thesis argues that Griffith’s political 
constitutionalism is best understood as a form of normative positivism and is very 
different from some more recent defences of political constitutionalism available in the 
scholarly literature. The thesis also considers how the big constitutional questions of the 
age in the UK—questions relating, for example, to bills of rights and devolution—play 
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This thesis provides a reinterpretation of J.A.G. Griffith’s ‘The Political 
Constitution’1—a reinterpretation that stresses the commitment Griffith 
expressed in that lecture to the normative dimension of legal positivism. I 
call this normative dimension normative positivism.2 
 
The task of providing yet another reinterpretation of ‘The Political 
Constitution’—a reinterpretation that says something at least partially new 
and preferably interesting about Griffith’s lecture—may upon initial 
reflection appear to be a challenge that is difficult to surmount. So much has 
been written about that lecture in the various reinterpretations that it has 
undergone in recent years that it would be understandable if one were to 
think that everything that could possibly be written about the lecture 
already has been. As the opening lines of a recent reinterpretation of the 
lecture make clear, many of Griffith’s arguments in the lecture are 
thoroughly ‘ingrained in the minds of public lawyers’:  
To open with J.A.G. Griffith’s lecture on The Political Constitution 
might seem clichéd. Recent years, after all, have seen several 
reinterpretations of this lecture that popularized the idiom “the 
political constitution”. Many of its claims about the relationships 
between law and politics and the proper roles of judges and 
                                            
1 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1. 
2 This is the label preferred by Jeremy Waldron, ‘Normative (or Ethical) Positivism’ in Jules 
Coleman (ed), Hart’s Postscript:  Essays on the Postscript to ‘The Concept of Law’ 
(Oxford University Press 2001). Other labels for essentially the same concept available in 
the scholarship include ethical positivism (Tom Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical 
Positivism (Dartmouth Publishing Co Ltd 1996) and prescriptive legal positivism (Tom 
Campbell, Prescriptive Legal Positivism: Law, Rights and Democracy (Routledge-
Cavendish 2004).).   
 2 
politicians, as well as the memorable manner in which Griffith 
expressed them, are today so ingrained in the minds of public lawyers 
that it might be thought that there is no more that can be said about 
them.3 
 
Of the vast body of scholarship that Griffith produced between 1947 and 
2003,4 ‘The Political Constitution’ ranks, along with The Politics of the 
Judiciary,5 as among his best-known works.6 As Martin Loughlin writes in 
his tribute to Griffith, ‘[s]tudents of public law readily recognise him as the 
author of such aphorisms as “the constitution is what happens” [a line from 
‘The Political Constitution’7] and for his radical critique of the politics of the 
judiciary.’8  
 
                                            
3 Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber, ‘A Grammar of Public Law’ (2013) 14 German LJ 
2137, 2137. Other recent reinterpretations of Griffith’s lecture include Thomas Poole, 
‘Tilting at Windmills? Truth and Illusion in ‘The Political Constitution’’ (2007) 70 Modern 
Law Review 250; Graham Gee, ‘The Political Constitutionalism of J.A.G. Griffith’ (2008) 
28 Legal Studies 20, 21 (‘One could be forgiven for thinking that all that can be said about 
Griffith’s political constitutionalism has already been said.’). 
4 The LSE Department of Law, where Griffith spent the majority of his career, recently 
produced a bibliography in his honour:  Maria Bell, ‘J.A.G. Griffith (1918-2010):  A 
Bibliography’ (2012), The London School of Economics and Political Science 
(Unpublished). Available at <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/46491/> visited 22 February 2015. 
5 JAG Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary (Manchester University Press 1977). 
6 See Gee, ‘The Political Constitutionalism of J.A.G. Griffith’ (n 3) 40 (referring to these two 
works as ‘the most familiar of Griffith’s works.’); Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills? Truth and 
Illusion in ‘The Political Constitution’’ (n 3) 250 (referring to ‘The Political Constitution’ as 
Griffith’s ‘most important and influential work’ and ‘one of the key texts of late twentieth-
century British public law scholarship’.). 
7 Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (n 1) 19 (‘The constitution of the United Kingdom lives 
on, changing from day to day for the constitution is no more and no less than what happens. 
Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened that would be 
constitutional also.’).  




That is not to suggest, however, that these two works (that is ‘The Political 
Constitution’ and The Politics of the Judiciary) by themselves offer an 
adequate measure of Griffith’s impact on British constitutional thought. As 
Loughlin continues, ‘[a] reputation built on a passing knowledge of some of 
his occasional lectures and essays—works in which his captivating prose and 
rhetorical style could dazzle—does not yield the scholarly measure of the 
man.’9 Nor is it the case that the scholarship that has paid increasing 
attention to Griffith’s work in recent years has focused exclusively on 
Griffith’s arguments in ‘The Political Constitution’ or on his arguments 
about the politics of the judiciary. The January 2014 issue of Public Law (a 
journal for which Griffith himself served as founding editor in 1956 and 
retained its editorship until 198110) devotes the entire space in its Articles 
section to articles discussing Griffith’s work—articles that cover an array of 
topics, including Griffith’s contributions to the field of administrative law,11 
his views on the Office of the Lord Chancellor,12 and his views on the subject 
of Parliament and legislation.13 
 
Nevertheless, ‘The Political Constitution’ remains one of Griffith’s most 
influential and important pieces of scholarship, and despite all that has been 
written about it in recent years, it would be a mistake to think that the 
debates surrounding the lecture have left no room for another scholarly 
                                            
9 ibid. 
10 ibid. 
11 Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, ‘Administrative Law in Context:  Restoring a Lost 
Connection’ [2014] Public Law 28. 
12 Graham Gee, ‘What are Lord Chancellors For?’ [2014] Public Law 11. 
13 John McEldowney, ‘J.A.G. Griffith:  Parliament and Legislation’ [2014] Public Law 85. 
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intervention. That is because with all the attention that the lecture has 
received and with all the reinterpretations that it has undergone in recent 
years, the commitment Griffith expressed in that lecture to normative 
positivism deserves to be paid much greater attention than has hitherto 
been paid.14 
 
Normative positivism is a strand of legal positivism that insists upon the 
conceptual separation of law and morality for the good consequences that 
such separation is thought to produce. Legal positivism is generally regarded 
as consisting of a wholly descriptive and conceptual thesis,15 namely the 
separability thesis, which is the thesis that ‘there is no necessary connection 
between law and morals or law as it is and [law as it] ought to be’.16 Where 
                                            
14 Brief mention of Griffith’s normative positivism is found in Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills? 
Truth and Illusion in ‘The Political Constitution’’ (n 3) 257 (citations omitted) (‘the positivist 
position [Griffith] espouses has an explicit political point. He defends positivism as the best 
method for uncovering the reality beneath the layers of illusion and rhetoric. A ‘solid, 
positivist, unmetaphysical, non-natural foundation for analytical jurisprudence’, he insists, 
was essential for peering beneath the ‘elaborate façades’ and ‘out of date pieces of stage 
paraphernalia’ in order to find the levers of power, and the identity of those who 
manipulated those levers. Intellectual honesty, then, has a moral and political purpose. In 
this, Griffith shares H.L.A. Hart’s conviction that only positivism could make ‘men clear 
sighted in confronting the official abuse of power’, was most likely ‘to lead to a stiffening of 
resistance to evil’.’). See also David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality in a 
Time of Emergency (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 123 (arguing that Griffith and 
other functionalists ‘espouse a kind of leftwing Benthamism, a political positivism which 
regards law as the necessary instrument for conveying judgments about collective welfare to 
the officials who will have to implement those judgments.’). 
15 See Waldron, ‘Normative (or Ethical) Positivism’ (n 2) 411 (‘Legal positivism is commonly 
held to consist in a purely conceptual thesis’ (emphasis added); see also Campbell, 
Prescriptive Legal Positivism (n 2) 21 (citation omitted) (‘The theory of legal positivism is 
usually taken to be analytical, descriptive and explanatory.’). 
16 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (1958) 71 Harvard Law 
Review 593, 601n25. See Andrei Marmor, Positive Law and Objective Values (Oxford 
University Press 2001) 71 (‘There are many versions of legal positivism but all of them 
subscribe to the so-called separation thesis.’) (emphasis added). But see Jules Coleman’s 
following observation:  ‘[I]n the eyes of many, there is little more than [the] warm embrace 
of the separability thesis that unifies legal positivists with one another. One problem with 




conceptual and normative positivism part ways, however, is that, whereas 
the conceptual positivist’s interest is in accurately describing the nature of a 
legal system and in accurately describing the concept of law, and whereas 
the conceptual positivist believes that law and morality ought to be kept 
separate for reasons primarily to do with descriptive accuracy, the normative 
positivist believes that there are ‘beneficial moral consequences’17 associated 
with the separation of law and morality over and above descriptive accuracy 
for which reason positivism ought to be chosen as a concept of law.18 What is 
implicit in the argument that positivism ought to be chosen for instrumental 
reasons is the acceptance of ‘the socially constructed and thus non-eternal 
nature of the concept of law’.19 It is the pursuit of these morally good 
consequences that leads the normative positivist to argue that ‘it would be a 
good thing for the law to be as the [conceptual] positivist thinks it is.’20 
Normative positivism ‘identifies the contamination of legal decision by moral 
judgment as a moral disadvantage; it says that we lose something of value 
thereby.’ 21  The ‘beneficial moral consequences’ argument could take a 
number of forms, including HLA Hart’s insistence that the conceptual 
                                                                                                                                 
shared rejection of it that is all that unites us.’ Jules L Coleman, ‘Beyond the Separability 
Thesis:  Moral Semantics and the Methodology of Jurisprudence’ (2007) 27 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 581, 582n2. 
17 Frederick Schauer, ‘The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julie 
Dickson’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 493, 493-495. The phrase is Julie 
Dickson’s, who refers to this argument as the ‘Beneficial Moral Consequences Thesis’. See 
Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Hart Publishing 2001) 84-102. 
18 See Frederick Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ in Michael Freeman and Patricia Mindus 
(eds), The Legacy of John Austin’s Jurisprudence (Springer 2013) 275-280.  
19 ibid 281. 
20 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 1999) 167. 
21 ibid. 
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separation of law and morality would facilitate citizen disobedience to 
wicked laws,22 Jeremy Bentham’s insistence that such conceptual separation 
would facilitate law reform,23 and Bentham’s, Thomas Hobbes’s, and David 
Hume’s insistence that the discretion of judges and other law-applying 
officials ought to be minimized in order to avoid the arbitrariness that would 
result if such decisions turned upon the moral judgment of those entrusted 
with the application of law.24 Modern defences of normative positivism are to 
be found in the works of Tom Campbell, 25  Neil MacCormick, 26  Gerald 
Postema,27 and Jeremy Waldron,28 among others.29 
                                            
22 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Penelope A. Bulloch, Leslie Green & Joseph Raz eds, 
3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 210. Whether or not Hart may be classified as a full-
blooded normative positivist is a matter of debate to which we turn in Chapter 2, Section 
2.4. 
23 See Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ (n 18) 282-285. The leading modern account of 
Bentham’s normative positivism is Gerald J Postema, Bentham and the Common Law 
Tradition (Oxford University Press 1986), esp. Ch 9. In addition to attributing normative 
positivist views to Bentham, Postema also does so for Thomas Hobbes and David Hume. 
24 See Waldron, Law and Disagreement (n 20) 167. 
25 Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism (n 2); Campbell, Prescriptive 
Legal Positivism (n 2); Tom Campbell, Rights: A Critical Introduction (Routledge 
2006) Ch 11. 
26 Neil MacCormick, ‘A Moralistic Case for A-moralistic Law’ (1985) 20 Valparaiso Law 
Review 1. 
27 Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (n 23). 
28 Waldron, Law and Disagreement (n 20); Waldron, ‘Normative (or Ethical) Positivism’ 
(n 2). 
29 Stephen R Perry, ‘Interpretation and Methodology in Legal Theory’ in Andrei Marmor 
(ed), Law and Interpretation:  Essays in Legal Philosophy (Clarendon Press 1997) 100 
(‘Hart’s theory attributes a function to law from the point of view of the theorist, rather than 
from the point of view of the participants within the practice. While there is room in 
jurisprudence for such a methodology, it is in a number of respects unsatisfactory. The most 
important problem is that it effectively abandons the ambition of jurisprudence to explain 
the normativity of law.’); according to Waldron, it is also possible to include in this list 





When we turn to Griffith’s arguments in ‘The Political Constitution’, we find 
that Griffith was expressing what turns out to be a strong commitment to 
normative positivism. In ‘The Political Constitution’, Griffith argued ‘for a 
highly positivist view of the constitution’30 and said that ‘I do not believe 
that the concept of law is a moral concept.’31 However, these statements 
were not being made as a matter of what we might describe as ‘disinterested 
observation’32 (one of the aims of a purely conceptual positivist). Far from it, 
there are normative considerations running through much of Griffith’s 
lecture on the basis of which he was arguing for the conceptual separation of 
law and morality. There are sufficient normative ingredients in Griffith’s 
legal positivism as expressed in ‘The Political Constitution’ to allow us to say 
with confidence that Griffith was a normative positivist. This thesis tells the 
story of J.A.G. Griffith’s Normative Positivism.  
 
Griffith himself did not describe his position in ‘The Political Constitution’ as 
‘normative positivism’; but neither did he use the words political 
constitutionalism or modernism or functionalism to describe his own views, 
yet these are also concepts that have come to be associated in recent years 
                                                                                                                                 
Ontario Law Review 203, although some of Raz’s other views, and in particular views he 
expresses in his more recent work, renders Raz’s position on normative positivism unclear 
to Waldron. See Waldron, ‘Normative (or Ethical) Positivism’ (n 2) 412n7, 432n66. 
30 Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (n 1) 19. 
31 ibid. 
32 Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ (n 18) 283 (arguing that Bentham and John Austin 
were both normative positivists and that their legal positivism was not simply ‘a function of 
disinterested observation’.). 
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with Griffith’s work.33 The fact that Griffith did not use any of these words 
to describe his vision in his Chorley Lecture does not, of course, mean that 
his arguments have no relationship to these concepts, for ‘the fact that you 
do not use [a] word doesn’t mean you are not accessing the concept. A 
concept can be referred to by a word or by a paragraph.’34  
 
CLARIFYING EXISTING DEBATES 
To identify Griffith as a normative positivist serves to clarify at least two 
sets of debates surrounding the arguments Griffith made in ‘The Political 
Constitution’. Let us look at each of the two in turn. 
 
1.  The Descriptivism Debate.  One such debate relates to the use of the word 
‘descriptive’ to describe Griffith’s arguments in the ‘The Political 
Constitution’ and the suggestion that Griffith’s arguments in the lecture are 
irrelevant to normative constitutional theory. These are criticisms of 
Griffith’s lecture that have surfaced in recent years in the existing 
scholarship. It has been said, for example, that Griffith’s interpretation of 
                                            
33 See Paul Craig, ‘Political Constitutionalism and Judicial Review’ in Christopher Forsyth 
and others (eds), Effective Judicial Review: A Cornerstone of Good Governance 
(Oxford University Press 2010) (‘Griffith is properly regarded as a leading exemplar of 
political constitutionalism’); but see Martin Loughlin, ‘Modernism in British Public Law:  
1919-79’ [2014] Public Law 56, 66 (arguing that ‘Griffith sits firmly within the tradition of 
modernism that Laski, Jennings and Robson expounded’ and that it is incorrect to say that 
‘his school is something called “political constitutionalism” (a notion of recent coinage)’.). On 
Griffith’s ‘functionalism’, see Martin Loughlin, ‘The Functionalist Style in Public Law’ 
(2005) 55 University of Toronto Law Journal 361, 368: ‘The functional style offered not 
only an analysis but a prescription: it aimed at human improvement, and in that sense it 
was a jurisprudential approach that was tied to a philosophy of human transformation.’). 
34 Jeremy Waldron, ‘What do the Philosophers Have against Dignity?’ (September 17, 2014). 
NYU School of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 14-59. Available at SSRN: 




the UK constitution was that ‘it had no moral or normative content’;35 that 
Griffith’s ‘notion of the constitution [was] purely descriptive—neither legally 
prescriptive nor morally normative’;36 and that ‘[w]hen it came to discussing 
constitutional questions, Griffith only ever described—he never prescribed.’37 
For ease of reference, let us refer to the group of scholars who advance such 
criticism against Griffith as Group A. 
 
A superficial reading of Group A’s aforementioned criticisms of Griffith 
might suggest that Group A is describing Griffith’s ‘work’38 or his ‘analysis’39 
as being completely devoid of normative or prescriptive argument. A closer 
reading of Group A’s allegation of descriptivism against Griffith, however, 
reveals something different. As I will attempt to demonstrate in Chapter 3 
in much greater detail than is possible in this Introduction, Group A’s 
criticism of Griffith is not that Griffith’s lecture was devoid of normative 
argument; (indeed scholars belonging to Group A expressly acknowledge 
Griffith’s normative arguments); instead, as I will argue in Chapter 3, 
scholars belonging to Group A presuppose a Dworkinian anti-positivist 
                                            
35 Dawn Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom (Oxford University 
Press 2003) 380. 
36  JWF Allison, The English Historical Constitution: Continuity, Change and 
European Effects (Cambridge University Press 2007) 34. 
37 Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing 2005) 37. 
38 Loughlin, ‘Modernism in British Public Law’ (n 33) 66 (responding to Tomkins (n 37) and 
arguing that ‘it is easy—but wrong—to state that Griffith’s work is purely descriptive’); 
Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills? Truth and Illusion in ‘The Political Constitution’’ (n 3) 253 
(responding to Tomkins (n 37) and arguing that ‘[w]e misunderstand Griffith if we see him 
as simply presenting a descriptive analysis’ and noting that Griffith’s ‘work is thoroughly 
prescriptive’.). 
39 Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills? Truth and Illusion in ‘The Political Constitution’’ (n 3) 253 
(arguing that to suggest that Griffith presented a wholly descriptive analysis is a 
misinterpretation of Griffith’s lecture). 
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understanding of the UK constitution (according to which understanding the 
UK constitution is deemed to be a repository of abstract principles that 
exists above the hard positive law as a form of higher constitutional law—
constitutional principles that are unearthed through a process of moral 
interpretation40) as the only possible understanding of the UK constitution, 
and their criticism of Griffith, I will argue, reflects a Dworkinian anti-
positivist bias.  
 
Thus, when Dawn Oliver argues that Griffith’s ‘interpretation’ of the UK 
constitution was that the constitution had ‘no moral or normative content’,41 
she is presupposing the existence of a constitution as a repository of abstract 
principles and is, then, accusing Griffith of believing that that repository is 
empty of normative principle. However, the better reading of Griffith, I will 
argue, is not that he believed that the constitution is an empty repository; 
no, Griffith doubted or denied, for normative reasons, the very existence of a 
constitution understood as a repository of abstract principles, for which 
reason he famously said that ‘the constitution is no more and no less than 
what happens.’42 As Loughlin notes in the course of placing Griffith within 
the modernist tradition, Griffith’s ‘focus remained fixed on the system of 
government rather than on the constitution.’43 Griffith was ‘[a]lert to the 
tyranny of categories’ and was ‘circumspect in discussion of ‘the 
                                            
40 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1978); Ronald 
Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harvard University Press 1986). 
41 Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom (n 35) 380. 
42 Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (n 1) 19. 




constitution’.’44 For Griffith, ‘the constitution was merely the assemblage of 
rules organising government, changing as the rules changed’;45 law, for 
Griffith, ‘meant hard positive law, most authoritatively enacted in 
statute’ 46 —a claim that he made ‘with the intention of overthrowing 
metaphysical ideas’.47 
 
Drawing attention to Griffith’s normative positivism and the anti-positivist 
biases of his critics, thus, has the effect of clarifying a live controversy within 
the existing scholarship.  
 
2.  Political Constitutionalism. Identifying Griffith as a normative positivist 
also has the effect of clarifying our understanding of the concept that has 
come to be known in recent years in British public law scholarship as 
political constitutionalism. Richard Bellamy has recently observed that his 
own monograph on political constitutionalism,48 along with Griffith’s ‘The 
Political Constitution’49 and Adam Tomkins’s Our Republican Constitution50 
have ‘come to be seen as prime normative statements of political 
                                            
44 ibid. 
45 ibid. 
46 ibid 66. 
47 ibid. 
48  Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the 
Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
49 Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (n 1). 
50  Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (n 37). 
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constitutionalism as applied to the U.K.’ 51  It is, indeed, true that a 
discussion of political constitutionalism in present day public law 
scholarship in the UK would be considered incomplete without a reference to 
any one of these three scholars, all three of whom are generally regarded as 
leading representatives of this school of thought.52 
 
But what do we mean by political constitutionalism? Before we answer that 
question, let us consider the following remarks, not about political 
constitutionalism per se, but about ‘-isms’ in general, that one commentator 
makes in a discussion about legal positivism: 
In talking about legal positivism, one is forced to make a preliminary 
point about the use of labels to describe philosophical movements. 
Theory-labelling is a tricky business. To be sure, labels are useful 
tools to refer to jurisprudential trends, but they can be misleading in 
so far as they are taken to convey the idea that there is a uniform 
trend or even a group of scholars out there—a “school”—united by a 
uniform and consistent research program, by the use of the same 
technical (epistemological, theoretical) tools, and by widely shared 
solutions to a set of problems. 
However, a putative unified account of “legal positivism” would be 
patently false. Legal positivism is not (at any rate, is not now) 
anything resembling a school. Rather, it is an array of theses, of 
theoretical questions perceived of as important, and of theoretical 
concepts and methods of inquiry agreed upon by positivists only at a 
fairly high level of abstraction.53 
 
                                            
51  Richard Bellamy, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’ (2011) 9 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 86, 90n18 (emphasis added).  
52 See Graham Gee and Grégoire CN Webber, ‘What Is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 273; Marco Goldoni, ‘Two Internal Critiques of Political 
Constitutionalism’ (2012) 10 International Journal of Constitutional Law 926.  
53 Giorgio Pino, ‘Positivism, Legal Validity, and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (2014) 




The first point, in the light of the above quotation, that I wish to make about 
political constitutionalism is that, like legal positivism, though perhaps not 
to the same degree as legal positivism, political constitutionalism, too, 
represents ‘an array of theses’54 agreed upon by political constitutionalists, 
and by those who talk about political constitutionalism, only ‘at a fairly high 
level of abstraction.’55 
 
At that high level abstraction, political constitutionalism may be defined as 
one of two ‘[r]ival theories of the British constitution’,56 the other one being 
legal constitutionalism, with parliamentary sovereignty being ‘rejected by 
strong versions of legal constitutionalism’57 while being ‘a crucial element of 
political constitutionalism’. 58  Another way of describing the difference 
between legal and political constitutionalism may be what another recent 
work states is the difference between the two theories, again, stated at a 
fairly high level of abstraction: 
Roughly speaking, political constitutionalism stands for the 
proposition that the limits on governmental power inherent in the 
concept of constitutionalism—limits that qualify the noun in the term 
‘constitutional democracy’—and especially those that are expressed in 
terms of individual rights and liberties, are or should be 
predominantly political in nature, enforced through the ordinary 
mechanisms of Madisonian-style structural constraints and, 
                                            
54 ibid. 
55 ibid. 
56  Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty and Constitutional Change in the 
United Kingdom’ in Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland and Alison Young (eds), Sovereignty 
and the Law: Domestic, European and International Perspectives (Oxford University 




especially, through electoral accountability. In other words, to a 
significant extent the representative nature of modern democracy 
provides its own built-in check on the scope of governmental power, 
thereby fusing the two constitutive concepts. By contrast, legal 
constitutionalists believe that these limits in general, and rights in 
particular, are or should be predominantly legal in nature and 
enforced through the power of courts to disapply acts that exceed 
them.59 
 
My aim in this project is to look beneath the fairly abstract accounts of 
political constitutionalism that are found in the above quotations. I am more 
interested, in other words, in exploring the diversity that exists deep within 
political constitutionalism, at least insofar as the theory is understood in 
British public law scholarship, and my aim is to unearth at least some of the 
reasons as to why that diversity exists. 
 
About that diversity, Neil Walker has recently observed that in UK public 
law scholarship, the works that represent the political constitutionalist 
school of thought ‘occupy no single clear position, but an indistinct spectrum 
of possibilities.’60 These works, Walker notes,  ‘may embrace, on the one 
hand, a kind of realism in which the absence of a legal authority that 
constrains as well as enables political power casts the constitution as an 
arena of raw political competition’,61 and, ‘on the other hand, they may 
embrace a more normatively committed stance which makes a virtue of the 
                                            
59 Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism: Theory 
and Practice (Cambridge University Press 2013) 22. 
60 Neil Walker, ‘Our Constitutional Unsettlement’ [2014] Public Law 529, 533. Among the 
works that Walker identifies as belonging to this collection of diverse arguments are 
Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (n 37); Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism 
(n 48); Keith Ewing, ‘The Resilience of the Political Constitution’ (2013) 14 German Law 
Journal 2111. 




constitutional prominence of political institutions and the affirmation of 
representative democracy and strong political accountability this implies in 
the modern state, even if these institutions were born in a pre-democratic 
age.’62 
 
In order to explore this diversity within political constitutionalism, I will 
place side by side two contrasting versions of political constitutionalism: the 
version associated with the arguments Griffith made in ‘The Political 
Constitution’ and another version advocated by Tomkins in Our Republican 
Constitution. Once we place side by side the accounts of these two scholars, 
who are thought to be leading representatives of political constitutionalism, 
we will find that Griffith’s political constitutionalism is best understood as a 
form of normative positivism, while Tomkins’s political constitutionalism, 
rather than being a form of normative positivism, is built upon Dworkinian 
anti-positivist foundations.  
 
Drawing attention to Griffith’s normative positivism, then, also has the 
effect of helping us make more sense of this diversity inherent within the 
concept of political constitutionalism. Loughlin has recently observed that ‘it 
is incorrect to say that Griffith’s ‘school is something called “political 
constitutionalism” (a notion of recent coinage)’.63 But I think it is possible to 
sustain the argument that Griffith was, in some ways, a political 
constitutionalist, if we define the concept of ‘political constitutionalism’ in at 
least some of the ways in which we defined the concept above.64 However, if 
                                            
62 ibid 533-534. 
63 Loughlin, ‘Modernism in British Public Law’ (n 33) 66. 
64 See text to (n 56) – (n 62). 
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we are going to enlist Griffith as an ally of the political constitutionalist 
school of thought, we must also remember the diversity that exists within 
the concept of political constitutionalism, and we must also remember that 
Griffith’s political constitutionalism is best understood as a form of 
normative positivism—a form of political constitutionalism that is very 
different from the modern defence of political constitutionalism found in the 
work of Tomkins. 
 
 
STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS  
 
The argument presented in this thesis will proceed as follows. Chapter 2, 
entitled J.A.G. Griffith’s Normative Positivism, will tell the story of Griffith’s 
normative positivism. Several arguments need to be defended along the way 
to presenting an account of Griffith’s normative positivism. The chapter will 
begin by detailing the various strands of legal positivism, some of which are 
normative, others of which are non-normative. Having acquired the 
vocabulary that is necessary for a discussion of Griffith’s normative 
positivism, this chapter will also address some ancillary questions that are 
necessary to address in the context of any discussion of normative 
positivism; these questions include whether or not normative positivism 
should even be considered a strand of legal positivism, whether or not 
normative positivism can logically co-exist with the purely conceptual form 
of legal positivism, and whether or not purely descriptive jurisprudence not 
invested in normative aims—the type of jurisprudence that some conceptual 
positivists claim to be engaged in—is even possible. These are questions 
about which legal theorists disagree, and I will address them to the extent 




however, is to defend the claim that running through much of Griffith’s 
lecture is a strong commitment to normative positivism, and the chapter will 
defend that claim, in Sections 2.5 and 2.6, using evidence from Griffith’s 
lecture. 
 
If the aim of Chapter 2 is to describe what Griffith was saying in his lecture, 
the aim of Chapter 3 is to demonstrate what Griffith was not saying in his 
lecture. Chapter 3, entitled A Response to Griffith’s Critics, will be exactly 
that—a response to three of Griffith’s critics. Their criticism of Griffith, I 
will argue, reflects an anti-positivist bias and a lack of appreciation of 
Griffith’s normative positivism. The aim of this chapter will also be to 
juxtapose two accounts of political constitutionalism—one found in Griffith’s 
lecture and the other found in the work of one of Griffith’s critics, Adam 
Tomkins. The chapter will argue that whereas Griffith’s political 
constitutionalism is a form of normative positivism, there is a an anti-
positivist streak running through the political constitutionalism of Tomkins, 
which makes these two versions of political constitutionalism very different. 
This argument will have both a descriptive and an evaluative dimension; it 
will describe this key difference between the political constitutionalism of 
Griffith and Tomkins, and it will express a preference for the political 
constitutionalism of Griffith over the political constitutionalism of Tomkins 
precisely because, unlike Tomkins’s political constitutionalism, Griffith’s 
political constitutionalism is a form of normative positivism. 
 
In Chapter 4, I will argue that the arguments Griffith presented in his 
lecture are best appreciated by adopting a particular vantage—that vantage 
is the vantage of the citizen who is invested in the values promoted by 
republican theories, such as having an involved citizenry who is able to 
participate in the decisions that are taken in its name using procedures that 
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take seriously disagreement among citizens. In particular, I will argue in 
this chapter that it is crucial to resist the temptation to try to make sense of 
Griffith’s arguments from the vantage of an appeals court judge, which 
happens to be the vantage from which a great deal of legal writing happens 
to take place today.65 
 
In the final substantive chapter of the thesis, Chapter 5, I will ask what 
contributions, if any, can the normative positivist arguments that Griffith 
made in ‘The Political Constitution’ make to our understanding of what I 
refer to in this thesis as ‘the narratives of devolution’. 66  Rather than 
providing a summary of the argument presented in Chapter 5 here, I will 
wait until that chapter to define what the narratives of devolution are and to 
consider what contributions, if any, Griffith’s normative positivism can make 
to these narratives. 
 
 
                                            
65 James Allan, The Vantage of Law (Ashgate 2013) 179. 
66 I borrow this phrase from Aileen McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the Contested 
Constitution and the Authorship of Constitutional Change’ (April 17, 2014) SSRN. 
Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2431050> (visited 21 February 2015); see also Gavin 
Anderson and others, ‘The Independence Referendum, Legality and the Contested 
Constitution: Widening the Debate’ (January 31, 2012) UKCLA Blog. Available at 
<http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/31/gavin-anderson-et-al-the-independence-





J.A.G. GRIFFITH’S NORMATIVE POSITIVISM 
 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter tells the story of J.A.G. Griffith’s normative positivism. A 
number of arguments need to be defended along the way to presenting that 
story, and I begin with a roadmap of how the argument will proceed.  
 
Section 2.2 will provide an overview of the different strands of legal 
positivism (some of which are non-normative, others of which are normative) 
and will introduce the terminology that will be employed in subsequent 
sections of the chapter—terminology that will help us navigate through 
Griffith’s normative positivism. The primary aim of this section is to achieve 
terminological and conceptual clarity so that the arguments in subsequent 
sections of the chapter, and indeed the remainder of the thesis, will be 
clearer.  
 
Section 2.3 will address the debate as to whether the normative varieties of 
legal positivism discussed in Section 2.2 should even be called legal 
positivism. This is an important question in contemporary debates within 
the positivist tradition, and it is a question that is highly relevant to our 
discussion—we need to know whether or not what I am calling Griffith’s 
‘normative positivism’ should even be considered a strand of legal positivism, 
and this is a question about which leading voices within the positivist 
tradition disagree. Relying on the authority of those voices within the 
positivist tradition who answer this question in the affirmative, this section 
will argue that the normative strands of legal positivism are entitled to the 
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positivist mantle and will address related questions along the way—
questions such as whether or not the descriptive and normative varieties of 
positivism can logically coexist, whether there is any value in purely 
analytical jurisprudence, and whether or not purely conceptual analysis of 
the sort that conceptual positivists claim to be engaged in is even possible 
without taking a normative position. These related questions are ones that I 
will touch upon to the extent that they are relevant to my discussion.  
 
Section 2.4 will address the positivist commitments of Jeremy Bentham, his 
disciple John Austin, and HLA Hart. There are at least two reasons why it is 
important for this chapter to discuss in some detail Bentham’s and Austin’s 
positivism and at least one reason for discussing Hart’s. First, a discussion of 
the positivism of Bentham and Austin helps in challenging the view, 
common in analytic jurisprudence, that Hart’s legal positivism rendered pre-
Hart versions of positivism ‘obsolete or irrelevant.’1 Secondly, and related to 
the first reason, the type of legal positivism that I attribute to Griffith in this 
chapter has more in common with Bentham’s and Austin’s normative 
positivism than with Hart’s. And finally, it is worthwhile exploring Hart’s 
positivism for the purposes of this chapter because Hart’s commitment to the 
normative dimension of legal positivism is, probably more so than in the case 
of any other stalwart of the positivist tradition, most difficult to pin down. It 
is difficult because, while some of his arguments point in the direction of 
embracing normative positivism, others point the other way. Exploring the 
                                            
1 See Frederick Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ in Michael Freeman and Patricia Mindus 
(eds), The Legacy of John Austin’s Jurisprudence (Springer 2013) 271 (‘H. L. A. Hart 
did not invent legal positivism. Nor did his hugely influential version of legal positivism 
render all earlier versions obsolete or irrelevant. And although the first of these statements 
is hardly controversial, the second is likely to be perceived in the precincts of modern 
English language analytic jurisprudence as somewhere between debatable and simply 
wrong.’ (citations omitted)). 
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question of whether or not Hart was a normative positivist, then, helps us 
appreciate that the sort of interpretive endeavour upon which this chapter is 
embarking can at times be difficult because the arguments of the theorist 
whose views are being interpreted can point in different directions, and the 
best that the reader can sometimes do is to make inferences about what the 
theorist probably meant.2 
 
Section 2.5 is where the chapter will finally turn to discussing Griffith’s legal 
positivism as expressed in his Chorley Lecture. Using evidence from his 
lecture, this section will discuss the normative dimension of Griffith’s legal 
positivism. 
 
Finally, Section 2.6 will try to read between the lines of a paragraph from 
Griffith’s lecture—a paragraph that is perhaps one of the most famous 
descriptions of the UK constitution in British public law scholarship: 
The constitution of the United Kingdom lives on, changing from 
day to day for the constitution is no more and no less than what 
happens. Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing 
happened that would be constitutional also.3 
 
In reading between these lines, I will argue in this section that when we 
read this paragraph in the light of the philosophical commitments that 
Griffith expressed in his lecture—a commitment to normative positivism, a 
commitment to democracy, and a commitment to moral anti-realism—we 
better understand why Griffith defined the UK constitution in this way.  
                                            
2 See James Allan, ‘Positively Fabulous: Why It Is Good To Be a Legal Positivist’ (1997) 10 
Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 231 (exploring whether or not Hart was 
a normative positivist and discussing the need to make inferences about Hart’s preferences 
in those instances in which Hart’s arguments are unclear).  




2.2  THE STRANDS OF LEGAL POSITIVISM—ACQUIRING THE VOCABULARY 
 
The purpose of this section is to discuss the various strands of legal 
positivism in order to acquire the vocabulary that will serve us in 
subsequent sections of the chapter as we attempt to navigate through 
Griffith’s legal positivism. 
 
It is arguably impossible to offer a ‘unified account’4 of legal positivism. If 
our goal, nevertheless, is to present one thesis that, at ‘a fairly high level of 
abstraction’, 5  is almost universally agreed upon by adherents of legal 
positivism, then we may say with some confidence that most, if not all, legal 
positivists subscribe to the so-called separability thesis.6 This thesis, stated 
by one of legal positivisms most distinguished proponents, is the thesis that 
‘it is in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy certain 
                                            
4 Giorgio Pino, ‘Positivism, Legal Validity, and the Separation of Law and Morals’ (2014) 27 
Ratio Juris 190, 192-193 (‘a putative unified account of “legal positivism” would be 
patently false. Legal positivism is not (at any rate, is not now) anything resembling a 
school.’). 
5 ibid (arguing that positivism represents ‘an array of theses, of theoretical questions 
perceived of as important, and of theoretical concepts and methods of inquiry agreed upon 
by positivists only at a fairly high level of abstraction.’). 
6 See Andrei Marmor, Positive Law and Objective Values (Oxford University Press 2001) 
71 (‘There are many versions of legal positivism but all of them subscribe to the so-called 
separation thesis.’) (emphasis added). I say ‘most, if not all’ because of Jules Coleman’s 
following observation:  ‘[I]n the eyes of many, there is little more than [the] warm embrace 
of the separability thesis that unifies legal positivists with one another. One problem with 
this view is that neither Joseph Raz nor I accept the separability thesis, and it may be our 
shared rejection of it that is all that unites us.’ Jules L Coleman, ‘Beyond the Separability 
Thesis:  Moral Semantics and the Methodology of Jurisprudence’ (2007) 27 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 581, 582n2. 
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demands of morality, though in fact they have often done so.’ 7  That 
distinguished proponent, Hart, of course ‘did not invent legal positivism’,8 
and before Hart, Bentham and his disciple Austin articulated this thesis in 
similar terms.9 Stated differently, the separability thesis, which, barring 
some exceptions,10 unites legal positivists, is the thesis that ‘it is essential to 
a legal system that what the law is can be established without considering 
what the law morally ought to be.’11 
 
Beyond the separability thesis, there are numerous conceptual distinctions 
among the different versions of legal positivism, and as we work through 
these differences, readers will find it useful to refer to the following 
diagram:12 
                                            
7 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Penelope A. Bulloch, Leslie Green & Joseph Raz eds, 3rd 
edn, Oxford University Press 2012)185-186. 
8 Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ (n 1) 271. 
9 One of the best-known formulations of the separability thesis is Austin’s in John Austin, 
The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (Wilfred E. Rumble ed, Cambridge 
University Press 1995—first published 1832) 157 (‘The existence of law is one thing, its 
merit and demerit another. Whether it be or be not is one enquiry; whether it be or be not 
conformable to an assumed standard, is a different enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is 
a law, though we happen to dislike it, or though it vary from the text, by which we regulate 
approbation and disapprobation.’). 
10 See Coleman, ‘Beyond the Separability Thesis’ (n 6) 582n2. 
11  David Dyzenhaus, Sophia Reibetanz Moreau & Arthur Ripstein (eds), Law and 
Morality:  Readings in Legal Philosophy (3rd edn, University of Toronto Press 2007) 5 
(arguing that ‘[w]hatever their other differences, positivists share [this] view’.). 
12 The diagram is mine and was created employing the terminology in Schauer, ‘Positivism 




Schauer identifies three varieties of legal positivism:  (i) conceptual 
positivism; (ii) normative positivism; and (iii) decisional positivism.13 The 
first of these three is a purely conceptual, non-normative thesis, the second 
is normative, while the third has both descriptive and normative 
dimensions.  
 
Before turning to the different varieties of positivism below, I want to make 
a couple of points about terminology for the sake of clarification at the 
outset. First, there are some scholars who use the label ‘normative 
positivism’ to refer to a thesis that is very different from what I am calling 
normative positivism. These scholars define normative positivism as a thesis 
that defines law as a system of norms, which is a descriptive, non-normative 
thesis. 14  The normative positivism I have in mind, as I stated in the 
introductory chapter, is, on the other hand, a normative thesis. As Jeremy 
                                            
13 ibid. 
14 E.g. Deryck Beyleveld and Roger Brownsword, ‘Normative Positivism: The Mirage of the 
Middle-Way’ (1989) 9 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 463. 
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Waldron says about this terminological point, ‘the reader is hereby put on 
notice’.15  
 
A second point of clarification I wish to make is that, as the reader will have 
noticed from the diagram above, the word ‘normative’ appears in the 
diagram twice—(i) normative positivism and (ii) normative decisional 
positivism. Schauer uses these two terms to distinguish between two strands 
of legal positivism that are both normative in character but are both 
conceptually distinct. The first is concerned with how we understand a legal 
system while the second is concerned with how judges and other decision-
makers apply the law.16 The first, in other words, ‘is a program of legal 
understanding and not institutional design’17—it is not ‘about adjudication, 
nor about how non-adjudicative legal decisions should be made, nor about 
how legal institutions should be designed in order to produce better 
decisions.’18 The second (normative decisional positivism that is), on the 
other hand, is about adjudication and about ‘the design of legal institutions 
and legal decision-making procedures.’19  
 
I will say much more about the differences between these two positivisms 
below, but the preliminary point of clarification I make at this stage is that 
when I use the term ‘normative positivism’ in this chapter (and indeed in 
                                            
15 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Normative (or Ethical) Positivism’ in Jules Coleman (ed), Hart’s 
Postscript:  Essays on the Postscript to ‘The Concept of Law’ (Oxford University Press 
2001) 412. 
16 Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ (n 1) 278. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid (citations omitted).  
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this thesis), I am using the term to refer to both of these varieties. In other 
words, for me, Griffith was a normative positivist in both the senses just 
mentioned, and where it is necessary to stress the conceptual distinction 
between these two types of normative positivism, I will either do so expressly 
or it will be clear from the context. 
 
2.2A Conceptual Positivism 
Conceptual positivism is ‘very much the modern understanding’20 of legal 
positivism that ‘focuses on a series of conceptual claims about the 
relationship between law and morality.’21 Conceptual positivism comes in 
two varieties: (a) inclusive legal positivism22 (also known as soft positivism23 
or incorporationism24) and (b) exclusive legal positivism.25  
 
                                            
20 ibid 275-276. 
21  ibid (abstracting away ‘interesting variations and disagreements’ within conceptual 
positivism). 
22 Wilfrid J Waluchow, Inclusive Legal Positivism (Clarendon Press 1994); Kenneth 
Einar Himma, ‘Inclusive Legal Positivism’ in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford University Press 2004). 
For discussion, see Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ (n 1) 276. 
23 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 7) 250-254. For discussion, see Schauer, ‘Positivism Before 
Hart’ (n 1) 276. 
24 Jules Coleman, ‘Incorporationism, Conventionality, and the Practical Difference Thesis’ 
in Jules Coleman (ed), Hart’s Postscript:  Essays on the Postscript to ‘The Concept of 
Law’ (Oxford University Press 2001). For discussion, see Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ 
(n 1) 276. 
25 Andrei Marmor, ‘Exclusive Legal Positivism’ in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and Philosophy (Oxford University Press 
2004); Joseph Raz, ‘Authority, Law and Morality’ (1985) 68 The Monist 295. For 
discussion, see Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ (n 1) 276. 
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The first variety of conceptual positivism, that is inclusive legal positivism, 
in ‘its purest and most capacious form’26 is the thesis that ‘morality is not a 
necessary condition of legality in all possible legal systems in all possible 
worlds.’ 27  This inclusive version of conceptual positivism holds that 
‘morality, while often and sometimes even desirably part of law and part of 
the rule of recognition in this or that legal system, is not a component of the 
concept of law.’ 28  And inclusive legal positivism’s ‘most significant 
opponent’29 is another conceptual thesis, namely exclusive legal positivism. 
Waldron's definition of these two versions of conceptual positivism is helpful 
for understanding the key difference between the two;  as Waldron puts it, 
exclusive legal positivism is the thesis that ‘law necessarily does not 
implicate morality’30 whereas inclusive legal positivism is the thesis that 
‘law does not necessarily implicate morality.’31 Notice how the subtle change 
in the order of words in the italicized text creates a meaning that is 
substantially different. 
 
There are a couple of ways in which conceptual positivism (both exclusive 
and inclusive) is very different from other versions of legal positivism, and, 
accordingly, before turning to those other versions of positivism, it would be 
useful to highlight what those two key distinguishing features are. 
                                            




30 Waldron ‘Normative (or Ethical) Positivism (n 15) 414 (emphasis added). 
31 ibid (emphasis added). 
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Firstly, unlike normative and decisional positivism (discussed below), 
conceptual positivism is normally supported and presented as a wholly 
descriptive thesis.32 For the conceptual positivist, legal positivism is ‘an 
attribute of a concept’,33 and ‘it is in the nature of the concept of law that 
morality is either no part of it [,which is the exclusive legal positivist thesis] 
or is not necessarily a part of it [,which is the inclusive legal positivist 
thesis].’34 
 
Secondly, for the conceptual positivist, any good consequences that might 
flow from the conceptual separation of law and morality (above and beyond 
the benefit of descriptive accuracy) would only be seen as ‘fortunate side-
effect[s]’35 of that conceptual separation. For the conceptual positivist, the 
conceptual distinction between law and morality would remain, regardless of 
whether that conceptual distinction produced any positive side-effects over 
and above descriptive accuracy, and that distinction would also remain ‘even 
if that were a sad fact about the world, and even if it led to injustice.’36 As 
Schauer explains using an analogy, ‘just as the pernicious effects of typhoid 
would not lead the rational observer to deny its existence, so too would any 
putative deleterious effects of the conceptual separation of law and morality 
be irrelevant to the question of its existence.’37  
                                            
32 Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ (n 1) 276. 
33 ibid. 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid 277. 
36 ibid. 




With those two key distinctions between conceptual positivism and the other 
two varieties of legal positivism established, our discussion now turns to 
what those other two varieties of legal positivism, namely normative 
positivism and decisional positivism, are. 
 
2.2B Normative Positivism 
According to one of normative positivism’s most distinguished proponents, 
normative positivism is the thesis that ‘the law ought to be such that legal 
decisions can be made without the exercise of moral judgment’38 or, to put it 
differently, normative positivism is the thesis that ‘it would be a good thing 
for the law to be as the [conceptual] positivist thinks it is.’ 39  That 
distinguished proponent, Waldron, further observes about this version of 
legal positivism:  
Normative positivism is itself a moral claim:  indeed it is a moral 
claim about the making of moral claims in the particular area of social 
life we call law. It identifies the contamination of legal decision by 
moral judgment as a moral disadvantage; it says that we lose 
something of value thereby.40 
 
Waldron considers normative positivism to be ‘by far the most interesting 
form of legal positivism’ and argues that ‘it is hard to imagine how a 
positivist definition of the concept of law could be sustained, without 
eventually having to resort to some such normative thesis’.41 
 
                                            





According to Schauer, normative positivists view the concept of law like they 
do other concepts—‘as social artefacts, subject to the creation and re-creation 
by the society within which they exist’, 42  and they believe ‘that the 
conceptual separation of law and morality is largely a function of choosing a 
concept of law that has [the] feature [of being conceptually distinct from 
morality].’ 43  Normative positivism promotes choosing the conceptual 
separation of law and morality for the good consequences that would flow 
from such a choice. These good consequences include, to take a couple of 
examples, Hart’s insistence that maintaining the conceptual separation 
between law and morality would allow citizens to better appreciate the 
moral issues at stake when faced with the decision to follow or disobey 
iniquitous law,44 and Bentham’s insistence that such conceptual separation 
would make it easier to reform the law.45  
 
To recap this definition, normative positivism is the view that ‘positivism is 
chosen by a society rather than just emerging’,46 and adherents of normative 
positivism ‘offer reasons why it is better for some purpose other than 
descriptive accuracy’47 for legal positivism to be chosen over other concepts of 
law. In other words, the normative positivist attaches to the conceptual 
                                            
42 Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ (n 1) 277. 
43 ibid 
44 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 7) 210. On whether Hart may be read as being whole-
heartedly committed to normative positivism, see Section 2.4 below. 
45 See Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ (n 1) 283; see also Gerald J Postema, Bentham 
and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford University Press 1986) Ch 9 (discussing 
Bentham's ‘utilitarian positivism’.). 




separation of law and morality good consequences over and above descriptive 
accuracy, and it is the pursuit of these morally beneficial consequences that 
leads the normative positivist to urge that law and morality be kept 
separate. 
 
2.2C Decisional Positivism 
Finally, decisional positivism is a version of legal positivism that has both 
normative and descriptive dimensions. As I made clear in the introduction to 
this section,48 the normative dimension of decisional positivism is different 
from the normative positivism discussed in the previous subsection (Section 
2.2B) in that the normative positivism discussed in the previous subsection 
is about how we understand the concept of law whereas decisional positivism 
(the subject of this subsection) is a thesis that, in its normative dimension 
encourages a particular design of the institutions and decision-making 
procedures of law, and that in its descriptive dimension is a thesis about how 
these institutions and procedures actually operate. 
 
Decisional positivism in its normative dimension—i.e. normative decisional 
positivism— 
seeks to create institutions relying on relatively precise rules, 
minimizing adjudicative discretion, limiting the law-making power of 
judges and other law-application officials, restricting legal decision-
makers to a limited set of easily identifiable sources, and in general 
fostering predictability and limiting judicial authority.49 
 
Descriptive decisional positivism, by contrast, is a descriptive thesis that— 
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characterizes a legal system as positivist insofar as it relies on, for 
example, statutes rather than common law, insofar as those statutes 
are precise rather than vague, insofar as a formalist approach dictates 
questions of statutory interpretation, insofar as it limits judicial 
discretion, and insofar as its domain of acceptable legal sources is a 
relatively small portion of the array of acceptable social sources.50 
 
Decisional positivism, thus, makes both normative and descriptive claims. 
Normative decisional positivism is the claim that ‘legal systems should be 
designed to minimize discretion of judges, police officers, and other legal 
officials’.51 Descriptive decisional positivism, on the other hand, is ‘the metric 
along which actual legal systems might be characterized.’52 Schauer gives 
the example of ‘the extreme of the civil law ideal type (or, perhaps better, 
stereotype, or maybe even caricature)’53 as a legal system that ‘might lie at 
the pole of extreme decisional positivism’,54 and, by contrast, ‘a legal system 
pervaded by common law methods, instrumentalism, and anti-formalism, 
arguably instantiated in the contemporary United States’55 as a system that 
‘might lie at the opposite pole of minimal decisional positivism.’56 Thus, in its 
descriptive dimension, decisional positivism is ‘the scalar or non-binary 
measure of just how heavily legal decisions are constrained by the texts of 
formal legal sources and just how much of the array of those sources is a 
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limited subset of the full array of social sources, a subject identifiable by 
pedigree and not by content.’57 
 
We might ask why normative decisional positivists such as Bentham, 
Hobbes, and Hume argued that the discretion of judges and other officials 
entrusted with the application of law ought to be minimized. Waldron notes 
that the reason is to avoid arbitrary government: 
[For the normative decisional positivist,] putative cases of moral 
decision-making in law…are unsatisfactory aspects of the law to be 
condemned and minimized. The legal system should be reformed so 
that moral decision-making, by judges or officials, is eliminated as far 
as possible. 
Why? The reason in Hobbes’s, Hume’s, and Bentham’s 
jurisprudence had to do with the desirability of certainty, security of 
expectation, and knowledge of what legally empowered officials were 
likely to require. If the decisions of an official turned on the exercise of 
his moral judgment, there would be no telling what he might come up 
with. From the point of view of the citizen trying to organize his life, 
the official’s decisions would be arbitrary.58 
 
Arbitrariness of the sort that concerns normative decisional positivists can 
take a number of forms; Waldron identifies three, saying that in ‘modern 
jurisprudence, the word “arbitrary” has at least three connotations, all of 
them bad’:59 
(1) Sometimes it means ‘unpredictable’, and that…was the charge that 
particularly worried Jeremy Bentham and other thinkers in the 
mainstream of British positivism. (2) Sometimes it means 
‘unreasoned’, as when a decision is made on the basis of whim or 
reflex prejudice rather on the basis of argument. Now, these are not 
the same. A judicial decision can be unreasoned without being 
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unpredictable:  we may know in advance, for example, that a judge is 
a ‘knee-jerk’ conservative on some range of issues and be able to 
predict his response accordingly. On the other hand, a legal decision 
can be unpredictable without being unreasoned. We may know that 
the judge is going to reason morally (by his own lights) but not know 
what his moral framework will be. Or even if we do know that he is, 
say, a utilitarian, we may be unable to predict his decision because we 
do not know enough about his reasoning powers or about the 
information available to him. (3) A third sense of ‘arbitrariness’ is 
particularly important with regard to American constitutional law. 
Some feel that even if judges are making moral decisions as 
reasonably and as predictably as they can, still their decisions lack 
political legitimacy. It is for the people or the legislators they have 
elected to make that sort of decision; it is not for the judges to take the 
determination of social principle and social value into their own 
hands. In this democratic sense, ‘arbitrary’ means something like 
‘without authority or legitimacy’.60 
 
It is for these reasons that normative decisional positivists ‘oppose and seek 
to minimize the amount of moral decision-making exercised by judges and 
other (unelected) officials in the legal system.’61  
 
The normative considerations running through the normative decisional 
positivism of Hobbes, Hume, and Bentham, then, were their interest in 
minimizing discretion of those entrusted with the application of law in order 
to prevent the citizen from being subjected to arbitrary government. The 
normative positivism of all three of these philosophers is documented at 
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length by Gerald Postema,62 while a leading modern defence of normative 
decisional positivism is found in the work of Tom Campbell.63  
 
 
2.3  ARE NORMATIVE AND DECISIONAL POSITIVISM REALLY ‘LEGAL 
POSITIVISM’? (AND CAN NORMATIVE POSITIVISM LOGICALLY COEXIST 
WITH CONCEPTUAL POSITIVISM?) 
 
Of the varieties of legal positivism discussed in the preceding section, it is 
conceptual positivism that is often argued to be the only version of legal 
positivism that is legal positivism properly understood.64 So, for example, 
Jules Coleman, a prominent voice in the positivist tradition, argues that 
‘[l]egal positivism makes a conceptual or analytic claim about law, and that 
claim should not be confused with programmatic or normative interests 
certain positivists, especially Bentham, might have had.’65 The denial of the 
label ‘legal positivism’ to normative and decisional positivism does not 
necessarily consist of a denial of the existence of normative and decisional 
positivism as a matter of historical fact, but instead consists of the view that 
normative and decisional positivism are ‘simply contingent or accidental 
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features’66 of the work of such figures as Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin.67 In 
short, for a number of scholars, conceptual positivism is the only version of 
legal positivism that represents the ‘core commitments’68 of legal positivism. 
 
Schauer has recently detailed the reasons why the ‘core commitments’ 
argument is problematic. With the view of assigning conceptual positivism 
the status of the ‘core’ or genuine meaning of legal positivism and denying 
the positivist label to normative or decisional positivism, Schauer takes 
issue. He asks: 
[E]xactly what kind of claim is the claim that conceptual 
positivism...is the “core commitment” of legal positivism? The claim is 
hazy, because there are different notions of what it is for something to 
be at the “core”. The core, after all, is a spatial metaphor often ill-
suited to capture notions of salience, importance, or theoretical 
centrality, which is why it is not self-evident that the core is the most 
important part of an apple or the most scientifically significant part of 
the planet Earth. To say that something is at the core in a non-
physical way is thus to make an instrumental claim in need of further 
clarification. If the claim is historical, and if locating the historical 
core of positivism is largely an inquiry into motivation, or into the 
importance or salience of a particular question for particular people, 
then...it is difficult to deny that decisional or normative positivism 
and not conceptual positivism is the “core” commitment of legal 
positivism, at least as understood by Bentham, Austin, and most 
others of their generation.69 
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It would be one thing to make a historical claim about the core commitments 
of, say, Austin's legal positivism, which was at times motivated by 
descriptivism, but it is an entirely different claim to turn that historical 
claim into a philosophical one; however, those who allege that conceptual 
positivism reflects the core commitments of legal positivism are typically 
presenting an argument that is philosophical, not historical.70 
 
What, then, are some of the arguments in defence of the philosophical claim 
that conceptual positivism is the only genuine version of legal positivism? 
Schauer notes that ‘those subscribing to the view that the core commitment 
of legal positivism is a conceptual claim about [the separability of law and 
morality] make much of the fact that conceptual positivism is a necessary 
condition of both normative and decisional positivism, and is consequently 
logically and philosophically prior to them.’71 As Waldron puts it in reference 
to Coleman’s denial of the positivist label to normative and decisional 
positivism, Coleman’s philosophical objection is that normative positivism 
amounts to ‘put[ting] the cart before the horse.’72 Conceptual positivism, in 
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other words, is argued to be a necessary condition for the other versions of 
positivism noted above, and hence the only version of legal positivism 
deserving of that label. 
 
Against this claim, scholars have responded in one of two ways. One way is 
to argue that the logical prerequisite argument itself is problematic, and the 
other is to accept the logical prerequisite argument and yet still claim that it 
does not follow that we should for that reason deny the positivist label to 
normative or decisional positivism.  
 
Postema takes the former approach. Postema argues that treating 
conceptual positivism as a prerequisite for normative and decisional 
positivism is based on a problematic view about the role of language in 
elucidating social concepts, including the concept of law: 
Analytical Jurisprudence rests on a problematical philosophy of 
language. It mistakenly assumes that the concepts we use can be 
divorced from the language of everyday life in which they function. 
But language shapes thought, and language emerges from shared 
practices and patterns of meaningful human activity... Conceptual 
analysis is not sharply distinct from the enterprise of gaining an 
understanding of the practices and forms of life in which the concepts 
have their life. …Jurisprudential theory, then, even when it appears 
to be engaged in conceptual analysis, is focused on the task of giving 
an account of legal institutions, and the practice and ‘sensibility’ that 
breathe life into them. This accounting can never limit itself to simple 
description. For these practices are not mere and mindless habits, or 
behavioural routines with no intrinsic significance to those who 
execute them. They are intelligible social enterprises with a certain, 
perhaps very complex, meaning or point.73 
 
Postema, in other words, seems to be taking the view, shared by John Finnis 
and Ronald Dworkin among others, that purely analytical jurisprudence (the 
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goal of the purely conceptual positivist) is not really possible without taking 
a normative position.74 
 
Schauer takes the latter approach noted above, which is that although he 
accepts that Postema may be correct, for the sake of argument, he invites 
the reader to assume that Postema is mistaken: 
I assume that the three varieties of positivism sketched above are in a 
logical and linear relationship to each other, with conceptual 
positivism being a prerequisite for both normative and descriptive 
positivism, and normative positivism being also a prerequisite for 
decisional positivism. The question then is whether, as a matter of 
philosophy and not of history, the first should be treated as the core of 
legal positivism and the second and third as mere contingent offshoots 
not entitled to the designation “positivist” at all. If the truth of 
conceptual positivism is a necessary condition for the truth—or 
falsity—of normative positivism, and so too, mutatis mutandis, for 
decisional positivism, then conceptual positivism is the core of 
positivism, with normative and decisional positivism being, at best, 
positivism by derivation, positivism by analogy, or simply perversions 
of positivism.75  
 
Having assumed that conceptual positivism is, in fact, a logical precondition 
of the other forms of positivism discussed above, Schauer still wonders why 
it should be the case that only conceptual positivism deserves the ‘positivism’ 
label, using as an analogy to demonstrate his point the theory of natural 
selection: 
[The argument that denies the positivist mantle to normative and 
decisional positivism] assumes that when one thing is a necessary 
condition for another then the former is the core concept and the 
latter is merely contingent. But why should that be so? Consider the 
theory of natural selection. In order for natural selection to be correct, 
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there must exist a mind-independent physical reality. That form of 
epistemic objectivism, controversial in some circles, is a necessary 
condition for the evolutionary theory of natural selection, but to 
describe the claim of a mind-independent physical reality as the core 
commitment of the theory of natural selection, rather than simply a 
precondition or presupposition of it, misses the point of the entire 
theory. Even though the theory of natural selection, like any other 
scientific theory, is a descriptive one, a descriptive theory—or 
account—has a point, and we lose the point of a descriptive theory if 
we treat it [as] subservient to the sometimes contested facts and 
theories that are preconditions of its plausibility. Conceptual analysis 
may well be logically prior to evaluation…but it is hardly clear that 
what is logically prior is more important or closer to some “core.” For 
that we need further argument.76 
 
For Schauer, it is not clear why we should treat preconditions as more 
important than what those preconditions are preconditions of, and neither is 
it clear why we should regard logical relationships as more important than, 
say, empirical relationships: 
It is true that A being a necessary condition of B does not mean that A 
logically entails B. And thus the fact that conceptual positivism is a 
necessary condition of decisional positivism does not deny that it could 
be a necessary condition of some alternative to decisional positivism 
as well. To say that conceptual positivism is the core commitment of 
positivism because it is a necessary condition of both decisional 
positivism and decisional non-positivism is to make the evaluative 
judgement that identifying the precondition is more important than 
the decision between the two consequences, but that determination is 
hardly logically compelled. 
Moreover, there is no reason to believe that logical relationships 
are necessarily more important than empirical ones. Suppose, for 
example, that judges contingently internalized something we might 
call the legal point of view or legal consciousness. Were that the case, 
then as an empirical matter such judges might be more inclined to 
make decisions entirely on the basis of positive law in a society with a 
positivist concept of law than in one with a natural law concept. This 
relationship would be neither logical nor conceptual, but the 
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contingent empirical connection between the two might explain 
associating the two in a relationship of probabilistic causality.77 
 
It is, in other words, not clear, even if conceptual positivism is a logical 
prerequisite of normative and decisional positivism, why we should for that 
reason treat that precondition as the core of legal positivism, nor is it clear 
why logical relationships are more significant than empirical ones.  
 
A further argument that Schauer addresses is John Gardner’s claim, as 
Schauer reads it, that the core commitments of legal positivism are those 
that are shared by key figures in the positivist tradition, a list that includes 
Hobbes, Bentham, Austin, Kelsen, Hart, Coleman, and Raz. 78  To this 
Schauer responds that ‘it is curious as to why that which is shared by these 
admittedly major figures in the positivist tradition should be considered the 
core commitments of positivism’.79 He goes on to ask that if ‘we can associate 
certain commitments with some but not all of those figures, are those 
commitments less important than the ones that all share?’80 Furthermore, 
he notes that there are some commitments of normative positivism that are, 
in fact, shared by ‘Hobbes, Bentham, Austin, MacCormick, Waldron, 
Postema, and conceivably (at least according to Waldron) Raz, among 
others.’81 The question before us, then is, ‘whether the commitments shared 
                                            
77 ibid 288. 
78  John Gardner, ‘Legal Positivism: 5 1 ! 2 Myths’ (2001) 46 American Journal of 
Jurisprudence 199. For discussion, see Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ (n 1) 288. It is 
unclear to me from reading Gardner whether he is actually making this claim but this is 
how Schauer reads him. 




by some stalwarts of the positivist tradition but not others are the most 
important, and then we cannot avoid deciding why it is we want to know, as 
opposed to identifying by fiat the figures whose shared commitments are the 
most important.’82 Schauer also notes that from among those legal positivists 
whom Gardner identifies, with the exception of Kelsen, and focusing 
exclusively on English language jurisprudence, the only positivist on 
Gardner’s list whose relationship to normative positivism is difficult to 
establish clearly is Hart,83 but that takes us back to the original question 
with which Schauer’s article—a discussion of ‘Positivism Before Hart’—is 
concerned, that is ‘the question whether Hart’s understandings of legal 
positivism should be considered uniquely authoritative as well as 
exclusive.’84 
 
Schauer's argument, in sum, is that ‘even if conceptual positivism is a logical 
prerequisite for normative or decisional positivism, nothing about which lies 
at the core and which is at the fringe flows from that fact.’85 Furthermore, 
‘since the alleged priority of conceptual positivism follows even less 
historically than philosophically, there is no reason, at least on the basis of 
the existing arguments, for treating normative and decisional positivism as 
less entitled to the positivist mantle than conceptual positivism.’ 86 
Normative and decisional positivism both ‘have their roots well planted in 
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the positivist tradition, no more but no less than conceptual positivism’,87 
and there is no ‘reason to suppose that one more than the others lies at some 
supposed core of legal positivism.’88 All three versions of legal positivism are 
‘important for some purposes and less so for others, and little would be lost if 
we were to recognize that we have inherited from the positivist tradition a 
multiplicity of positivist views, each of which have their virtues, and each of 
which have their purposes.’89 
 
Waldron has, similarly, argued that the worries that many conceptual 
positivists have that lead them to make the ‘core commitments’ argument 
are misconceived: 
[I]t is surely worth discussing the general shape or character of a 
positivist jurisprudence, quite apart from the particular content that 
fills that shape. After all, legal positivism is a label associated with a 
very broad cluster of theories. At the level of the ‘positivity’ of law that 
interests legal positivists: some are interested in the separation of law 
and morality at the retail level; some are interested in the textual 
and/or rule-like qualities of law, for reasons that go beyond or stand 
apart from the separability thesis; some are interested in law as a 
distinctive institution and its institutional characteristics; and some 
are interested in the ethical autonomy of various legal-professional 
roles, such as judging. (We will call this ‘Menu A’.) And at the level of 
what they see as the affirmative value or function of law (or legality or 
the rule of law), some normative theorists are interested in peace, 
some are interested in predictability (and other values connected with 
predictability, such as utilitarian prosperity or Hayekian autonomy), 
some are interested in the control of power, some are interested in 
democracy, some are interested in political obligation and/or 
legitimacy, and some are interested in the conditions of social 
coordination. (We will call this ‘Menu B’.)  
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Those who resist the general jurisprudential methodology 
associated with normative positivism may do so because they fear that 
a particular one of these interests from Menu B is being foisted on 
legal positivists—as though they must all have the programmatic 
interests that, say, Bentham or Hobbes had, or not count as real 
positivists at all. But the fear is groundless.90  
 
Why does Waldron think Coleman’s and other positivists’ worry is 
groundless? He says that Campbell and Postema and others ‘who emphasize 
the normative dimension of positivist jurisprudence are not trying to foist 
their particular normative programme onto positivists in general (though no 
doubt they have their own views on the normative issues).’91 For Waldron, 
what normative and decisional positivists are doing, instead is that they are 
‘simply saying that the selection of something from Menu A [see above92] as 
the aspect of positivity to focus on in one’s jurisprudence is not intelligible on 
its own, and cannot credibly be presented as a matter of pure ‘analysis’.’93 
For Campbell and Postema, and Waldron himself, for items from Waldron’s 
‘Menu A’94 to be to be ‘intelligible,’95 they ‘must be motivated.’96 Thus, what 
positivists such as Campbell, Postema, and Waldron are saying, in 
Waldron’s view, is that ‘we do not fully understand a positivist theory of law 
until we can map a choice from Menu A onto a choice from Menu B.’97 
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We are still left with answering the second part of the two-part question that 
serves as the title of this section, which is the question of whether or not 
conceptual positivism can logically coexist with normative positivism. The 
answer to this question is that it depends on what the specific beliefs are of 
the conceptual positivist and the normative positivist about the nature of 
and the creation of concepts, and their beliefs about whether or not concepts 
can be created or identified for purely descriptive reasons.  Thus, as Schauer 
argues, ‘[i]f the conceptual positivist believes that there is a pre-existing 
concept that can be described without having or presupposing normative 
commitments, and if the normative positivist believes that constructing a 
concept of law must be based on normative considerations, then the two are 
incompatible.’98 On the other hand, it is possible to argue that normative and 
conceptual positivism can coexist ‘if one believes that concepts can be created 
for normative reasons without themselves being normative, or if one believes 
that people can have normative reasons for identifying and stressing non-
normative concepts’.99  
 
I close this section with the observation that some works in the scholarly 
literature doubt the value of non-normative, purely conceptual analysis,100 
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and others also doubt that purely conceptual analysis is even possible,101 
arguing that it is not possible for concepts to be described ‘without taking 
any moral or normative freight.’102 Hart, of course, argued that it is possible, 
arguing in the Postscript to The Concept of Law that his account ‘is 
descriptive in that it is morally neutral and has no justificatory aims:  it does 
not seek to justify or commend on moral or other grounds the forms and 
structures which appear’ 103  in his account of law, and Coleman has 
expressed agreement with Hart. 104  Waldron, in an article in which he 
promotes a democratic version of normative positivism, weighs in on this 
issue: 
For the most part, the methodological argument has been about 
whether there can be a purely descriptive jurisprudence uninvested 
with evaluative content. Those who believe that there can be such a 
jurisprudence have not wanted to deny that there can also be a 
normative jurisprudence. Thus, in the Postscript to the second edition 
of The Concept of Law, Hart writes that he is willing to concede that 
evaluative theories like those of Dworkin or Finnis are “of great 
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interest and importance as contributions to an evaluative justificatory 
jurisprudence.” His comments are purely defensive: he just does not 
want a descriptive or a conceptual jurisprudence to be precluded out 
of hand. Hart does say—slightly less defensively—that his sort of 
jurisprudence offers “an important preliminary” to any useful moral 
criticism of law,” just as Jules Coleman wants to insist—first things 
first, as it were—that “jurisprudence does not begin by trying to 
determine which features of law are important or interesting.” Even 
though it may go on to be evaluative (and democratic and whatever 
you like), it has to begin by giving a plausible non-evaluative account 
of what law essentially is.105 
 
Waldron is willing to concede that Hart’s and Coleman’s opinion on this 
matter may be ‘made to look plausible in the case of…[a] sort of ultra-
abstract general jurisprudence’, 106  but argues that in the case of 
jurisprudence of the sort envisaged by a normative positivist philosophy, and 
of the sort that is the subject of both Waldron’s article and my thesis, is 
‘bound to be a value-laden jurisprudence.’107 For the purposes of the present 
discussion, then, what we may say about this debate is that even if purely 
analytical jurisprudence is a possibility, it is in any event not the type of 
jurisprudence that the present discussion is concerned with, being a 
jurisprudence that is both normative and evaluative. Even if purely 
analytical jurisprudence of the sort envisaged by Hart and Coleman is a 
possibility, Griffith’s positivism, in any event, was of the normative variety 
and was very much what Waldron would describe as a ‘value-laden 
jurisprudence.’108 
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2.4  BENTHAM, AUSTIN, AND HART 
 
This section turns to a discussion of the legal positivism of Bentham, Austin 
and Hart. The justification for doing so for the purposes of this chapter was 
made clear in the introduction. To repeat, the justification for considering 
Bentham’s and Austin’s positivist convictions for the purposes of this 
chapter is that their positivist convictions are closer to Griffith’s than to the 
positivist convictions of Hart and other post-Hart legal positivists, who focus 
only or predominantly on the non-normative versions of positivism. 
Furthermore, a discussion of Bentham’s and Austin’s positivism helps in 
challenging the common belief that pre-Hart versions of legal positivism are 
not entirely relevant to modern positivist jurisprudence. And the 
justification for considering Hart’s positivism, other than the fact that his 
positivism represents the dominant view about modern positivism in 
general, is that it is unclear whether or not Hart ought to be described as a 
normative positivist. Asking the question of whether or not Hart was a 
normative positivist, then, helps us appreciate the difficulties associated 
with an interpretive exercise of the sort in which this chapter is engaged, 
such difficulties being the result of the ambiguous nature of the arguments 
of the theorist whose work is being examined. 
 
2.4A  Bentham and Austin 
It is widely recognized that both Bentham and his disciple Austin ‘constantly 
insisted  on the need to distinguish, firmly and with maximum of clarity, law 
as it is from law as it ought to be. This theme haunts their work, and they 
condemned the natural-law thinkers precisely because they had blurred this 
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apparently simply but vital distinction.’109 Thus, to say that Bentham and 
Austin espoused, using the terminology introduced in Section 2.3, the 
variety of positivism known as conceptual positivism ‘should attract little 
disagreement.’110 
 
However, Bentham’s and Austin’s commitment to positivism is not limited to 
the conceptual variety. Both Bentham and Austin’s commitment to the 
separation of law and morality was not simply ‘a function of disinterested 
observation’,111 given that both believed ‘that there was a non-descriptive 
point in separating law from morality, and that point was to facilitate the 
reform of the law.’112 I italicize a portion of the previous sentence because 
that italicized text captures one of the primary beneficial moral 
consequences on the basis of which both Bentham and Austin encouraged 
the separation of law and morality—that such separation would facilitate 
law reform. As James Allan puts it in a recent book:  ‘The claim or 
insistence, that what law is and what it ought to be should be kept separate, 
lies at the heart of the Benthamite project. You need to know what you have 
before you can improve it, reform it and make it better’.113 As Schauer notes: 
Bentham was…a vehement critic of existing law, both in detail and in 
the large. The common law was for him anathema, as was judicial 
legislation and the entirety of the law of evidence, and these examples 
demonstrate the scale of Bentham’s critique. His objections to English 
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law went to large blocks of it—perhaps all of it—and separating what 
law is from what law ought to be, and thus separating law and 
morality, was essential to Bentham’s aim of reforming the substance 
and structure of the English legal system. Moreover,…Bentham’s 
normative agenda was not subsidiary to his conceptual or descriptive 
program. On the contrary, it was his normative agenda that drove the 
importance of distinguishing law as it is from law as it ought to be. In 
terms of motivation—which is of course not the same as logical or 
conceptual priority—there is little doubt that Bentham’s conceptual 
positivism was developed for normative reasons.114  
 
For Bentham, and Austin as well, therefore, the positivist separation of law 
and morality was a matter of choosing a concept of law that would facilitate 
law reform. 
 
We may say based on the above evidence that Bentham and Austin were 
both normative positivists, although matters are less clear than in 
Bentham’s case with regard to Austin’s commitment to normative 
positivism, for Austin also suggested that he had purely descriptive goals.115  
 
What about the normative decisional positivism (that is, the view that the 
discretion of judges and others entrusted with the application of law ought to 
be minimized) of Bentham and Austin? Taking Bentham first, it is clear that 
Bentham believe that the discretion enjoyed by legal decision-makers ought 
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to be minimized, arguing as he did for the codification of the law in order to 
‘preclude judges and other legal decision-makers in individual cases from 
making political, policy, economic, or moral judgments.’116 In Bentham’s 
vision of the law, the discretion enjoyed by judges was to be minimized to 
such an extent that, ‘if it had to exist at all, [judicial decision-making had to 
be limited] to the application of linguistically clear codes to particular 
events, with legal outcomes to be reached almost entirely by applying the 
ordinary meaning of the terms in the legal codes to the facts of particular 
cases.’117 Allowing judges and other decision-makers to determine moral 
questions ‘was simply not part of the process’118 for Bentham, and these 
views are a clear indication of Bentham’s normative decisional positivist 
views. 
 
Was Austin a normative decisional positivist as well? Austin was not 
opposed to the same degree as Bentham to decision-making by judges, and 
Austin’s views on the matter evolved over the course of his career: 
In the Province of Jurisprudence Determined, [Austin] says very little 
about judging or judge-made law, but does describe it as “highly 
beneficial and even absolutely necessary,” even while criticizing 
judges for legislating in a “timid, narrow, and piecemeal manner” and 
“legislating under cover of vague and indeterminate phrases.” But by 
the time Austin turned his attention more directly to codification, he 
not only wrote extensively in support of legislative codification 
generally, but also described it as “expedient,” especially in light of the 
“evils inherent in judiciary law,” evils he discussed at some length.119 
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Schauer’s analysis of Austin’s work reveals that although Austin held 
somewhat different views form Bentham on the nature of and the 
desirability of common law decision-making and on what form codification 
ought to take, it is nevertheless the case that Austin ought to be classified as 
a normative decisional positivist, holding as Austin did ‘the view that the 
legal system should be structured so that both the subjects of the law and 
the legal decision-makers who apply, interpret, and enforce it need have 
little recourse to morality (or policy, for that matter).’120  
 
Bentham and Austin held views that qualify both of them as conceptual, 
normative, and normative decisional positivists. These views were very 
similar to the positivist views expressed by Griffith in his Chorley Lecture, 
as we shall see in Section 2.5 below, following a discussion of the positivist 
convictions of Hart. 
 
2.4B  Hart 
Out of all the scholars discussed herein, Hart’s commitment to normative 
positivism is arguably the most difficult to prove, for in his key works on 
legal positivism, he made statements that could be read as pointing in both 
directions. That is to say, parts of these key works may be interpreted in a 
way that depicts Hart as being sympathetic to normative positivism and 
other parts may be read in a way that depicts him as not being so. 
 
Among those key works, the most suitable to consult in order to ascertain 
Hart’s commitment to normative positivism are Hart’s 1958 article in the 
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Harvard Law Review that sparked his well-known debate with Lon Fuller121 
and The Concept of Law, described by Coleman as ‘the most important and 
influential book in the legal positivist tradition’—a book whose ‘importance 
is undisputed’ but a book about which ‘there is a good deal less consensus 
regarding its core commitments, both methodological and substantive.’122 
 
To read into Hart’s work a normative positivist position, one can turn to 
Chapter 9 of The Concept of Law, where Hart details the good consequences 
that he thinks would result from choosing a positivist over a natural law 
understanding of law. Towards the close of that chapter, he details what is 
at stake in choosing the wider (positivist) concept of law versus the narrower 
(natural law) understanding of law when he says: 
For what really is at stake is the comparative merit of a wider and a 
narrower concept or way of classifying rules…. If we are to make a 
reasoned choice between these concepts, it must be because one is 
superior to the other in the way in which it will assist our theoretical 
inquiries, or advance and clarify our moral deliberations, or both. 
The wider of these two rival concepts of law includes the narrower. 
If we adopt the wider concept, this will lead us in theoretical inquiries 
to group and consider together as ‘law’ all rules which are valid by the 
formal tests of a system of primary and secondary rules, even though 
some of them offend against a society’s own morality or against what 
we may hold to be an enlightened or true morality. If we adopt the 
narrower concept we shall exclude from ‘law’ such morally offensive 
rules. It seems clear that nothing is to be gained in the theoretical or 
scientific study of law as a social phenomenon by adopting the 
narrower concept.123 
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Hart’s choice of words ‘reasoned choice’ and ‘comparative merit’ in the 
quotation above do suggest a sympathy towards normative positivism—the 
idea that a positivist understanding of law ought to be chosen for 
instrumental reasons.124 What are these instrumental reasons? By adopting 
the wider, positivist understanding of law, he says, ‘we can accommodate 
within it the study of whatever the special features morally iniquitous laws 
have, and the reaction of society to them.’125 That, for Hart, is a good 
consequence of adopting a positivist understanding of law. On the other 
hand, are the consequences of adopting a narrower, natural law 
understanding of law (which says that morally iniquitous law is not really 
‘law’) more beneficial to society than the consequences of adopting the wider 
positivist understanding? Hart does not believe so: 
What then of the practical merits of the narrower concept of law in 
moral deliberations? In what way is it better, when faced with morally 
iniquitous demands, to think ‘this is in no sense law’ rather than ‘This 
is law but too iniquitous to obey or apply’? Would this make men more 
clear-headed or readier to disobey when morality demands it? Would 
it lead to better ways of disposing of the problems such as the Nazi 
regime left behind? No doubt ideas have their influence; but it 
scarcely seems that an effort to train and educate men in the use of a 
narrower concept of legal validity, in which there is no place for valid 
but morally iniquitous laws, is likely to lead to a stiffening of 
resistance to evil, in the face of threats of organized power, or a 
clearer realization of what is morally at stake when obedience is 
demanded. …Wicked men will enact wicked rules which others will 
enforce. What surely is most needed in order to make men clear-
sighted in confronting the official abuse of power, is that they should 
preserve the sense that the certification of something as legally valid 
is not conclusive of the question of obedience, and that, however great 
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the aura of majesty or authority which the official system may have, 
its demands must in the end be submitted to a moral scrutiny.126 
 
Hart continues until the end of the chapter to argue that the beneficial 
consequence of adopting a positivist understanding of law—that consequence 
being that a positivist understanding would encourage resistance to immoral 
or iniquitous law—offers the best reason for citizens of a legal system to 
adopt a positivist understanding of law. And when Hart famously debated 
Lon Fuller in the pages of the Harvard Law Review, there, too, Hart, in 
defending the positivism of Bentham and Austin, talked about the beneficial 
consequences of adopting a positivist conception of law.127 
 
If the above offers the best evidence in support of the claim that Hart was 
sympathetic to normative positivism, other aspects of his legal positivism 
point in the opposite direction. In the Postscript to The Concept of Law, Hart 
stresses that his account ‘is descriptive in that it is morally neutral and has 
no justificatory aims:  it does not seek to justify or commend on moral 
grounds the forms and structures which appear in [his] general account of 
law, though a clear understanding of these is…an important preliminary to 
any useful moral criticism of law.’128 
 
In the light of the above evidence pointing in opposite directions, scholars 
have, understandably, concluded that it is not possible to say with 
confidence whether or not Hart belongs to the normative positivist school of 
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thought, but neither, they say, is it possible to reach with certainty the 
opposite conclusion. Julie Dickson, for example, writes: 
Hart appears to present the issue of whether to classify morally 
iniquitous law as law or not as a choice, and to contend that the choice 
is to be influenced by the intellectual and moral beneficial 
consequences resulting from one way of classifying it over another. 
This view sits awkwardly with the approach taken to characterising 
law elsewhere in [The Concept of Law], where Hart appears to regard 
his task as being to explain the nature of law, and where he seems to 
view law as having a nature, and as having essential properties which 
make it into what it is, and which are capable of being ascertained. If 
this is so, then it is incongruous to speak in terms of choosing to view 
law in one way or another depending on the beneficial consequences of 
so doing.129 
 
Endorsing Dickson’s description of Hart’s contradictory views noted above as 
‘awkward[]’, Schauer argues that ‘[e]ven if the warrant for characterizing 
Hart as a normative positivist is questionable, the justification for claiming 
that his positivism was entirely descriptive is equally so.’130 
 
It is, furthermore, unclear as to what Hart’s views were on normative 
decisional positivism—the view that judicial discretion ought to be 
minimized. Allan argues that Hart does not make clear his views on 
normative decisional positivism except in ‘the most indirect way’,131 and one 
would, accordingly, have to make inferences as to what Hart’s views on the 
subject are. On the one hand, some of Hart’s arguments in The Concept of 
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Law suggest that judicial law-making is inevitable, and perhaps even 
desirable, as when he says in the Postscript to that book: 
That judges should be entrusted with law-making powers to deal with 
disputes which the law fails to regulate may be regarded as a 
necessary price to pay for avoiding the inconvenience of alternative 
methods of regulating them such as reference to the legislature.132 
 
On the other hand, Allan argues that some of Hart’s other works on 
Bentham and some of the arguments that he makes in other works reflect 
views that may be read as being sympathetic to normative decisional 
positivism; Allan, however, accepts that these conclusions are speculative: 
Recalling that Hart welcomes at least the minimum exercise of 
discretion that the penumbra of uncertainty provides, where would it 
be most defensible to put him in the range between one who desires 
relatively little judicial discretion and one who desires relatively great 
judicial discretion? One can infer, in reading essays like ‘American 
Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream’ and some of his essays on Bentham, that Hart would have 
disapproved of pervasive, or relatively great amounts of, judicial 
discretion. …[However,] [h]ow exactly this Hart of mine would have 
advocated limiting that discretion—by not adopting a Bill of Rights 
say, or by shunning civil law drafting techniques, or by proscribing a 
full-blooded purposive approach to statutory interpretation—is far too 
speculative….133  
 
The question whether Hart was a normative positivist or normative 
decisional positivist is one that is difficult to answer, as evidenced from the 
above, and the best one can do is to make inferences about what Hart 
probably meant. Schauer’s observation is perhaps the best way to close this 
section, which is, to repeat, that ‘even if the warrant for characterizing Hart 
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as a normative positivist is questionable, the justification for claiming that 
his positivism was entirely descriptive is equally so.’134 
2.5  GRIFFITH’S NORMATIVE POSITIVISM 
 
We are finally in the position, having acquired the necessary vocabulary and 
having cleared some of the jurisprudential ground that is necessary to cover 
in a discussion of normative positivism, to discuss Griffith’s commitments to 
normative positivism.  
 
Griffith discusses legal positivism in his lecture on a number of occasions. 
Early on in the lecture, he refers to the work of positivists such as M. Duguit 
whose work he found influential. Speaking of Duguit, he writes that Duguit 
‘seemed to me to present the nearest thing to a solid, positivist, 
unmetaphysical, non-natural foundation for analytical jurisprudence.’135 ‘I 
read him avidly’,136 he writes, and recalls that ‘I wrote a long essay about 
him for my tutor Ivor Jennings who never returned it or, for all I know, read 
it.’137 
 
Much of the space in the lecture is devoted to Griffith’s critique of the anti-
positivist accounts of his contemporaries Lord Hailsham, 138  Lord 
Scarman,139 and Ronald Dworkin.140 Dworkin’s Taking Rights Seriously was 
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a recent publication at the time of Griffith’s lecture, and of Dworkin’s claim 
in that book that his theory ‘identifies  a particular conception of community 
morality as decisive of legal issues’,141 Griffith writes that Dworkin attempts 
‘to hide in a mist of words the conflict which is the characteristic of our 
society.’142 Dworkin’s notion of a community morality, according to Griffith, 
is ‘nonsense at the very top of a very high ladder.’143 
 
Griffith’s clearest endorsement of positivism comes much later in the lecture 
when he writes: 
I do not believe that the concept of law is a moral concept. Of 
course I will, as cheerfully and as seriously as the next person, engage 
in discussions about the value of individual laws and pass moral 
judgments about them. But laws are merely statements of a power 
relationship and nothing more. A law remains a political act about 
which it is indeed possible to hold opinions. But it can be called good 
only in the limited sense that a number of people hold that opinion of 
it. If I had to find a name for this position I would call it Mini-
Austinism. … 
I am arguing then for a highly positivist view of the constitution; of 
recognising that Ministers and others in high positions of authority 
are men and women who happen to exercise political power but 
without any such right to that power which could give them a superior 
moral position; that laws made by those in authority derive validity 
from no other fact or principle, and so impose no moral obligation of 
obedience on others; that so-called individual or human rights are no 
more and no less than political claims made by individuals on those in 
authority; that a society is endemically in a state of conflict between 
warring interest groups, having no consensus or unifying principles 
sufficiently precise to be the basis of a theory of legislation.144 
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Griffith describes his position as ‘Mini-Austinism’145 and, like Austin, we see 
Griffith in this paragraph endorsing the separability thesis.146 Griffith’s 
claim that ‘I do not believe that the concept of law is a moral concept’147 is 
the clearest endorsement of conceptual positivism if there ever was. Recall 
from Section 2.2 that conceptual positivism is the claim, as Schauer explains 
it, that legal positivism is ‘an attribute of a concept’,148 and ‘it is in the 
nature of the concept of law that morality is either no part of it or is not 
necessarily a part of it.’149  Griffith too believes that morality is not part of 
the concept of law, and for Griffith, just as for Hart,150 the existence of law 
does not impose on citizens ‘the moral obligation of obedience’, 151  a 
connection between Griffith and Hart that Tom Poole also draws in a recent 
work.152 
 
What Griffith is also doing in the paragraph just quoted is endorsing the 
meta-ethical theory known as moral anti-realism. Anti-realism is the view 
that denies the moral realist claim that ‘there are moral facts which 
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determine the truth or falsity of the judgments people make’.153 Moral anti-
realists, in other words, believe that: 
[T]here are only moral judgments and the people who make them. 
Some of the judgments that are made we like, and some we do not 
like. Some we repudiate and some we cherish. Some we ignore, and 
some we ride out to kill for. But there are no objective matters of fact 
which justify these attitudes or which make any of the judgments 
correct or any of them incorrect.154 
 
Thus, when Griffith writes that ‘[a] law remains a political act about which 
it is indeed possible to hold opinions… [but that] it can be called good only in 
the limited sense that a number of people hold that opinion of it’,155 he is 
endorsing moral anti-realism. I will come back to the relationship between 
Griffith’s moral anti-realism and his other commitments (namely his 
commitments to democracy and normative positivism) later in the 
chapter.156 
 
For present purposes, however, the argument worth stressing is that like 
Bentham and Austin, and among contemporary scholars like Campbell, 
Waldron, and Postema and others, Griffith was not a purely conceptual 
positivist whose positivism was merely ‘a function of disinterested 
observation’.157 Griffith was not merely interested in describing the nature of 
the legal system or in accurately describing attributes of the concept of law 
in a conceptual positivist fashion. No, Griffith, in his Chorley Lecture argues 
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‘for a highly positivist view of the constitution’158—he argues, as a normative 
positivist would, for choosing a concept of law that sees law, the way a 
conceptual positivist describes it, for normative reasons. As Poole has 
observed, ‘the positivist position [Griffith] espouses has an explicit political 
point.’159 Griffith was advocating a program of legal understanding in which 
a positivist conception of law and morality is chosen for instrumental 
reasons. 
 
Griffith was also a normative decisional positivist. Recall from Section 2.2 
that normative decisional positivism is the view that ‘legal systems should 
be designed to minimize the discretion of judges, police officers, and other 
legal officials’.160 Recall also that the reasons normative decisional positivists 
believe that the discretion of judges and other law-applying officials should 
be minimized have to do with an interest in preventing the citizen from 
being subjected to arbitrary government.161 Who knows what the judges 
would come up with, believes the normative decisional positivist, if the 
judges’ decisions were largely based on their own version of morality, and so 
the normative decisional positivist attempts to minimize the discretion 
enjoyed by judges and other officials in the legal system entrusted with the 
function of applying the law in order to minimize the possibility of arbitrary 
government.162 
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Arbitrariness for the normative decisional positivist could take a number of 
forms, and I noted above163 Waldron’s discussion of at least three possible 
ways in which legal decisions may be appear to the normative decisional 
positivist to be arbitrary.164 The sense of ‘arbitrariness’ of legal decisions 
that Griffith was interested in minimizing was the third sense in which 
Waldron describes the concept of arbitrariness: 
Some feel that even if judges are making moral decisions as 
reasonably and as predictably as they can, still their decisions lack 
political legitimacy. It is for the people or the legislators they have 
elected to make that sort of decision; it is not for the judges to take the 
determination of social principle and social value into their own 
hands. In this democratic sense, ‘arbitrary’ means something like 
‘without authority or legitimacy’.165 
 
As I shall demonstrate in the next paragraph with evidence from 
Griffith’s lecture, Griffith was a normative decisional positivist who 
wanted to avoid the arbitrariness that would result if the decisions of 
unelected judges, whose decisions lack political legitimacy, turned on 
their moral judgment.  
 
What evidence do we have that Griffith was a normative decisional 
positivist interested in minimizing the discretion of judges for democratic 
reasons? An argument running through much of Griffith’s lecture was his 
opposition to the adoption, in the United Kingdom, of a bill of rights. 
Griffith believed in minimizing the discretion of judges and opposed 
handing over to judges the power to interpret ‘woolly principles and even 
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woollier exceptions’166 under a bill of rights. In other words, Griffith 
opposed bills of rights because of his interest in avoiding the 
arbitrariness that would result from giving judges strong interpretive 
powers that judges normally enjoy under such legal instruments. This 
opposition to bills of rights, driven by his normative decisional positivism, 
is evident on a number of occasions in his lecture, arguably most clearly 
so in the following quote: 
[W]e should not try to solve our problems by the application of…a Bill 
of Rights. If we incorporate the European Convention into our 
domestic law, [important political] questions…will be left for 
determination by the legal profession as they embark on the happy 
and fruitful exercise of interpreting woolly principles and even 
woollier exceptions. … 
The solution to such problems should not lie with the imprecisions 
of Bills of Rights or the illiberal instincts of judges. … 
If we had a Bill of Rights, …political questions of much day-to-day 
significance would, even more than at present, be left to decision by 
the judiciary.167  
 
Griffith believed that bills of rights hand over strong interpretive powers to 
judges. He believed that it is important for a legal system to minimize the 
discretion of law-applying judicial officials in order to avoid the arbitrariness 
that would result from, in Waldron’s words, ‘the contamination of legal 
decision by [the] moral judgment’168 of unelected judges. Tom Campbell 
describes the version of normative positivism that opposes bills of rights in 
this manner as a form of democratic positivism: 
[Democratic positivism is] a prescriptive version of legal positivism 
according to which rule governance is seen as an essential ingredient 
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of any social and political organisation that effectively promotes the 
human rights values of wellbeing, equality and respect for persons. 
Democratic positivism focuses on the value of rules, their impartial 
administration and their democratic legitimation. Rights feature in 
democratic positivism both in the formulation of what constitutes 
democracy (such as the right to vote and freedom of speech) and in the 
emphasis on having rules that are designed to promote wellbeing in 
ways that respect the equal worth of human beings. 
The prime analytical recommendation in the articulation of 
democratic positivism is that we confront directly the ambiguity of 
such statements as ‘you have a right to life’ which may be taken to be 
either an ‘is’ or an ‘ought’ statement. Statements that this or that 
person has this or that right may be taken as factual assertions, that 
there is in place in a specific community/society/law an effective 
entitlement, or as prescriptive assertions that there ought to be such 
an effective entitlement in place. Ambiguous talk of moral or human 
rights that run the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ together in ways that suggest 
that people in some mysterious way do have rights that they do not in 
practice have, although perhaps they ought to have, is an impediment 
both to clear thinking about rights and to their effective articulation 
and implementation.169 
 
Griffith did not articulate with the same level of detail the theory of 
democratic positivism as does Campbell in the quotation above, but Griffith’s 
opposition to bills of rights for democratic reasons does suggest that Griffith 
may appropriately be described as a democratic positivist—someone who 
promotes the positivist separation of law and morality for democratic 
reasons. 
 
To close this section, it is worth reiterating that Griffith’s legal positivism 
was not of the purely conceptual variety. Unlike a great many adherents of 
contemporary legal positivism, Griffith was not simply interested in 
accurately describing the nature of a legal system or interested in accurately 
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describing the concept of law.170 Far from it, he urged for the adoption of a 
positivist conception of law for normative reasons. Griffith believed that the 
decisions that govern us ought to be taken by democratically accountable 
officials rather than by unelected judges. Thus, he said, ‘Bills of 
Rights…merely pass political decisions out of the hands of politicians and 
into the hands of judges or other persons. To require a supreme court to 
make certain kinds of political decisions does not make those decisions any 
less political. I believe firmly that political decisions should be taken by 
politicians. In a society like ours this means by people who are removable.’171 
He re-articulated his arguments against bills of rights and his belief in the 
need to place our faith in the democratic process in an article published 
shortly after the enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998, an article in 
which he discussed the ‘dangers of entrusting the judiciary with too much 
power at the expense of the democratic process.’172  
 
 
2.6  THE CONSTITUTION IS WHAT HAPPENS:  GRIFFITH’S DEMOCRATIC 
POSITIVISM AND HIS MORAL ANTI-REALISM 
 
Griffith famously defined the UK constitution in his Chorley Lecture in the 
following memorable way: 
The constitution of the United Kingdom lives on, changing from day to 
day for the constitution is no more and no less than what happens. 
Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing happened 
that would be constitutional also.173 
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More than two decades later, Griffith wrote again about the concept of 
unconstitutionality in the context of the UK constitution: 
It is not therefore possible to argue that there is something 
unconstitutional or unhistorical or logically perverse in asserting, as 
does Sir John [Laws], that judges should further invade the province 
of Executive decision-making by the extension of judicial review. What 
can be argued is whether particular invasions are politically unwise or 
undesirable.174 
 
Why did Griffith describe the constitution in this way? Some commentators 
have interpreted Griffith’s description of the UK constitution in ways that, I 
believe, are not entirely fair to Griffith, and in Chapter 3, I will offer a 
defence of Griffith that counters those interpretations of Griffith’s words. 
But before turning to what I believe these words do not mean, I want in this 
section to argue what I think they do mean. 
 
My argument in this section is that when Griffith’s description of the UK 
constitution quoted above and his views on the concept of unconstitutionality 
in the context of the UK constitution are read in the light of Griffith’s other 
philosophical commitments, we better understand why Griffith defined the 
UK constitution in the manner that he did. There is a certain coherence, I 
will argue, in defining the constitution the way Griffith did and in holding 
normative positivist views, holding the views that Griffith did about 
democracy, and subscribing, as Griffith did, to the meta-ethical theory 
known as moral anti-realism.  
 
In order to defend this argument, I will address two questions. Section 2.6A 
will ask why legal positivism is an attractive theory for someone committed 
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to democracy, and Section 2.6B will ask why legal positivism is an attractive 
theory for someone committed to moral anti-realism. 
 
2.6A  Why Griffith the Democrat Found Legal Positivism Attractive 
Why would a democrat—a partisan of democracy if you will—find legal 
positivism attractive? Not every theorist committed to democracy finds legal 
positivism attractive, of course. Ronald Dworkin is a prominent example. In 
a book review of a book by legal positivist Jules Coleman,175  Dworkin 
provided a reappraisal of legal positivism—a reappraisal in which he argued 
that positivism once ‘had a democratic flavor’176 but that that democratic 
flavour no longer remained: 
The political influence of legal positivism has sharply declined in the 
last several decades…, and it is no longer an important force either in 
legal practice or in legal education. Government has become too 
complex to suit positivism's austerity. The thesis that a community's 
law consists only of the explicit commands of legislative bodies seems 
natural and convenient when explicit legislative codes can purport to 
supply all the law that a community needs. When technological 
change and commercial innovation outdistance the supply of positive 
law, however—as they increasingly did in the years following the 
Second World War—judges and other legal officials must turn to more 
general principles of strategy and fairness to adapt and develop law in 
response. It then seems artificial and pointless to deny that these 
principles, too, figure in determining what law requires. Following the 
war, moreover, the idea steadily gained in popularity and in 
constitutional practice that the moral rights people have against 
lawmaking institutions have legal force, so that if the legislature 
condemns a class of citizens to second-class status, its act is not 
simply wrong but also void. Once again, it seemed increasingly 
pointless to declare that these moral constraints on government were 
not themselves part of the community’s law. The political appeal of 
positivism correspondingly drained away. It was associated no longer 
                                            
175 Coleman, The Practice of Principle (n 104). 
176 Ronald Dworkin, ‘Thirty Years on’ (2002) 115 Harvard Law Review 1655. 
 
 69 
with democratic progress, but with conservative majoritarianism; it 
was liberal judges who appealed to morality in justifying greater legal 
protection for individual rights. Most academic lawyers assumed that 
if a general theory about the nature of law was needed at all, it had to 
be more subtle than legal positivism.177 
 
This is not a flattering reappraisal of legal positivism, and for someone 
committed both to legal positivism and democracy, it seems important to 
respond to Dworkin’s claims and to defend legal positivism from a 
democratic perspective. 
 
Just exactly that type of defence is provided in a recent article by Waldron, 
who argues that he has ‘more faith in positivist jurisprudence than Dworkin 
does’.178 Waldron argues that what explains, at least in part, Dworkin’s 
views about positivism quoted above is the fact that Dworkin ‘associates 
democracy with a jurisprudence of rights enforced by the judiciary’.179 
Democracy, of course, is an ‘essentially contested concept’,180  and some 
theorists define that concept to mean much more than just a thin procedural 
idea of majority rule and prefer a substantive conception of democracy that 
includes the protection of substantive rights; as one commentator puts it, 
‘[t]he concept of democracy…is a broad enough church to encompass both 
thin and fat, procedural and substantive, conceptions of democracy.’ 181 
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Dworkin’s preference for the thicker, substantive conception of democracy is 
well known.182  
 
Waldron, however, in his democratic defence of legal positivism, rejects 
Dworkin’s expansive definition of democracy: 
I am not going to take [the Dworkinian line]. I do not want this to be 
just another argument about the affinity between legality and the 
substantive rights that these more expansive theorists associate with 
democracy. I do not just want to say, cheaply, that democracy is 
ultimately about individual rights; and law is too; therefore law is 
intrinsically democratic. I want a more robustly democratic 
jurisprudence than that.183  
 
For Waldron, democracy means something different. Waldron’s conception of 
democracy is closer to the republican ideal rather than the liberal conception 
of democracy,184 and he elaborates upon this republican conception in the 
following way: 
For me, democracy includes the idea that rulers are chosen by the 
people whom they rule, the people determine the basis under which 
they are governed, and the people choose the goals of public policy, the 
principles of their association, and the broad content of their laws. 
The people do all this by acting, voting, and deliberating as equals, 
through elections and through their relations with representatives. 
The reference to the discipline of equality—acting, voting, and 
deliberating as equals—is crucial. People disagree and they need 
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formal procedures to come to decisions from the baseline of those 
disagreements. And when I talk of decisions made among the people, I 
mean to refer to rather formal aspects of those decisions—formal in 
the sense of procedures disciplined at all times by the principle of 
political equality and by an awareness that lapses into informality 
often connote the lazy privileging of some voices over others.185  
 
Griffith, too, like Waldron, was sceptical of the liberal conception of 
democracy, as he made clear both in his critique of Scarman, Hailsham, and 
Dworkin in ‘The Political Constitution’186 and in his critique of Sir John 
Laws.187 
 
To return to our discussion, then, why would a democrat like Waldron or 
Griffith, who holds something akin to a republican conception of democracy, 
find legal positivism attractive? What does a democratic defence of legal 
positivism look like? What do legal positivism and democracy have in 
common in terms of what they value? 
 
Provenance. One answer to the questions just asked is that both democrats 
and legal positivists stress the importance of the sources of law. Positivists, 
as Waldron notes, are preoccupied with the issue of sources; they ‘present 
conceptions of law that are dominated by issues about provenance—where 
law comes from, how and by whom it is made.’188 The preoccupation with 
sources was a feature of the early legal positivism of Hobbes,189 Bentham190 
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and Austin,191  all of whose positivism, unlike modern legal positivism, 
considered law to be the command of a sovereign. The question of source was 
so important for the early positivists that in this early positivist 
jurisprudence, ‘[o]ther questions, posed by an older tradition in 
jurisprudence—What is the content of the command? Is it just? Is it 
reasonable?—are brushed aside in this imperious preoccupation with 
provenance.’192 
 
Modern positivism, of course, rejects the command theory of law—a revision 
to positivist jurisprudence brought about by Hart’s theory of law as ‘the 
union of primary and secondary rules.’193 Notwithstanding that rejection of 
the command theory of law, modern legal positivism remains preoccupied 
with the sources of law. As Waldron notes, ‘Hart and his followers believe 
that rules of recognition identify rules as law mainly by their institutional 
pedigree—i.e., the mode of their enactment or where and how they were first 
laid down.’194  
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What does a democratic positivist—that is, someone committed to legal 
positivism for democratic reasons—have to say about the issue of 
provenance? The answer, in two words, is political legitimacy. The democrat 
cares about a host of questions to do with what the source is of laws that 
govern a democratic society: 
When there is a question about enforcing a given norm, a democrat 
will want to ask hard questions about its origin: where and by whom 
was the decision made that this should be one of the norms enforced 
in this society? If it was controversial, then how was that controversy 
resolved? Who exactly participated in the decision, and on what terms 
and through what processes did they participate? You may say that 
anyone interested in political accountability (not just a democrat) will 
want to press these questions. But a democrat will press them because 
he has very strong views about how decisions like these should be 
made. He believes that in principle everyone who stands to be 
governed by a given norm if it is adopted has the right to participate 
on equal terms in determining whether it should be adopted. He 
believes that every society should set up political institutions that 
embody this principle and should seek to reform or subordinate 
decision-making institutions that operate on any other basis.195 
 
Whereas the Hobbesian positivist’s preoccupation was with there being a 
determinate sovereign, the democratic positivist’s interest is not so much in 
who is the sovereign but rather ‘who gets to be the sovereign’.196 For those 
committed to democracy, the question of who made the law, argues Waldron, 
is ‘indispensable’.197 Partisans of democracy are especially concerned with 
sources ‘because they know that those whose enfranchisement they want to 
secure—“the common people”—are those who have historically been 
excluded from any participation in the processes by which norms for their 
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society are chosen.’198 Thus, ‘[a]n interest in sources…is not just a hobby for 
democrats; it is a matter of principle, in regard to which they think 
experience shows that special vigilance is necessary.’199 Moreover, for the 
democrat, what matters in addition to what the sources of law are is the 
concern that laws ‘come from the right source in the right way.’200 
 
A democrat who is concerned with what the sources are of particular laws 
for reasons just outlined would worry about an anti-positivist notion of law 
that assigns pre-political validity to a norm. A democratic positivist would 
worry about claims that there is a ‘right answer’ in ‘hard cases’201—a notion 
that, as one democratic positivist argues, fails ‘to distinguish invocations of 
morality that are supposed to be legally binding from those that are simply 
cases of judges exercising discretion.’202 If an anti-positivist argues that a 
certain outcome is the right answer in a given case, the democratic positivist 
would want to know why. What is the source of that right answer? Who 
enacted that rule? Was it enacted democratically? How do we know that 
what the anti-positivist is claiming to be law is not simply the feelings of the 
particular judge or legal theorist? These are hard questions to which a 
democratic positivist would demand an answer as part of her allegiance to 
democracy. 
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Democracy and the Separability Thesis. The separability thesis was 
discussed above as a feature of legal positivism that unites nearly all legal 
positivists.203 Here, I consider the attraction of the separability thesis from a 
democratic perspective. 
 
For Waldron, it is not difficult to explain ‘the discomfort of a democratic 
jurisprudence with any content-based criterion which refuses to recognize as 
law what a democratic legislature has enacted on the ground that it conflicts 
with what is taken to be justice.’204 In other words, a partisan of democracy 
should be uncomfortable with the idea that a democratically-enacted norm 
may be denied the label ‘law’ because it violates the subjective sense of 
justice of a judge or legal theorist or other person. Democrats, for Waldron, 
‘are likely to insist as part of our allegiance to democracy that any content-
based prejudices must be pushed aside in order to allow the people to choose 
freely for their law whatever norms they think appropriate.’205 Waldron 
acknowledges that this may be a ‘heretical position’206 for some modern 
philosophers, such as Dworkinians, who would say that their ‘allegiance to 
democracy (their theory of democratic legitimacy) has limits, which are 
defined by the essentials of their favorite theory of justice or theory of 
human rights.’207 From the Dworkinan or other anti-positivist (natural law) 
perspective, ‘democratic decision making can be tolerated only when the 
people do not get it too far wrong, or only when the people's decisions are not 
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too egregiously offensive to the political philosopher's independently 
established sense of justice and rights.’208 
 
A democratic positivist, however, ‘more than most other political theorists, 
[is] sensitive to the realities of moral disagreement.’ 209  Democratic 
positivists— 
expect there to be disagreement about justice in an ordinary polity 
under normal conditions; they believe these disagreements should be 
resolved politically by fair procedures of voting; but they have no 
reason to say that anyone is required to change his opinion about 
justice simply because he was defeated in a fair vote. Accordingly, the 
democrat will accept that any given law may be regarded as unjust—
or as embodying a mistake or misapprehension about justice—by a 
substantial percentage of those to whom it applies. If he believes 
nevertheless that the losers are required to accept the outcome of a 
fair vote (despite their views about justice), he will want to separate 
the proposition that a given norm was adopted in the right way from 
the proposition that it was the right norm to adopt. And this will be 
something like a democratic version of the separability thesis.210 
 
In other words, a democratic positivist expects there to be disagreement 
about notions of justice, and she believes that those disagreements ought to 
be voted upon and decided in a democratic way. Democratic positivists are 
very uncomfortable with the idea that the subjective sense of justice of a 
judge or theorist should trump a decision reached pursuant to a fair and 
democratic procedure. For the democratic positivist, it is important to 
separate ‘the proposition that a given norm was adopted in the right way 
from the proposition that it was the right norm to adopt.’211 
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My argument for the purposes of this section is that when Griffith defines 
the constitution as ‘the constitution is no more and no less than what 
happens’, 212  he is doing so as a democratic positivist for whom the 
democratic provenance of law is indispensable and for whom there are 
democratic reasons for separating law and morality. Griffith was a 
democratic positivist who worried about anti-positivist notions of law that 
were being advanced by his contemporaries213—anti-positivist notions that 
assigned pre-political validity to the liberal principles that, his 
contemporaries argued, underpin what they considered to be the 
‘constitution’. Griffith was uncomfortable with such anti-positivist 
understandings, in part, because it was unclear what the democratic 
provenance was of such liberal ‘constitutional’ rules that his contemporaries 
were defending and partly because he was uncomfortable with the idea that 
a subjective sense of justice of his liberal contemporaries was being advanced 
as ‘constitutional’ rules able to trump the democratic process.  
 
Loughlin has recently provided a reinterpretation of Griffith’s lecture in 
which he reads Griffith in a similar way. Loughlin argues that for Griffith, 
‘law meant hard positive law, most authoritatively enacted in statute’214—a 
claim that Griffith made ‘with the intention of overthrowing metaphysical 
ideas (rule of law, separation of powers), puncturing common law myths, and 
ensuring that law could be placed at the service of scientific progress.’215 
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Loughlin ascribes these views to what he calls the Modernist school of 
thought in UK public law. I believe that Loughlin’s interpretation of Griffith 
may also be defended as a democratic positivist interpretation once we 
consider the reasons that Loughlin argues Griffith and other modernists 
were wary of describing the ‘constitution’ in expansive terms: 
[The modernists’] focus remained fixed on the system of government 
rather than on the constitution. Alert to the tyranny of categories, 
they were circumspect in discussion of ‘the constitution’. For 
modernists, the constitution was merely the assemblage of rules 
organising government, changing as the rules changed; any more 
abstract understanding of the term was felt to be a ploy to protect the 
values of the old regime which a new social order sought to 
overthrow.216 
 
Loughlin is correct to say that Griffith and other modernists rejected the 
abstract notion of ‘the constitution’ for the reasons he states, but I believe 
that, given Griffith’s democratic positivist views, it is also possible to 
attribute Griffith’s reluctance to speak of ‘the constitution’ in the same way 
as his liberal contemporaries because of the discomfort that he felt with anti-
positivist notions of law. As any democratic positivist would be, Griffith 
valued the democratic provenance of law and was, to quote Waldron, very 
‘sensitive to the realities of moral disagreement’, 217  a sensitivity that 
becomes evident in Griffith’s lecture when he writes:  ‘All I can see in the 
community in which I live is a considerable disagreement about the 
controversial issues of the day and this is not surprising as those issues 
would not be controversial if there were agreement.’218 Griffith was aware in 
1978 just as much as constitutional law scholars are aware to this day that, 
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as leading modern textbooks remind us, in ‘the United Kingdom, the term 
‘unconstitutional’ has no defined content’219 and that there ‘seems no obvious 
criterion for deciding what is constitutional and what is not, and no 
authoritative selection of provisions which could be called ‘the 
constitution’.’220 Griffith, the democratic positivist, was very aware of the 
dangers of allowing unelected judges, about whom he said ‘I would trust no 
more than I trust princes’,221 of having the power to declare their own moral 
preferences to be ‘constitutional’ rules that would put those rules beyond 
debate and beyond the democratic process. By arguing that ‘the constitution 
is no more and no less than what happens’,222  Griffith the democratic 
positivist attempted to avoid the dangers to democracy that he believed were 
posed by the anti-positivist notions of the constitution promoted by his 
contemporaries. For Griffith the democratic positivist, the democratic 
provenance of law, as Richard Bellamy puts it in a discussion of normative 
positivists in general, ‘form[ed] an essential feature of its political 
legitimacy.’223  
 
Griffith’s definition of the constitution ‘as no more and no less than what 
happens’224 is also explained, however, by his commitment to the meta-
ethical theory known as moral anti-realism, to which we now turn. In order 
                                            
219  Anthony Bradley, Keith Ewing and Christopher Knight, Constitutional and 
Administrative Law (16th edition, Pearson 2014) 23-24 (emphasis added). 
220 Vernon Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Hart Publishing 2009) 13. 
221 Griffith, ‘The Brave New World of Sir John Laws’ (n 172) 165. 
222 Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (n 3) 19. 
223 Bellamy, ‘Political Constitutionalism and the Human Rights Act’ (n 202) 91. 
224 Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (n 3) 19. 
 80 
to defend this claim, I will explore the question of why legal positivism might 
be an attractive theory for someone committed, as Griffith was, to moral 
anti-realism. 
 
2.6B  Griffith’s Moral Anti-Realism and His Vision of the Constitution 
 
I mentioned in the previous section the difference between moral anti-
realism and moral realism, and noted that Griffith’s arguments in his 
Chorley Lecture may be read as endorsing moral anti-realism.225 In this 
section, I explore the relationship between moral anti-realism and normative 
positivism. My argument in this section will be that Griffith’s definition of 
the UK constitution (quoted above226) is also explained by his moral anti-
realism. 
 
Recall that a moral anti-realist believes that there are no objectively right 
answers, but only what people feel about the wrongness or rightness of 
something. Allan argues that for the democrat and the moral anti-realist, 
normative decisional positivism, the view that the discretion of judges ought 
to be minimized, is an attractive position because in ‘a world where objective 
moral facts simply do not exist, where evaluations of right and wrong are in 
effect personal sentiments…, a judge’s moral views seem unlikely to be any 
better than anyone else’s.’227 So, the moral anti-realist, therefore, is likely to 
wonder: ‘Why should an unelected judge’s moral sentiments or judgment 
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over-ride those of the elected law-makers?’228 For the moral anti-realist, 
then, normative decisional positivism—the thesis that judicial discretion 
ought to be minimized for democratic reasons and in order to avoid arbitrary 
government229—is attractive because for someone who does not believe there 
are any ‘mind-independent’230 realities—for someone who does not believe, in 
other words, that there are objectively right answers—it is unlikely that that 
person would believe that judges have at their disposal objectively ‘right 
answers’ that ought to trump decisions reached by a majority of legislators 
who have been elected by a majority of citizens.231 
 
Another question that Waldron has addressed is whether the moral realist 
has any reason to find normative positivism unattractive. In other words, is 
it also the case that for the moral realist, natural law theory (which suggests 
that there are objective, morally correct answers) is attractive and normative 
positivism unattractive? Waldron does not believe so. Waldron argues that 
even if there may be objectively right answers, we have no way of 
determining what those answers are. As he puts it, even if there are such 
right answers, the answers do not ‘reach out…and grab the 
decisionmaker’.232 Even if we accept as a matter of fact that there are 
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objectively right answers, that fact ‘does not drive the judge to pursue it, let 
alone determine that he will reach it. Different judges will reach different 
results even when they all take themselves to be pursuing the right 
answer’.233  
 
For Waldron, it is not moral subjectivity but moral disagreement ‘that gives 
rise to our worries of judicial moralizing.’234 And ‘since realists have almost 
nothing of interest to say about the resolution of moral disagreement, they 
have nothing to offer to allay those concerns.’235 Waldron’s point is that 
arbitrariness exists under either philosophy (moral realism or moral anti-
realism), and so the reasons that normative positivists find judicial law-
making undesirable—reasons to do with ‘the desirability of certainty, 
security of expectation, and knowledge of what legally empowered officials 
[are] likely to require [of citizens]’236—are also reasons for the moral realist 
to support normative positivism: 
If moral realism is false, then what clash in the court-room and in the 
political forum are people’s differing attitudes and feelings, and there 
will seem to be something arbitrary about any one of them prevailing 
over any of the others, when none can be certified, so to speak, on any 
credentials other than the fact that some people find it congenial. If 
realism is true, then what clash in the courtroom and in the political 
forum are people’s differing beliefs…about moral matters of fact. But 
that these are beliefs about matters of fact does not detract in any way 
from what will still seem to be a certain arbitrariness in one of them 
prevailing over any of the others…[A]ribtrariness is there, on either 
meta-ethical account.237 
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Thus, since arbitrariness remains on either a moral realist or a moral anti-
realist account, there is no reason to believe that the moral realist has more 
reason than the moral anti-realist to reject normative positivism; far from it, 
if arbitrariness is there on either meta-ethical account, then there is reason 
even for the moral realist to subscribe to normative positivism. 
 
Let us return, now, to the question with which we are concerned in this 
subsection, namely the relationship between Griffith’s moral anti-realism 
and his definition of the UK constitution.  
 
I conclude this discussion with the observation that when Griffith was 
arguing that ‘the constitution is no more and no less than what happens’,238 I 
believe he was saying so not just as a democratic positivist (an argument I 
defended above239) but also as a moral anti-realist. His definition of the 
constitution as nothing more and nothing less than ‘what happens’240 ought 
to be read alongside Griffith’s commitment to moral anti-realism, a 
commitment that Griffith expresses in the following quote:  ‘A law remains a 
political act about which it is indeed possible to hold opinions. But it can be 
called good only in the limited sense that a number of people hold that 
opinion of it.’241 Griffith was worried about invocations of morality (that 
reflect no more than the moral feelings of the invoker) being described as 
‘constitutional’ rules when there is no reason, Griffith likely believed, to 
                                            
238 Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (n 3) 19. 
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240 Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (n 3) 19. 
241 ibid.  
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believe that the views of judges who are declaring those rules to be 
constitutional rules are any better in moral terms than the views of the 
average individual. For reasons noted above, I believe that Griffith found 
normative positivism attractive not only because he was a democrat but also 
because he was a moral anti-realist. As Loughlin has observed, for Griffith, 
‘law meant hard positive law, most authoritatively enacted in statute’242—a 
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A RESPONSE TO GRIFFITH’S CRITICS 
 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
I turn, in this chapter, to a defence of Griffith against the criticism of three 
of his critics, namely JWF Allison, Dawn Oliver, and Adam Tomkins. The 
principal argument of this chapter is that the criticism of these critics 
reflects a Dworkinian anti-positivist bias; Griffith’s critics, I will attempt to 
demonstrate, presuppose a Dworkinian anti-positivist understanding of the 
UK constitution as the only possible understanding of it, on the basis of 
which presupposition they launch their critique against Griffith. In other 
words, their criticism of Griffith, I will argue, reflects a Dworkinian anti-
positivist bias and a lack of appreciation of Griffith’s normative positivism. 
 
Among the three critics of Griffith discussed herein, I will spend the most 
amount of time on Tomkins’s critique of Griffith. This is so because both 
Tomkins and Griffith together are often thought to be leading 
representatives of the school of thought known as political constitutionalism, 
yet a key difference between the two scholars’ political constitutionalism—
that difference being that Griffith’s political constitutionalism is a form of 
normative positivism whereas Tomkins’s political constitutionalism is built 
upon an understanding of the UK constitution that is Dworkinian anti-
positivist in character—is rarely brought out in the scholarship. It will, 
therefore, be my aim in this chapter to draw attention to this key difference 
between the political constitutionalism of Tomkins and Griffith. This 
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argument, as I will make clear towards the end of the chapter, will have 
both a descriptive and an evaluative dimension. 
 
 
3.2  DWORKINIAN ANTI-POSITIVISM AND ITS CRITICISM 
 
Let us begin with a discussion of Dworkinian anti-positivism and some of its 
criticisms. A discussion of Dworkinian anti-positivism is necessary before we 
can turn to defending Griffith against the Dworkinian anti-positivist biases 
of his three critics.   
 
3.2A Dworkinian Anti-Positivism 
In Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin argued that legal positivism ‘provides a 
theory of hard cases’ 1  and argued that positivists misunderstand what 
judges do in such cases. Hard cases, according to Dworkin, are those cases in 
which ‘a particular lawsuit cannot be brought under a clear rule of law, laid 
down by some institution in advance’.2 In such instances, Hart argued that 
judges use their discretion to make new law, but for Dworkin, this was a 
defect in positivist theory because of its neglect of the role that principles 
play in hard cases. 
 
Dworkin argued that when the existing law does not provide clear 
instructions to judges on how to decide a case, ‘one party may nevertheless 
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have a right to win.’3 Even in hard cases, he argued, the judge has a duty to 
discover what the pre-existing rights are of the parties rather than to engage 
in retrospective law-making. Dworkin considered this to be a defect of Hart’s 
theory insofar as it allowed for retrospective law-making, which Dworkin 
criticized on democratic grounds.4 Dworkin believed that in hard cases, 
judges unearth the moral principles that underpin the legal system—
principles that exist underneath the hard positive law and principles that 
provide judges with a ‘right answer’5 in hard cases. As Jeremy Waldron 
memorably put it in his tribute prepared for Dworkin’s memorial service in 
London in 2013: 
He had the effrontery to suggest that there were right answers to 
the legal problems posed in hard cases and that it mattered whether 
we got the answers right or wrong. This was a view which many 
disparaged, but it was a view that respected the position of plaintiffs 
and petitioners as people coming into law to seek vindication of their 
rights, not just as lobbyists for a quasi-legislative solution. It was a 
position, too, that respected the obligation of judges never to give up 
on the sense that the existing law demanded something of them, even 
in the most difficult disputes. … 
Dworkin helped us chart the topography of law; for the corpus juris 
is not just a heap of norms; beneath the explicit rules there are 
principles and policies that a legal system has committed itself to 
implicitly, over the years; deep subterranean channels of moral 
concern that flow through every part of the law.6 
 
                                            
3 ibid. 
4 ibid 84-85, cited in HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Penelope A. Bulloch, Leslie Green & 
Joseph Raz eds, 3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 275, where Hart discusses and 
responds to this critique.  
5 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 1) 279. 
6 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Ronald Dworkin: An Appreciation’ (June 7, 2013). NYU School of Law, 
Public Law Research Paper No. 13-39. Available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2276009> 
2-3 (final emphasis added). 
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These principles, for Dworkin, consist of rights rather than policies.7 In 
Chapter 4 of Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin draws a distinction between 
legal arguments concerned with policy versus legal arguments concerned 
with rights. The former, argues Dworkin, ‘justify a political decision by 
showing that the decision advances or protects some collective goal of the 
community as a whole.’8 By contrast, ‘[a]rguments of principle justify a 
political decision by showing that the decision respects or secures some 
individual or group right.’9 
 
For Dworkin, there was a weakness in legal positivism to the extent that it 
did not account, in its notions of legal validity, for how principles acquire 
their validity. Principles, argued Dworkin, cannot be traced back to Hart’s 
‘rule of recognition’. 10  The origin of principles ‘lies not in a particular 
decision of some legislature or court, but in a sense of appropriateness 
developed in the profession and the public over time.’11 The continued power 
of principles, he argued, ‘depends upon this sense of appropriateness being 
sustained.’12  For Dworkin, it is not possible to talk of principles to be 
overruled or repealed because when their significance in the legal system 
declines, they ‘are eroded, not torpedoed.’13 Dworkin acknowledged that ‘if 
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9 ibid.  
10 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 4) 100. 





we were challenged to back up our claim that some principle is a principle of 
law, we would mention any prior cases in which that principle was cited, or 
figured in the argument’ and we would mention ‘any statute that seemed to 
exemplify that principle’.14 However, ‘we could not devise any formula for 
testing how much and what kind of institutional support is necessary to 
make a principle a legal principle, still less to fix its weight at a particular 
order of magnitude.’15 
 
Dworkin’s argument of how judges decide hard cases was further developed 
in Law’s Empire.16 In this book, Dworkin built his theory of law as a theory 
of adjudication, i.e. as a theory of how judges decide hard cases. Using the 
metaphor of a ‘chain novel’, he likened legal interpretation to literary 
interpretation, arguing that in order to understand legal interpretation, we 
have to imagine an exercise in which a judge deciding a case is like a 
novelist engaged in the project of writing a chain novel.17 For Dworkin, 
judges are like chain novelists in that ‘each novelist in the chain interprets 
the chapters he has been given in order to write a new chapter, which is 
then added to what the next novelist receives, and so on. Each has the job of 
writing his chapter so as to make the novel being constructed the best it can 
be, and the complexity of this task models the complexity of deciding a hard 
case under law as integrity.’18 
 
                                            
14 ibid. 
15 ibid. 
16 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986). 
17 ibid 228-229. 
18 ibid 229 (emphasis added). 
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The notion of ‘law as integrity’ was another key theme in Law’s Empire.19 It 
ought to be regarded as an admirable achievement to summarize the 
argument presented in Law’s Empire, in particular this notion of law as 
integrity, in but a few paragraphs, which is credit that is rightly due to 
Waldron, who lucidly summarizes Dworkin’s arguments in the book in the 
following excerpt: 
In an argument of quite stunning complexity, his 1986 book Law’s 
Empire set out grounds for the responsibility that lawyers and judges 
have to the laws as a whole, including their responsibility to measures 
enacted by people who may not have shared their views about justice. 
Our job, he said, as lawyers, scholars, and judges, is to bring 
interpretive coherence—integrity—to the whole body of the law.  
The unearthing of these principles and the burden of this integrity 
meant that legal reasoning, in Ronnie’s opinion, is a form of moral 
reasoning. This was the artery of his jurisprudence: that legal 
reasoning is a form of moral reasoning. Certainly, it is a complicated 
and uneasy form, for it depends on judgments about the moral 
importance of contingent events like enactment and the setting of 
precedents that ordinary moralizing does not concern itself with. 
“Nothing guarantees that our laws will be just,” Ronnie 
acknowledged. But that doesn’t mean that we separate the relation 
between law and morality; it means we complicate the relation 
between law and morality. Like a system of ethics that has to deal 
with the moral significance of promises we wish had never been made, 
so too the morality of law has to come to terms—come to moral 
terms—with statutes we wish had never been passed and precedents 
we wish had not been laid down. But the mark of legality is the felt 
need to respect those with whom we share the community, including 
those whose decisions we disagree with—to respect on moral grounds 
the legacy that they have contributed to, as we expect them to respect 
the legacy—the same legacy of law— that we have contributed to.  
As I said, the affirmation of this entanglement of law and morality 
was the artery of Ronnie’s jurisprudence. And for the philosophy of 
law generally, these are ideas of momentous importance. They will 
resonate down the generations. They are not uncontroversial by any 
means, but the controversies they provoke have been productive, 
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sparklingly productive, in the otherwise desiccated landscape of our 
subject.20 
 
As Waldron puts it, ‘the artery of Dworkin’s jurisprudence’ was the 
‘entanglement of law and morality’ as well as his argument that ‘legal 
reasoning is a form of moral reasoning’—a form of reasoning in which, by 
unearthing the ‘deep subterranean’ principles to which the legal system has 
committed over time, we, ‘as lawyers, scholars, and judges…bring 
interpretive coherence—integrity—to the whole body of the law.’21 
 
 
3.2B  A Critique of Dworkinian Anti-Positivism 
 
Richard Bellamy advances four arguments against Dworkin’s anti-positivist 
arguments detailed above. First, he argues that Dworkin’s ‘holistic approach 
to the law can often be arbitrary, encouraging the application of principles 
and considerations in settled parts of the law that are remote from, and 
inappropriate to, the case at hand.’22 Bellamy is sceptical of Dworkin’s claim 
that the herculean effort that a Dworkinian judge must engage in to bring 
interpretive coherence to the law is possible at all times.23 That coherent 
picture, argues Bellamy, may not be forthcoming in all cases: 
Different parts of the law give different weights to different goods, 
values and types of moral claim. Civil and criminal cases tend to 
operate with different standards of evidence and notions of 
responsibility, for example. Even similar areas of the law may involve 
                                            
20 Waldron, ‘Ronald Dworkin’ (n 6) 3-4. 
21 ibid (emphasis added). 
22  Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the 
Constitutionality of Democracy (Cambridge University Press 2007) 76 (emphasis added). 
23 ibid 
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quite different criteria. Principles and considerations relevant to cases 
of sex discrimination, say, may be quite inappropriate to issues of 
race. Dworkin’s holistic approach may force a coherence that does not 
and should not obtain, by treating very different areas as if they were 
the same.24 
 
For Bellamy, Dworkin conceals the problems that become evident with his 
theory down in the quagmire of detail by arguing at a very high level of 
abstraction. Down in that quagmire of detail, Bellamy argues, ‘the moral 
considerations involved [may be] of quite diverse and incommensurable 
kinds’,25 in which case, Dworkin’s ‘appeal from rights in one part of the law’26 
and their application to a different part of the law may lead to incoherence 
rather than coherence. 
 
Bellamy’s second criticism of Dworkin’s theory is that ‘decisions based on 
rights need not yield a right answer.’27 There may be more than one answer 
that appears to be equally right, and although Dworkin does not deny that 
rights may conflict or that conflicting rights may require to be balanced, 
Dworkin still believes that a right answer exists and that the judge will still 
be able to strike the appropriate balance between the conflicting rights. This, 
argues Bellamy, ‘assumes commensurability at some level that may not 
exist.’28 John Mackie points out this weakness in Dworkin’s right-answer 
thesis in the following way: 
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This argument assumes too simple a metric for the strength of 
considerations, that such strengths are always commensurable on a 
linear scale, so that the strength of the case for one side must be 
either greater than that of the case for the other side, or less, or else 
they must be equal in the sense of being so finely balanced that even 
the slightest additional force on either side would make it the 
stronger. But in fact considerations may be imperfectly 
commensurable, so that neither of the opposing cases is stronger than 
the other, and yet they are not finely balanced. Consider the 
analogous question about three brothers: Is Peter more like James 
than he is like John? There may be an objectively right and 
determinable answer to this question, but again there may not. It may 
be that the only correct reply is that Peter is more like James in some 
ways and more like John in others, and that there is no objective 
reason for putting more weight on the former points of resemblance 
than on the latter or vice versa. While we might say that Peter's 
likeness to James is equal to his likeness to John (because neither is 
determinately the greater), this does not mean that any slight 
additional resemblance to either would decide the issue; hence, it does 
not mean that this equality expresses an improbably exact balance.29 
 
Dworkin’s theory, in short, does not take account of reasonable disagreement 
that may exist in the exercise of balancing rights.30 Dworkin suggests that 
there is a pre-existing right answer even in the case of conflicting rights, but 
his theory does not take account of what Waldron has said about moral 
realism, which, as we saw in Chapter 2, is that even if moral realism is true 
and there are objectively right answers, humans do not have the capacity to 
make those right answers true: ‘making true and making false are not 
things that facts do to judges.’31  
 
                                            
29 John Mackie, ‘The Third Theory of Law’ (1977) 7 Philosophy & Public Affairs 3, 9. 
30 Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (n 22) 77. 
31 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 1999) 186. 
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A third criticism Bellamy advances against Dworkin’s theory is that the 
latter’s theory of individual rights does not take account of when rights need 
and should be balanced against the public interest. ‘Rights certainly 
deserve’, argues Bellamy, ‘to be regarded as weighty interests that any view 
of the public interest should take into account’ but that, as Dworkin himself 
acknowledges, ‘[r]ights often derive their rationale not from their benefit to 
the rights holder per se but from the public goods they promote’.32 For 
Bellamy, ‘[l]ittle would ever be done if collective benefits could never 
outweigh individual rights.’33 Yet, if we accept the need to value rights for 
the public interest that they promote, then Dworkin’s theory has a problem, 
which is that if ‘such considerations are likely to alter according to 
circumstances’, then that makes ‘the prospective almost a priori account of 
law [Dworkin] seeks impossible.’34 
 
Finally, a fourth criticism Bellamy advances against Dworkin’s theory is 
that it requires judges to interpret the law in its morally best light, a 
requirement that Bellamy believes is difficult to sustain ‘in the face of the 
limitations of human reasoning which appear to allow for rival claims to be 
made.’35 This goes back to the point made above about the irrelevance of 
moral objectivity and the inability of humans to have a mechanism of finding 
the morally ‘right’ answer even if that answer objectively exists.36 There is, 
Bellamy argues, ‘no reason to suppose that the judiciary will concur on the 
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morally best view of the law any more than the rest of the population if 
reasonable disagreements in this area are possible.’37 In fact, ‘insisting that 
judges look for some comprehensive, objective theory of the law is more likely 
to generate such disagreements than a more modest approach.’38 In other 
words, if applying rules can be difficult because of their open texture, as 
positivists insist, then applying Dworkinian ‘abstract principles of justice 
seems likely to be even more indeterminate.’39 
 
Not only does Dworkin’s theory not ‘rule out’ instances of judicial discretion, 
his theory of interpretation, indeed, ‘actively encourages [discretion].’ 40 
Bellamy believes that ‘[b]y inviting judges to offer a view of “good” law 
rather than law per se, Dworkin turns judges from third party arbiters into 
participants in many of the disagreements that it is politics’ rather than the 
law’s role to resolve.’41  He concludes that ‘[f]ar from promoting fidelity to 
law, the very ambition of Dworkin’s approach risks undermining it by 
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3.3  A RESPONSE TO GRIFFITH’S CRITICS 
 
This section turns to a defence of Griffith against the criticism of three of his 
critics, namely Dawn Oliver, JWF Allison, and Adam Tomkins. In the case of 
all three critics, I will argue that their critique of Griffith reflects a 
Dworkinian anti-positivist bias and a lack of appreciation of Griffith’s 
normative positivism. 
 
3.3A  Oliver and Allison 
Let us begin with Dawn Oliver’s discussion of Griffith’s arguments in ‘The 
Political Constitution’:   
It will be remembered that Griffith, in his lecture in 1979, argued that 
‘the constitution is no more and no less than what happens’ and that 
political decisions should be taken by politicians, not judges. He 
argued from and for a highly positivist interpretation of the 
Constitution, with no ‘oughts’ or moral content. He accepted that this 
does not prevent people from arguing for moral or self-interested 
positions about what the Constitution ought to be and what the law 
ought to provide, but his interpretation was that the Constitution was 
the result of the settlement of various conflicts between classes and 
interests over the years and had no moral or normative content.43 
 
Oliver argues that Griffith’s ‘interpretation’ of the UK constitution was that 
‘the Constitution…had no moral or normative content.’44 For Oliver, Griffith 
could have interpreted the ‘Constitution’ as being one that has ‘oughts’ or 
moral content, but he did not. The question that arises, then, from reading 
Oliver’s critique of Griffith is this: What is a constitution that has moral or 
normative content? 
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For an answer to this question, we can turn to TRS Allan’s recent 
publication in which he describes what such a vision of the UK constitution 
might be. Allan begins Chapter 1 of his book The Sovereignty of Law with 
the question, ‘What is the British Constitution and where can we find it?’45 
He reports what are some well-known features of the UK constitution, which 
include: that it is ‘unwritten’—or more accurately, ‘non-codified’;46 that it has 
‘multifarious’ sources, which include ‘ideas and ideals of liberty and 
justice’;47 that it is ‘the product of both history and morality’;48 and that its 
institutional arrangements ‘afford at least a basic structure for legitimate 
democratic government’.49 But for Allan, to really understand the British 
constitution, we need something more:  ‘To understand the constitution 
is…to grasp the principles that underpin and justify our practice. We must 
make sense of an evolving historical legal and political order, insofar as we 
can, by reference to the moral or political values that inform and explain our 
continuing adherence to it.’50 
 
The influence of Dworkin’s jurisprudence on Allan’s understanding of the 
UK constitution is easily discernible. In fact, Allan expressly acknowledges 
in a footnote in his introductory chapter the influence of Dworkin’s theory of 
legal-interpretation-as-moral-interpretation on Allan’s understanding of 
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law. 51  According to that Dworkinian anti-positivist understanding, ‘the 
corpus juris is not just a heap of norms; beneath the explicit rules there are 
principles and policies that a legal system has committed itself to implicitly, 
over the years; deep subterranean channels of moral concern that flow 
through every part of the law’52—deep subterranean principles that judges 
unearth through a process of legal interpretation, which Dworkin and Allan 
both see as a form of moral interpretation. For Allan, the UK constitution is 
not just a heap of norms; the UK constitutional system has, in Allan’s view, 
committed itself to deep subterranean principles that judges and others 
involved in the practice of law uncover through a process of legal 
interpretation, which is a form of moral interpretation. 
 
Allan’s work is described in public law scholarship as being representative of 
the school of thought known as common law constitutionalism. Martin 
Loughlin observes that what unites this group of scholars is the belief ‘that 
the common law is a repository of the basic rules of governmental authority, 
that these common law rules can be understood to provide a framework of 
rights that operate to protect liberty, and that the judiciary is now becoming 
conscious of its duty to rework constitutional fundamentals by fully 
explicating the meaning of these rules in legal-rational terms.’ 53  In 
Dworkinian terms, we might say that for common law constitutionalists, the 
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British constitution is a repository of substantive liberal principles that 
judges uncover through a process of legal/moral interpretation. 
 
Let us now return to Oliver’s critique of Griffith, in which she says that 
Griffith argued ‘from and for a highly positivist interpretation of the 
Constitution, with no ‘oughts’ or moral content.’ 54  I agree with that 
description to some extent. Griffith was arguing, in Griffith’s own words, ‘for 
a highly positivist view of the constitution’55 and was doing so from the 
perspective of a legal positivist.56 But notice how Oliver formulates her 
critique from the perspective of a Dworkinian anti-positivist when she 
changes the word ‘view’57 (that Griffith uses to describe his vision of the UK 
constitution) to the word ‘interpretation’ 58  that Oliver uses to describe 
Griffith’s argument. For Oliver, there exists a liberal constitution—a 
repository of liberal principles—which principles can be unearthed through a 
process of moral/legal interpretation. She presupposes the existence of such a 
liberal constitution and then suggests that Griffith’s ‘interpretation’ of that 
liberal constitution was that it had ‘no moral or normative content.’59 Oliver 
assumes that Griffith accepted that the constitution was a repository of such 
abstract principles but that he denied that it had any normative content. 
However, as I demonstrated in Chapter 2, it is not that Griffith accepted the 
                                            
54 Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom (n 43) 380. 
55 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1, 19. 
56 See Chapter 2. 
57 Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (n 55) 19. 
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existence of a constitution-as-a-repository-of-abstract-principles and then 
went on to suggest that that repository is empty of normative principles; no, 
for Griffith that repository of liberal principles either did not exist or could 
not be proven to exist. Griffith was a normative positivist, a democrat, and a 
moral anti-realist for whom there were normative reasons for denying the 
existence of a ‘constitution’ understood as a repository of abstract principles, 
for which reason he said that ‘the constitution is no more and no less than 
what happens.’60 As Loughlin notes in the course of placing Griffith within 
the modernist tradition, Griffith’s ‘focus remained fixed on the system of 
government rather than on the constitution.’61 Griffith was ‘[a]lert to the 
tyranny of categories’ and was ‘circumspect in discussion of ‘the 
constitution’.’62 For Griffith, ‘the constitution was merely the assemblage of 
rules organising government, changing as the rules changed’.63 
 
Thus, Oliver’s reading of Griffith contains at least two mistakes. Her first 
mistake is that she associates Griffith’s legal positivism with a wholly 
descriptive thesis, which is a common misinterpretation of legal positivism. 
As Tom Campbell writes, ‘the theory of legal positivism is usually taken to 
be analytical, descriptive, and explanatory. The point of legal positivism, on 
this view, is to provide an accurate account of law as it actually is rather 
than as it ought to be. This, it is assumed, follows from the positivist 
insistence that natural law theory neglects the logical distinction between 
description and prescription, and in particular confuses the analysis of law 
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with its critique.’64 The difficulty with this view, Campbell argues, is that it 
fails to distinguish between the content of law and the form of law. As 
Campbell notes, we can challenge this commonly held view about legal 
positivism ‘if we distinguish prescriptions relating to the content of a law 
from those relating to its form’;65 we can argue that it is useful ‘to regard 
legal positivism as a normative theory which seeks to determine what the 
law ought to be, not with respect to its content but with respect to its form.’66 
Oliver fails to recognize that Griffith was not a purely conceptual positivist 
attempting merely to accurately describe the nature of a legal system; he 
was a normative positivist who, like other normative positivists such as 
Campbell, ‘expresse[d] a preference for a certain type of legal system, 
where…there is a set of fairly specific general rules that can be identified 
and applied without recourse to contentious moral or other speculative 
matters’.67 Griffith preferred a legal system that Campbell describes as a 
system containing rules that citizens can easily understand and that judges 
can apply ‘without recourse to controversial first-order moral judgments.’68 
 
Oliver’s second error in her reading of Griffith, as noted above, is that she 
presupposes the existence of a Dworkinian liberal constitution as the only 
understanding of the UK constitution and then accuses Griffith of denying 
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that constitution ‘moral or normative content’,69 not realizing that Griffith in 
fact denied or doubted the very existence of such a constitution. Griffith’s 
repository was not empty; Griffith doubted the very existence of such a 
repository.70 Campbell, again, has illuminating comments in this regard: 
Law, as all practitioners know, Dworkin argues, is full of 
principles, with basically moral content. These principles, such as 
equality before the law, or that no one should benefit from his or her 
own wrongdoing, can override rules in the service of rights and 
therefore justice, and these principles cannot be understood and 
applied, Dworkin argues, without the exercise of moral judgment. 
With this sort of analysis, Dworkinians have convinced several 
cohorts of students and hence generations of present and future 
judges that it is the adjudicative duty of judges to make the law ‘the 
best that it can be’ and, by ‘the best that it can be’, he means, 
ultimately, the way that most nearly accords with the moral views of 
the individual judge, in practice with the concurrence of sufficient of 
his or her colleagues to carry the day in court. True, he applies this in 
the main to constitutional cases, and presents this as a way of 
interpreting existing legal materials, not creating law from scratch. 
Nevertheless, at bottom his theory is that ‘the law’ (and not just 
constitutional law) contains fundamental moral judgments of the 
judge, that is, moral judgments about substantive right and wrong, 
moral justice and injustice.71 
 
It is easy to see how a scholar who holds a Dworkinian understanding of the 
constitution as a set of liberal principles would regard Griffith’s 
‘interpretation’ of the constitution as lacking in moral or normative content. 
But Oliver’s starting point is a Dworkinian understanding of the 
constitution which itself is not without challenge. As Campbell argues, a 
Dworkinian ‘model of law as an extrapolation from judicial morals’ can be 
challenged ‘on the grounds that Dworkin overestimates the judicial capacity 
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to know what is morally right or wrong, and that the diversity of reasonable 
moral views that individual judges may hold is incompatible with producing 
an actual legal system that manifests the qualities of being both principled 
and coherent.’72 The problem with Dworkin’s vision of the law is that ‘[t]here 
are just too many judicial cooks with a hand in this particular law-making 
broth.’73 
 
Oliver is not alone in approaching Griffith’s lecture from Dworkinian anti-
positivist presuppositions and in accusing Griffith’s notion of ‘the 
constitution’ as lacking in normative content. JWF Allison does the same 
when he writes: 
[Griffith’s] notion of the constitution is purely descriptive—neither 
legally prescriptive nor morally normative. … 
…On the issue of fidelity to the politics of the political 
constitution…Griffith’s famous lecture, is, at best, paradoxical, and, at 
worst, contradictory. His notion of the political constitution is purely 
descriptive but his political approach is, as such, prescriptive – ‘to 
liberate the processes of government’. A descriptive political 
constitution and a prescriptive politics is the paradox or contradiction 
that Griffith’s lecture has left for those it has influenced.74  
 
Here again, we find a scholar who presupposes a Dworkinian notion of ‘the 
constitution’ (whose normative character is defined by its underlying 
substantive principles) and who makes the erroneous assumption that if a 
scholar such as Griffith denies such an abstract concept of ‘the constitution’, 
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that his ‘notion of the constitution’ is for that reason ‘purely descriptive—
neither legally prescriptive nor morally normative.’75 
 
3.3B  Tomkins 
Let us now turn to Tomkins’s critique of Griffith. Tomkins considers 
Griffith’s ‘The Political Constitution’ as ‘the most important statement on 
the political model of constitutionalism.’76 Notwithstanding that somewhat 
favourable comment and a few others, much of Tomkins’s discussion of 
Griffith is critical of what he perceives to be Griffith’s ‘constitutional 
descriptivism’. 77  Thus, about Griffith’s argument in ‘The Political 
Constitution’, he writes that ‘there is one major limitation to Griffith’s 
position’, which is that ‘the argument presented in ‘The Political 
Constitution’, for all its passionate rhetoric, was in constitutional terms, 
wholly descriptive.’78  
 
A superficial reading of these words might suggest that Tomkins is saying 
that Griffith’s analysis was devoid of normative argument. That is how 
Thomas Poole reads Tomkins’s claim when he argues that Tomkins’s 
description of Griffith’s analysis as wholly descriptive ‘underestimates the 
polemical dimension of Griffith’s work.’79 ‘We misunderstand Griffith’, says 
Poole, ‘if we see him as simply presenting a descriptive analysis. His work is 
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thoroughly prescriptive, and recognises itself as such, fighting the good fight 
against a host of liberal and conservative enemies, natural lawyers all.’80 
Others, too, have interpreted Tomkins’s argument to mean that he is 
denying the normative arguments present in Griffith’s work.81 
 
But that is not exactly what Tomkins is saying. Contrary to how Poole and 
others read Tomkins on this point, I do not believe Tomkins is saying that 
Griffith’s ‘analysis’82  or his ‘work’83 was entirely descriptive. In fact, on 
several occasions in his critique of Griffith, Tomkins acknowledges Griffith’s 
prescriptive arguments.84 A closer reading of Tomkins’s critique of Griffith 
reveals that Tomkins is doing something different. Rather than completely 
ignoring Griffith’s prescriptive arguments, what Tomkins is actually doing is 
drawing a distinction between constitutional prescriptions on the one hand 
and non-constitutional prescriptions on the other. Consider the following 
quote and focus on the sentences in bold: 
[T]here is one major limitation to Griffith’s position….This [limitation] 
is that the argument presented in ‘The Political Constitution’, for all 
its passionate rhetoric, was in constitutional terms wholly descriptive. 
While Griffith expressed forthright political opinions (for 
example, ‘political decisions should be taken by 
politicians…who are removable’, and ‘we need to force 
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governments out of secrecy and into the open’) these were 
articulated solely at the level of politics and not as matters of 
constitutional analysis. When he insisted that the ‘accountability 
of our rulers should be real and not fictitious’ he was not 
expressing his view of what the constitution requires, but merely his 
own political preference. 
When it came to discussing constitutional questions, Griffith only 
ever described—he never prescribed. His position was not that the 
arguments of Scarman, Hailsham, and Dworkin [contemporaries of 
Griffith whose work he criticizes at the start of his lecture] were 
unconstitutional: only that they were politically unwise and 
philosophically mistaken. … 
…Griffith’s defence of the political constitution was entirely 
descriptive. He may have believed that the political model of 
accountability was to be preferred over the legal. He may have 
considered it to be both more democratic and more effective. 
But he did not believe the political model of accountability to be 
constitutionally required; still less constitutionally entrenched.85 
 
As the arguments in bold make clear, Tomkins is not ignoring Griffith’s 
prescriptive arguments at all, so it is incorrect for Poole and others to say 
that Tomkins is accusing Griffith of presenting a wholly descriptive analysis 
or that Tomkins is saying that Griffith’s work was entirely descriptive. What 
Tomkins is doing, instead, is drawing a distinction between prescriptions 
that are ‘constitutional’ and those that are not. For example, immediately 
after acknowledging Griffith’s prescriptive arguments, Tomkins says that 
these prescriptive arguments ‘were articulated solely at the level of politics 
and not as matters of constitutional analysis.’86 Similarly, immediately after 
acknowledging Griffith’s statement that ‘the accountability of our rulers 
should be real and not fictitious’,87 Tomkins writes that this prescriptive 
argument does not mean that Griffith was expressing a view on ‘what the 
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constitution requires, but merely his own political preference.’ 88  And 
similarly, again, he writes that Griffith did not argue that Scarman’s, 
Hailsham’s, and Dworkin’s arguments were ‘unconstitutional: only that they 
were politically unwise and philosophically mistaken.’89 There is, in other 
words, a difference in Tomkins’s view between those prescriptions that reach 
the level of being ‘constitutional’ prescriptions and those that do not. 
 
Tomkins’s distinction between constitutional and non-constitutional 
prescriptions raises the obvious question: what exactly is the difference 
between a constitutional and a non-constitutional prescription? How do we 
determine whether a prescription is constitutionally required or 
‘entrenched’ 90  on the one hand and not on the other? In the United 
Kingdom—which ‘lacks a Constitution with a capital ‘C’’91—how do we 
determine whether and how a prescription achieves the status of a 
constitutional prescription? How do we make the determination as to 
whether or not a prescription is constitutionally entrenched in the context of 
a constitution whose meaning is deeply contested and unsettled, marked by 
great ‘uncertainty and disputation over the sources of constitutional 
change’92? As leading textbooks on the subject remind us, in the United 
Kingdom, the word ‘unconstitutional’ has ‘no defined content’;93 there exists 
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no ‘obvious criterion for deciding what is constitutional and what is not, and 
no authoritative selection of provisions which could be called ‘the 
constitution’.’94 Tomkins does not tell us what he believes the process is of 
determining how a prescription reaches the status of a ‘constitutional’ 
prescription, yet this is a process that is in no way clearly established, as 
Anthony Bradley, Keith Ewing and Christopher Knight observe: 
When used concerning executive decisions, ‘unconstitutional’ 
implies that a decision is not merely incorrect in law but also contrary 
to fundamental principle…. 
However, it may not be easy to determine whether the boundary 
between constitutional and unconstitutional conduct has been crossed, 
especially where there is no universally accepted rule of conduct. 
Different politicians may take opposing views of the constitutional 
propriety of the acts of a government. Unpopular proposals for new 
legislation are not for that reason unconstitutional, but a Bill which 
sought to destroy essential features of the electoral system or to give 
the Cabinet power to overrule decisions of the courts could rightly be 
described as unconstitutional. 
Another difficulty in determining what is constitutional in a given 
situation is that there may be no relevant precedent.95 
 
To demonstrate the point made in the last sentence, the authors cite the 
example of when an agreement to differ on an issue of economic policy in 
1932 was described as ‘unconstitutional’, that attack on the Government’s 
conduct faced the following rejoinder:96 ‘Who can say what is constitutional 
in the conduct of a National Government? It is a precedent, an experiment, a 
new practice, to meet a new emergency, a new condition of things.’97 
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It is incumbent upon Tomkins to tell his readers what his method is of 
determining how a prescription achieves the status of a constitutional 
prescription for his criticism of Griffith to make sense. As we shall see 
shortly, Tomkins does not expressly provide an answer to this question, but 
we can make inferences as to what his answer might be. In order to make 
such inferences we need to look closely at how Tomkins believes he can 
improve upon what he takes to be Griffith’s ‘constitutional descriptivism’.98 
 
In Our Republican Constitution, Tomkins seeks to present ‘a republican 
reading of the British constitution.’99 He is critical of what he takes to be the 
orthodox vision of the UK constitution, which he terms ‘legal 
constitutionalism’.100  He seeks to replace this orthodoxy with ‘an older, 
political, approach to the constitution’, which approach he argues ‘should be 
seen as resting on republican foundations.’101 This approach ‘is one that 
derives from an analysis of the [republican] values inherent in the British 
constitutional order.’102  
 
How does Tomkins believe he can improve upon what he takes to be 
Griffith’s ‘constitutional descriptivism’? Consider the following quote: 
The argument in this book takes issue with Griffith’s descriptivism. 
My view, contra Griffith, is that the government is accountable to 
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Parliament not only because, as matter of fact this is true, but also 
because the constitution insists upon it. Ministerial responsibility is, I 
will argue, a prescriptive rule as well as a descriptive practice. 
Similarly, I will suggest, when judges intervene in the business of 
parliamentary government they are not simply rewriting the 
unwritten constitution—they are not simply altering what the 
constitution describes—they are doing something which is different 
from what the constitution previously prescribed. In other words they 
are doing something that would previously have been 
unconstitutional.103 
 
Tomkins’s goal is to show that a breach of, say, the rules relating to 
ministerial responsibility or an instance of judicial activism does not simply 
reflect a change in the constitution but instead reflects unconstitutional 
behaviour. He believes that whereas Griffith’s response to such changes in 
constitutional practice would have been to say that there had occurred a 
change in the nature of the constitution itself, Tomkins’s argument is that 
such changes ought to be regarded as unconstitutional. 
 
Tomkins believes that ‘the model of the political constitution was never 
grounded in theory.’104 Griffith and other advocates of the political model of 
constitutionalism, in Tomkins’s view, ‘never explained the norms or values 
on which the model was founded.’105 For Tomkins, the lamentable result of 
this (perceived) gap in Griffith’s account is that this gap has allowed the 
‘legal constitutionalists…to brush the political constitution to one side.’106 
And to plug this gap, Tomkins believes more can be done than Griffith 
accomplished: 
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For Griffith, all that those of us who are not legal constitutionalists 
can do is politically to lament the foolishness of turning to the new 
model, of relying on the courts rather than on politicians to find ways 
of holding government to account. I disagree. I think that there is 
more we can do. For sure, we can show that legal constitutionalism is 
politically undesirable. But we can also take the argument to a new 
level. We can also show that it is unconstitutional.107 
 
To improve upon Griffith’s argument, then, Tomkins believes that he can 
‘take the argument to a new level’108 and show not only that a turn to legal 
constitutionalism is politically undesirable but also that it is 
unconstitutional. And how does Tomkins intend to demonstrate the 
unconstitutionality of the legal model of constitutionalism? By ‘ground[ing] 
the model of the political constitution normatively’ and by ‘show[ing] that it 
is not a mere description of what happens (or perhaps used to happen) but 
that it is also a prescription of what ought to happen.’109 This is something 
that Tomkins believes Griffith never did. Tomkins argues that ‘no matter 
how earnestly [Griffith] considered the model to be wise, he never thought of 
it as being required, ordained or entrenched.’110 This, for Tomkins, is a 
mistake. Thus, Tomkins’s aim in Our Republican Constitution is to show 
that the model of the political constitution is based on certain ‘constitutional’ 
values, and these values, according to Tomkins, are the values of 
republicanism. To ‘unearth and reveal those [republican] values’111—that is 
the goal of Tomkins’s book. 
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Notice the question-begging meaning of ‘constitutional’ and 
‘unconstitutional’ in Tomkins’s analysis. He argues that the goal of his book 
is to show that the political model of constitutionalism is not simply a 
description of what happened in the past but is something that was 
previously constitutionally ‘ordained’ or ‘entrenched’. He wants to show that 
a move to legal constitutionalism is ‘unconstitutional’ because it is different 
from what happened in the past. He argues that ‘when judges intervene in 
the business of parliamentary government they are not simply rewriting the 
unwritten constitution—they are not simply altering what the constitution 
describes—they are doing something which is different from what the 
constitution previously prescribed…they are doing something that would 
previously have been unconstitutional.’112 But how did the political model of 
constitutionalism achieve that ‘constitutional’ status in the first place? What 
is the source of the constitutional rule that judges must not ‘intervene in the 
business of parliamentary government’113? Consider Neil Walker’s following 
observations in his review of Tomkins’s book:  
[W]hat precisely is the relationship between historical understanding 
and normative projection in Tomkins’ constitutional methodology? 
Both a strong and a weaker connection might in principle be posited. 
The strong thesis holds that there is only one “true” meaning, or at 
least an undeniably best interpretation, of the constitutional record, 
that this should serve as the critical standard of present and projected 
constitutional doctrine and practice, and that doctrine and practice 
that does not meet this standard can rightly be branded as 
“unconstitutional.” In at least some passages, it is clear that it is this 
strong thesis that Tomkins seeks to defend (see e.g. 40). On the basis 
of his rediscovery of the republican pedigree of the seventeenth 
century, he wants to argue not only that liberal constitutionalism is 
                                            




inadequate in its conception of liberty and ineffective and 
undemocratic in its judge-centredness, but also that, far from 
possessing any explanatory privilege, it actually betrays the best 
understanding of the constitution. Yet surely this is to claim too 
much, especially when we consider how many parts of the republican 
settlement were diluted or displaced with the rise of cabinet 
government and a partisan party system from the eighteenth century 
onwards. Just who, and on what basis, are we expecting to convince 
when we seek to swap one categorical historical judgment 
(underpinning the liberal consensus) with another? And even if the 
new republican interpretation of history were objectively compelling, 
and were generally accepted as such, why should this revised pedigree 
in any case be decisive of our future normative order?114  
 
When we ask the questions that I asked above immediately before quoting 
Walker, it becomes evident what Tomkins’s underlying theoretical 
assumptions are about the nature of the UK constitution. These 
assumptions, as it turns out, are not very different from the general 
assumptions of those whom he considers his adversaries and whom he labels 
‘legal constitutionalists’.115  
 
Let me state clearly what I am not claiming. What I am not saying is that 
Tomkins’s vision of the UK constitution is identical to that of the common 
law constitutionalists insofar as what this school of thought believes are the 
substantive values underpinning the UK constitution. But what I am 
claiming is that Tomkins, like the common law constitutionalists, believes 
that there exists a repository of abstract principles that we can identify as 
‘the constitution’ that exists in the form of a higher constitution—principles 
that can be unearthed through a process of moral interpretation and 
principles that deserve our obedience on account of their moral weight. One 
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difference between his repository of principles and the common law 
constitutionalists’ repository is that the latter’s repository can generally be 
located within the school of political liberalism whereas Tomkins’s preferred 
values are to be located within what he takes to be republicanism. Another 
difference is that the common law constitutionalists rely on a combination of 
history and the common law as their repository while Tomkins relies on the 
achievements of Parliament combined with history.116 But their underlying 
vision of ‘the constitution’ is the same. Both believe in the very existence of 
that repository of abstract principles (liberal or republican), and both believe 
in using history ‘like a trump card in a game of whist’:  
What unites the historical aspect of common law constitutionalism 
with the republican argument of Tomkins is a shared belief that there 
exists some critical period during which the ‘true’ nature of the British 
constitution is revealed, and that the task of the constitutional 
historian or theorist is to identify this definitive moment and then, by 
removing the corruptions beneath which it has become buried, to 
restore its normative authority. The claims of the common law 
constitutionalists ultimately run back to the myth of some ancient 
Anglo-Saxon constitution that formed the repository of our 
immemorial liberties and was stifled under the Norman yoke. For 
Tomkins, it is the assertion that the true character of the constitution 
is revealed through the frame of mid-17th century civic 
republicanism. In both cases, the past is being treated ideologically, as 
a field in which, as Oakeshott would say, we are able to exercise our 
moral and political opinions like whippets on Sunday afternoons.117 
 
It is difficult not to see the parallel that exists between the Dworkinian anti-
positivist vision of law and Tomkins’s vision of what he takes to be the UK 
constitution. Tomkins, too, seems to think that underneath the hard positive 
law, the UK constitution has committed itself, to borrow Waldron’s words, to 
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‘deep subterranean channels of moral concern’ 118 —principles of 
republicanism—principles that Tomkins believes ‘flow through every part of 
the [constitution]’119 and that, owing to their moral weight, deserve our 
obedience. Tomkins sees himself as a Dworkinian Hercules attempting to 
provide the best possible interpretation that he can of the UK constitution, 
and his interpretation is that the principles that the UK constitution has 
committed itself to over the centuries are the principles of republicanism.  
 
I am also not claiming, of course, that Tomkins agrees with every aspect of 
Dworkin’s jurisprudence; that would be far too speculative a claim to make 
because nowhere does Tomkins explicitly associate himself with Dworkin’s 
legal-theoretical school of thought, or with any other jurisprudential school 
of thought for that matter. In fact, Tomkins expressly repudiates in his book 
the Dworkinian policy/principle distinction on the grounds that it is ‘never 
justified’120 or ‘grounded in principle’121 but ‘merely asserted’;122 but his own 
reliance on history to promote his republican argument deserves the same 
criticism. 123  Notwithstanding Tomkins’s repudiation of that aspect of 
Dworkinian jurisprudence, what I am claiming is that there is a certain 
affinity between Dworkin’s vision of law and Tomkins’s vision of what he 
takes to be the ‘constitution’. And this vision is very different from Griffith’s 
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vision of the UK constitution. When Tomkins criticizes Griffith for the 
latter’s ‘constitutional descriptivism’, what he is in effect criticizing Griffith 
for is for not believing that there is a repository of principles that exists 
above the hard positive law that Tomkins refers to as the ‘constitution’. 
Tomkins’s error, like Allison’s and Oliver’s error discussed above, in his 
reading of Griffith is that he believes that Griffith’s repository is empty of 
normative content, when what Griffith actually believed is not that his 
repository of principles is empty of normative content but rather that the 
kind of repository of abstract principles, to which his liberal contemporaries 
subscribed, either did not, or could not be proven to, exist.124  
 
It was in order to avoid the arbitrariness of this very approach (of arguing 
about the existence of a repository of abstract principles that we could call 
‘the constitution’) that Griffith resisted defining the ‘constitution’ in such 
anti-positivist terms. Loughlin is correct when he writes that, for Griffith, 
‘law meant hard positive law, most authoritatively enacted in statute’, a 
claim that Griffith ‘made with the intention of overthrowing metaphysical 
ideas’.125 It was to avoid the arbitrariness of the approach of Dworkin and 
other liberal constitutionalists of his contemporary era that Griffith argued 
‘for a highly positivist view of the constitution’.126 I stress the ‘for’ in the 
previous sentence to repeat the principal argument of Chapter 2, which is 
that Griffith argued for the conceptual separation of law and morality for 
normative reasons—Griffith, as I said so often in the previous chapter, was a 
normative positivist. And his critics who accuse him of ‘descriptivism’ or of 
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having a ‘descriptive’ notion of the constitution not only presuppose a 
Dworkinian understanding of the UK constitution as the only possible 
understanding of it but also show a lack of appreciation of Griffith’s 
normative positivism. 
 
In an effort to improve upon Griffith’s alleged ‘descriptivism’, Tomkins has 
arguably made things worse from a republican perspective by conceding 
ground to his opponents that he should not have conceded. He has 
presupposed the same general understanding of the UK constitution as the 
understanding of those whom he accuses of being ‘legal constitutionalists’, 
and to concede his opponents that ground—i.e. to accept that the 
constitution is a repository of what can easily be described as, in effect, his 
preferred substantive values127—is something that, as I will argue in the 
following section, makes his republican programme in some ways 
unattractive from a republican constitutionalist perspective. 
 
3.4  REPUBLICANISM AND NORMATIVE POSITIVISM 
 
This section turns to the relationship between republicanism and normative 
positivism. I will attempt to demonstrate in this section that there is a 
certain affinity between republicanism and normative positivism, which 
affinity is lost if a theorist attempts, as Tomkins does, to build a republican 
argument on an anti-positivist foundation. This affinity between normative 
positivism and republicanism may be described as an interest that both 
theories have in a strong democratic theory of legal authority according to 
which theory a law acquires its legitimacy from its being adopted by 
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democratic institutions that include procedures that show respect to 
disagreement among citizens. Section 3.4A below, therefore, is intended to 
demonstrate that relationship between republicanism and normative 
positivism. 
 
Section 3.4B, however, draws attention to the differences in normative 
positivism and republicanism in order to make clear that what I am not 
claiming is that both normative positivism and republicanism in all its forms 
have identical values. I will demonstrate these differences by looking at the 
debate as to whether or not judicial review is compatible with republicanism. 
That, however, is the descriptive dimension of my argument in Section 3.4B, 
which will also have an evaluative dimension. In its evaluative dimension, 
my conclusion in Section 3.4B will be that a republican theorist who is 
willing to countenance a strong form of judicial review also compromises the 
commitment to a strong democratic theory of legal authority that a 
republican is expected to endorse and shows a lack of faith in one’s fellow 
citizens to govern themselves according to the principles of republicanism. 
 
3.4A The Affinity Between Republicanism and Normative Positivism 
What is the relationship between republicanism and normative positivism? 
To answer this question, I want to begin this subsection by considering the 
following question:  what should a republican jurisprudence look like? To 
unpack the term ‘republican jurisprudence’, let us begin by considering the 
meaning of republican as it pertains to this discussion. 
 
To a political theorist, republican political theory is considered today to be 
the primary alternative to its liberal counterpart. Republican political theory 
may be traced back to an ancient political tradition, a tradition to which 
there has been ‘more than twenty-five centuries’ of contribution from the 
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works of ‘Aristotle to Montesquieu, Rousseau, [and] Arendt, and from Cicero 
[and] Machiavelli to Harrington, Paine, [and] Jefferson.’ 128  Founded on 
values traceable to this ancient tradition, modern republicanism has 
established itself today, following a revival that goes back a few decades, as 
a major alternative to political liberalism.129  
 
Modern republicanism is a ‘very broad church’130 capable of accommodating 
a range of different values, about which values there is not always 
agreement.131 For one strand of modern republicanism, the most important 
republican value is freedom or liberty understood as independence from 
arbitrary power—a value that is often phrased as freedom as non-
domination. 132  Other republican theorists view non-domination in less 
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substantive and more procedural terms or consider participation in self-
government to be a key republican value and stress the role of representative 
legislatures in realizing that value.133 There is, furthermore, disagreement 
among republican theorists as to the level of citizen participation that is 
required by their respective visions of republicanism, 134  as well as 
disagreement about the extent to which judicial review is expected to play a 
part in upholding republican values; judicial review and republicanism are 
compatible according to some theorists135 of republicanism but incompatible 
according to others.136 
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Those differences may, however, be abstracted away in the pursuit of an all-
encompassing principle to which most, if not all, republicans are committed, 
and that principle is the principle of ‘government by the people’.137 
 
The question with which this section is concerned—the question of what a 
republican jurisprudence ought to look like—is concerned with the 
relationship between the values of the political theory of republicanism and 
a theory of law. If we accept that ‘any normative political theory ought to 
entail its own normative legal theory’,138 then what republican jurisprudence 
seeks to do is to provide the most suitable normative legal theory for the 
normative political theory of republicanism. Put differently, the political 
theory of republicanism ‘entails legal republicanism, just as political 
liberalism implies some kind of legal liberalism.’139 
 
A useful definition of ‘legal republicanism’ is provided by Samantha Besson 
and José Luis Martí, who argue that there are two dimensions to legal 
republicanism: (i) republican law, which, in its substantive dimension is 
‘about the content of law’ and in its procedural dimension is about the 
‘structure and the form of the law’;140 and (ii) republican jurisprudence, 
which is ‘a jurisprudence that analyses legal concepts and the functioning of 
law according to the principles of republicanism.’141 The authors provide a 
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visual representation of how these concepts relate to each other which looks 
something like the following:142 
For the purposes of this section, I am most interested in the box marked 
‘republican jurisprudence’. I am interested in exploring the sense in which 
legal theory may be said to be a republican legal theory. 
 
Besson and Martí argue that a ‘republican lawyer is expected to endorse a 
strongly democratic theory of legal authority’ according to which theory a 
‘law’s legitimacy stems from its adoption by democratic institutions, showing 
due respect to actual disagreements among citizens.’143 The authors further 
note that ‘someone committed to a democratic theory of legal authority ought 
to endorse a normative approach to legal positivism’.144 What the authors 
are suggesting here is that the legal theory of normative positivism—a 
theory I discussed in Chapter 2—is the most appropriate theory of law to 
endorse for someone who is committed to a strong democratic theory of legal 
authority. And since a republican theorist is ‘expected to endorse a strongly 
                                            
142 ibid 28. 
143 ibid 30-31 (citation omitted). 
144 ibid 32 (citation omitted). 
 
 123 
democratic theory of legal authority’,145 it follows, in the authors’ view, that 
a republican ought to endorse the legal theory of normative positivism. It is 
my aim in the following discussion to demonstrate why I think Besson and 
Martí are correct. 
 
A Democratic Theory of Legal Authority.  I noted above Besson and Marti’s 
definition of a strong democratic theory of authority according to which a law 
is deemed legitimate if passed by a democratic institution in a process that 
accords respect to disagreement among citizens.146 Why does law enacted by 
a democratic institution that pays respect to disagreement among citizens 
command our respect? One answer is that ‘majority-decision commands our 
respect precisely because it is the one decision-procedure that does not, by 
some philosophical subterfuge, try to wish the facts of plurality and 
disagreement away.’147 
 
Waldron develops a theory of democratic authority that contrasts the 
standard account of legal authority developed by Joseph Raz. According to 
Raz’s ‘normal justification thesis’: 
 [T]he normal way to establish that a person has authority over 
another person involves showing that the alleged subject is likely 
better to comply with reasons which apply to him (other than the 
alleged authoritative directives) if he accepts the directives as 
authoritatively binding and tries to follow them, rather than by trying 
to follow the reasons which apply to him directly.148 
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Raz’s thesis is related mainly to what he takes to be the principal demand 
that a law makes of those to whom it applies, mainly the demand that the 
law is complied with. Waldron’s interest, however, is in exploring the space 
between ‘defying or ignoring a statute or other legal decision’ on the one 
hand and ‘working responsibly for its repeal or reversal’ on the other 
hand.149 For Waldron, a law or legal decision that exists at the moment as 
law makes a demand of responsible citizens ‘for a certain sort of recognition 
and…respect—that this, for the time being, is what the community has come 
up with and that it should not be ignored or disparaged simply because some 
of us propose, when we can, to repeal it.’150 If, in other words, we lose in a 
free and fair vote, it does not mean that we immediately disparage the law 
or legal decision; we should accept it for the time being and ought to work 
responsibly towards its amendment or repeal.  
 
Waldron’s theory of authority takes seriously what he terms the 
‘circumstances of politics’, 151  an idea developed from John Rawls’s 
‘circumstances of justice’.152  The circumstances of politics involve ‘the felt 
need among the members of a certain group for a common framework or 
decision or course of action on some matter, even in the face of disagreement 
about what that framework, decision or action should be.’153 For Waldron, 
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the circumstances of politics are ‘indispensable for our understanding of 
procedural decision-rules, like majority-decision, and the concomitant ideas 
of authority, obligation, and respect.’154 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, what is important to note about Waldron’s 
circumstances of politics is that, notwithstanding the competing 
understandings of republicanism mentioned above, the central values of 
republicanism can only be secured under conditions that take moral and 
political disagreement seriously.155  Let us take a core republican value 
mentioned above—freedom as non-domination—and consider two competing 
interpretations of it put forward by Pettit and Bellamy. As we shall see 
below, regardless of their differences, as Marco Goldoni puts it, ‘both 
approaches allegedly take into account the so-called “circumstances of 
politics’’’ and under both approaches, it may be said that ‘a polity can be said 
to secure non-domination to its members if and only if moral and political 
disagreement is taken seriously.’156 
 
Let us take Pettit’s interpretation of the republican value of freedom as non-
domination. For Pettit, ‘one agent dominates another if and only if they have 
certain power over that other, in particular a power of interference on an 
arbitrary basis.’157 In other words, domination occurs when one agent has 
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‘arbitrary sway’ over another.158 Pettit’s republican political theory ‘holds out 
the ideal of a regime that protects people from domination without itself 
being a dominating force in their lives.’159 As I said above, disagreement and 
the ‘circumstances of politics’ are central to Pettit’s republicanism, as he 
makes clear when he writes: 
Disagreement is inherently associated with a pluralistic democracy, so 
that there is little or no hope of finding a stable overlap between 
people’s private interests. Nevertheless, people do continue to argue 
with one another about what they ought to do together—they do not 
just come to blows and resign themselves to their differences—finding 
considerations that they equally recognize as relevant. And yet people 
do not themselves manage to generate consensus out of that 
argument, since they may weigh those considerations differently or 
apply them on the basis of different empirical assumptions. In these 
circumstances—the circumstances of democratic politics—the only 
possible basis on which to identify public-interest policies is as those 
policies that are not ruled out by mutually acceptable, commonly 
accepted reasons and that are selected for implementation by 
procedures that are not ruled out by such mutually acceptable, 
commonly accepted reasons.160 
 
For Pettit, the public interest is defined ‘on the basis of an active enterprise 
of democratic discussion and contestation amongst the citizenry’, and the 
public interest ‘requires institutions that make room for such deliberative 
processes.’161 
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Bellamy sees the value of non-domination in less substantive and more 
procedural terms than Pettit. For Bellamy, Pettit and other republicans 
‘have supposed that legal constitutionalism offers the best means of ensuring 
governments pursue policies that treat all with equal concern and respect.’162 
This approach, he argues, is based on a strategy ‘of an idealized politics from 
which all the sources of reasonable disagreement have been removed’—a 
strategy that leads to a form of ‘judicial domination’.163 Bellamy stresses the 
need for a political process that takes seriously the value of political equality 
and a process ‘that allows all citizens to count equally, even if they 
disagree’164 with actual outcomes of the democratic process. For Bellamy, a 
‘better candidate’165 for securing the goal of non-domination, therefore, is the 
democratic process itself rather than the courts. 
 
Whatever their differences, both Bellamy and Pettit stress what I have been 
referring to in this chapter as a strong democratic theory of legal authority 
that takes into account Waldron’s ‘circumstances of politics’. Both theorists 
take political and moral disagreement to be realities that a polity must take 
very seriously if it is to secure the republican goal of liberty as non-
domination.166 
 
Now, the republican focus on the realities of political and moral 
disagreement and the circumstances of politics may be contrasted with 
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contemporary liberalism in important ways. As Goldoni notes, ‘liberal 
theories of [authority] claim that consent is the ground for the legitimacy of 
government’, and ‘[a]utonomy can be reconciled with the directives of 
authority only insofar [as] the latter is recognized by consent.’167 Placing 
consent ‘at the core of the liberal conception of legitimate authority brings 
with it the lack of acknowledgment of disagreement in legal reasoning.’168 
Furthermore, the Dworkinian idea of ‘rights as trumps’ does not fit very well 
within a theory of democratic authority for which moral and political 
disagreement is so central.169 Dworkin’s idea of rights as trumps ‘does not 
resolve disagreement about the content of the rights’ but ‘simply take[s] for 
granted that there is a convergence at least around the kind of rights 
deemed to be trumps.’170 For republicans, by contrast, taking disagreement 
seriously means, as Besson argues, that we should ensure that ‘those 
institutions which are most representative of our disagreements and 
democratically most legitimate…have the last word on reasonably contested 
issues.’171  
 
We have established so far the centrality of the circumstances of politics for 
theories of republicanism. How does that centrality make normative 
positivism an appropriate jurisprudential theory for a republican theorist to 
endorse? 





171 Samantha Besson, The Morality of Conflict: Reasonable Disagreement and the 




In the previous chapter, I detailed the normative reasons for a theorist 
committed to democracy to endorse legal positivism as a theory of law.172 
These reasons were the stress that legal positivism places on the provenance 
of laws and the separability of law and morality. For a normative positivist 
who promotes the separation of law and morality for democratic reasons 
[hereinafter a ‘democratic positivist’], I detailed the reasons that this 
preoccupation with sources of law and the separation of law and morality are 
important. 
 
Taking sources first, as Waldron argues, ‘when there is a question about 
enforcing a given norm, a democrat will want to ask hard questions about its 
origin: where and by whom was the decision made that this should be one of 
the norms enforced in this society? If it was controversial, how was that 
controversy resolved? Who exactly participated in the decision, and on what 
terms and through what processes did they participate?’ 173  For the 
democratic positivist, ‘in principle everyone who stands to be governed by a 
given norm if it is adopted has the right to participate on equal terms in 
determining whether it should be adopted.’174 If a society does not allow for 
such participation, the democratic positivist believes that its institutions 
ought to be reformed.175 
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Taking, next, the positivist insistence on the separation of law and morality, 
there is a certain discomfort, for the democratic positivist, with the idea that 
‘a content-based criterion’ refuses to ‘recognize as law what a democratic 
legislature has enacted on the ground that it conflicts with what is taken to 
be justice.’176 It ought to be discomforting to a democratic positivist that a 
subjective sense of justice of a judge or theorist is allowed to set aside a 
democratically enacted norm. For democratic positivists, what is included in 
their ‘allegiance to democracy’ is the idea that ‘any content-based prejudices 
must be pushed aside in order to allow the people to choose freely for their 
law whatever norms they think appropriate.’ 177  Democratic positivists 
believe in doing so because they are cognizant of, and very sensitive to, the 
realities of disagreement; democratic positivists ‘expect there to be 
disagreement about justice in an ordinary polity under normal conditions’,178 
and they believe that such disagreements ought to be resolved 
democratically. The positivist insistence on the separation of law and 
morality means, for the democratic positivist, that we should separate ‘the 
proposition that a given norm was adopted in the right way from the 
proposition that it was the right norm to adopt.’179 
 
It is difficult not to see the affinity that republican theories noted above have 
with normative positivism, given the stress that both theories place on a 
strong democratic theory of legal authority that deems it ‘indispensable’180 
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that a given norm come from a democratic source through a process that 
takes disagreement among citizens about the content of that norm seriously. 
It is for this reason that Besson and Martí conclude that ‘legal republicanism 
ought to encompass a [normative] positivist theory of law, because it cannot 
rely on the existence of a natural, pre-political validity.’181 In other words, for 
both the republican and the normative positivist, to quote Bellamy, ‘the 
democratic provenance of a law forms an essential feature of its political 
legitimacy.’182 This is the affinity between republicanism and normative 
positivism to which I have so far attempted to draw attention. 
 
That is not to suggest that republicanism in all its forms has all the same 
values as normative positivism, as the following subsection demonstrates. As 
I discuss in the following subsection, although normative positivism has a 
general aversion to judicial discretion and seeks to minimize it as far as 
possible, 183  there are versions of republicanism that actively encourage 
judicial review. It is to the question of the compatibility of republicanism 
with judicial review that we now turn. 
 
3.4B Republicanism and Judicial Review 
 
Is judicial review compatible with republicanism? The answer, of course, 
depends on what substantive values of republicanism we value the most (or 
more than others). Various theorists who refer to themselves as ‘republican’ 
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come to different conclusions on the question of the compatibility of judicial 
review with republicanism.184 
 
In the early stages of the revival of republicanism that occurred over three 
decades ago, legal scholars considered judicial review to be compatible with 
republicanism.185 A feature of that republican revival, as mentioned above, 
has been the development of a strand of republicanism that sees ‘freedom as 
non-domination’ to be a key republican value. These scholars view judicial 
review as among a number of institutional constraints that makes possible 
the realization of that value. 186  Other republican theorists, however, 
consider participation in self-government to be a key republican value and 
stress the role of legislatures in realizing that value.187 For this latter group 
of scholars, judicial review does not meet the demands of the republican 
ideal of self-government and ought to be rejected for that reason.188 Thus, 
one vision of republicanism sees judicial review as an ingredient of 
republicanism that helps realize the goal of non-domination,189 while the 
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other sees judicial review as an impediment to participation in self-
government.  
 
3.4B(i) Michelman and Sunstein 
Frank Michelman was among the legal scholars who, during the early years 
of the republican revival, argued that judicial review ought to be seen as a 
vehicle for the realization of the republican goal of citizen participation.190 In 
one such work, Michelman argues for the need to ‘refocus constitutional 
vision on a republican notion of jurisgenerative politics as the crux of 
political freedom.’191 Michelman believes that for republican citizenship to be 
meaningful in the modern state, what is necessary is ‘admission to full and 
effective participation in the various arenas of public life’,192 and he argues 
that the courts provide a deliberative forum that facilitates such 
participation. In Michelman’s vision of republicanism, the ‘courts play an 
active and generative role’ in what he calls a ‘dialogic and non-authoritarian 
conception of constitutionalist practice’.193 
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Cass Sunstein, like Michelman, contributed to the constitutional law 
literature during the early days of the republican revival by arguing for an 
active role for the courts in realizing republican values.194 For Sunstein,  
republicanism ‘sees political liberty in collective self-determination’ and 
‘while it does not regard political participation as the sole good life for 
human beings, it attempts to provide outlets for citizen control and local self 
determination.’195 Sunstein’s defence of judicial review is one that considers 
the practice of judicial review necessary to compensate for the quality, or 
lack thereof, of deliberation in non-judicial institutions. Sunstein’s argument 
in favour of judicial review is that the courts have the capacity to improve 
public debate and to respond to the failure of a political process that he 
views as one of ‘lawmaking by powerful private groups.’196 Thus, in his 
defence of judicial review, Sunstein writes: 
There is an apparent anomaly in relying on principles of 
Madisonian republicanism as a basis for a vigorous judicial role. 
Those principles are rooted in a conception of politics which does not 
easily accommodate judicial intrusions. But those intrusions become 
defensible when they are based on constitutional and statutory 
provisions whose purpose and effect are to improve a political process 
that amounts in the circumstances to lawmaking by powerful private 
groups. The judicial role outlined here is hardly desirable in the 
abstract, and it need not be exclusive; it is justified in part by the need 
for some institution of government to incline politics in Madisonian 
directions.197  
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Sunstein’s defence of judicial review, therefore, is not enthusiastic but is 
one in which he sees judicial review as a necessary evil that ought to be 
supported for consequentialist reasons to do with the courts’ capacity to 
realize republican ends and to move ‘politics in Madisonian directions.’198 
His argument is for judicial review of a minimalist, rather than activist, 
type, and more recently he has written that courts should review cases on 




Jeremy Waldron is one of the theorists for whom one of the principal values 
of republicanism is participation in self-government realized through 
majoritarian institutions.200 According to this participatory ideal, citizens 
‘are to participate in politics not merely as acquisitive egoists devoted to 
their private interests, but as statesmen, that is, as people who feel a strong 
responsibility for public affairs’.201 The republican idea of the citizen is the 
idea of ‘an ordinary full member of the society—a member of the public 
whose affairs are properly comprised in the res publica, or a member of the 
community whose interests are properly comprised in the idea of the 
“commonwealth.”’202 Furthermore, the republican approach to suffrage is 
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that politics ought not to be viewed as ‘the special preserve of some 
extraordinary subset of the members’ of society, but that we should view 
politics as being about ‘the public and common affairs of the citizens’, and it 
should be ‘conducted among the citizens on that basis.’203 
 
The participatory ideal does not require that such participation be direct, 
however, as in the form of a direct democracy, for a system of representative 
government is deemed perfectly compatible with republicanism.204  In a 
system of representative government, ‘important decisions about public 
affairs—law-making, policymaking, or the great issues of state—are still 
made by officials and institutions in the name of the public and in a way that 
is responsive…to all the members of the public whose affairs these decisions 
ultimately are.’205 Thus, representative government is perfectly capable of 
accommodating the participatory ideal. 
 
Republican self-government also stresses the notion of political equality. In a 
republican system of government, ordinary citizens have ‘as much standing 
to participate in politics, even professional politics, as anyone in the 
society’—we are, as citizens, ‘one another’s equals so far as our stake and 
standing in political affairs is concerned.’206 Although it may seem that the 
structures of representative government create a kind of political inequality, 
‘the republican conviction is that these are both superficial (by comparison 
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with the deeper political egalitarianism) and answerable’ to the fundamental 
republican value of political equality.207 
 
After defending that vision of republicanism, Waldron goes on to argue why 
he does not believe judicial review meets the demanding requirements of 
republicanism. He begins by responding to Ronald Dworkin’s argument, 
made in the 1990s in support of a bill of rights for the United Kingdom—the 
argument that we can dispose of the republican concerns against judicial 
review by demonstrating that polls reveal widespread support for a British 
bill of rights.208 Waldron is not convinced that this argument of Dworkin’s 
disposes of republican concerns against judicial review: 
The fact that there is support among the citizens, even overwhelming 
support, for a constitutional practice does not make the practice 
republican. I guess that if the people want a regime of judicial review, 
then that is what they should have: that is what the idea of republican 
self-government requires, so far as constitutional practice and 
constitutional change are concerned. But we must not confuse the 
reason for carrying out a proposal with the character of the proposal 
itself. If the citizens voted to experiment with dictatorship, republican 
principles might give us a reason to allow them to do so. But it would 
not follow that dictatorship is a republican form of government.209  
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As Neil Walker writes about this point, ‘[p]rocess cannot always legitimate 
outcome, and certainly cannot do so indefinitely’, for ‘if process were 
unimpeachable then any manner or form of democratic abuse could be 
justified in the name of popular pre-commitment.’210 
 
A second argument Waldron responds to, again of Dworkin’s, is the claim 
that judicial review improves public debate, which debate ‘better matches 
[the] conception of republican government, in its emphasis on matters of 
principle, than almost anything the legislative process on its own is likely to 
produce.’ 211  American citizens, according to Dworkin, ‘better 
understand…the distinction between the question whether abortion is 
morally and ethically permissible, on the one hand, and the question 
whether government has the right to prohibit it, on the other’, and ‘they also 
better understand the more general and constitutionally crucial idea on 
which that distinction rests: that individuals have rights that may work 
against the general will or the collective interest or good.’212 
 
Waldron, again, is not convinced, arguing that he can make the same 
tentative empirical claims about public debate about rights in countries that 
do not have a constitutionalized bill of rights:  ‘[N]ational debates about 
abortion are as robust, as statesmanlike, and as well informed in countries 
like the United Kingdom and New Zealand, where [rights] are not 
                                            
210  Neil Walker, ‘Human Rights in a Postnational Order: Reconciling Political and 
Constitutional Pluralism’ in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing and Adam Tomkins (eds), 
Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 2002) 134. 
211  Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: The Moral Reading of the American 
Constitution (Harvard University Press 1996) 345, cited in Waldron, Law and 
Disagreement (n 31) 289. 
212 ibid, cited in Waldron, Law and Disagreement (n 31) 289. 
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constitutionalized, as they are in the United States—more so perhaps 
because they are uncontaminated by quibbling about how to interpret the 
text of an eighteenth-century document.’213 Honohan notes that the question 
as to whether or not judicial review improves public debate is at least 
partially an empirical question, noting that others such as Sunstein and 
Michelman have argued along the same lines about this point as Dworkin.214 
Beyond that empirical point, however, Waldron argues that it is in any event 
a ‘travesty’ that a republican theorist ought to see it as a gain that judicial 
review contributes to a so-called improvement in public debate: 
True republicans are interested in practical political deliberation 
among the citizenry, which is not just any old debating exercise, but a 
form of discussion among those who are about to participate in a 
binding collective decision. A starstruck people may speculate about 
what the Supreme Court will do next on abortion or some similar 
issue; they may even amuse each other, as we law professors do, with 
stories of how we would decide, in the (unlikely) event that we were 
elevated to that eminent tribunal. The exercise of power by a few 
black-robed celebrities can certainly be expected to fascinate an 
articulate population. But that is hardly the essence of active 
citizenship. Perhaps such impotent debating is nevertheless morally 
improving: Dworkin may be right that “there is no necessary 
connection between a citizen’s political impact or influence and the 
ethical benefit he secures through participating in public discussion.” 
But independent ethical benefits of this kind are at best desirable 
side-effects, hardly the primary point of civic participation in 
republican political theory.215   
 
                                            
213 Waldron, ‘Judicial Review and Republican Government’ (n 133) 167-168. 
214 Honohan, ‘Republicans, Rights, and Constitutions’ (n 134) 97. 
215  Waldron, ‘Judicial Review and Republican Government’ (n 133) 168-169 (citation 
omitted). 
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In other words, the benefits to republican democracy that Dworkin identifies 
are not the ‘essence’, according to Waldron, of the republican ideal of active 
citizenship but ‘at best desirable side-effects.’216 
 
A third argument that Waldron finds more plausible than the others 
considered so far is the argument that judicial review has the capacity to 
clear the channels of a defective political process.217 As Waldron summarizes 
this argument: 
[According to this argument,] republican government is a great 
achievement (where it exists), but it is not self-sustaining. It depends 
on the integrity of certain structures and processes, and on the 
existence and effective maintenance of certain conditions and 
guarantees. If these are not attended to, then republican government 
may wither away or self-destruct. One of the ways in which this might 
happen is through legislation: a legislative enactment may attack or 
undercut republican structures. That, then, is why we have the 
institution of judicial review of legislation. The special task of the 
courts, on this suggestion, is to underwrite and uphold the conditions 
that are necessary for self-government, not to pre-empt it or its 
outcomes.218 
 
Waldron finds this argument more plausible than Dworkin’s arguments 
presented earlier, but he believes that what John Hart Ely, the leading 
proponent of this representation reinforcement argument,219 has shown in 
making this argument is ‘that republican self-government is impossible in an 
                                            
216 ibid. 
217  United States v. Carolene Products (1938) 304 US 144, 152n4; John Hart Ely, 
Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press 
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218 Waldron, ‘Judicial Review and Republican Government’ (n 133) 171. 
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unalloyed form, not that the ideal of republican self-government involves or 
comprises the practice of judicial review.’220 
 
Waldron’s argument is that republican theorists who are willing to 
countenance judicial review compromise some of the very values of 
republicanism that they are expected to promote. He argues that 
republicanism in its ideal form is a ‘demanding ideal’.221 Although those 
republicans who are willing to accept or even encourage judicial review 
accept the demanding nature of the republican ideal, ‘they are not sure the 
citizenry are up to these demands.’222 These republican theorists, Waldron 
argues, ‘think that some of the demands that republican government places 
upon us are so exacting that they must be enforced by [non-republican] 
institutions such as courts oriented to the imposition of final decisions about 
matters of great controversy in the community.’223 But, as Waldron argues, 
civic republicanism is also a demanding ideal in another way: 
…[C]ivic republicanism is demanding in another way. Faith in a 
people’s ability to govern themselves demands that we accept certain 
risks—including the risk that the very system of self-government 
might self-destruct. As much as the faith of a parent in a young 
adult’s autonomy or the faith of a colonial power in the new political 
system of its erstwhile dependency, the theorist of republicanism 
advocates that we take a chance on a people’s ability to govern 
themselves. Sure it means that things are up for grabs, and it is not 
unimaginable that the newly enfranchised entity will grab at 
something dangerous or ill conceived. To be exercised by this 
possibility is only human, but to be obsessed by it, in one’s thinking 
about institutional design, is to turn one’s back on the republican 
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aspiration, and to commit oneself instead to some form of paternalistic 
or aristocratic tutelage.224 
 
A republican theorist, in other words, ought to have more faith in the ability 
of his or her fellow citizens to govern ourselves according to the ideals of 
republicanism. Sure, there are risks that a republic might ‘self-destruct’225 
by republican means, but we ought not to be so ‘obsessed’ 226  by that 
possibility that we ‘turn [our] back[s]’227 on core republican aspirations.  
 
For Waldron, ‘the worst form of republican apostasy is to worry that social 
issues that one regards (perhaps rightly) as of great importance may be 
settled in ways that do not depend purely on one’s own thinking, or one’s own 
conscience, or one’s own convictions about justice, and to portray that as the 
sort of danger that we need judicial review to guard against.’228 It is, in other 
words, a form of ‘republican apostasy’ to not accept the fact that we share 
the world with our fellow citizens with whose notions of justice we might 
reasonably disagree: 
For each of us, to engage in politics is to accept that we share the 
world with others—millions of others—who are constituted not just as 
objects of our moral concern but as individual thinkers with their own 
view on the matters that we take so seriously. There is a danger that 
when one moves from a politics dominated by interest to a politics 
dominated by principle, people will find it harder (morally harder) to 
accept compromise or to submit to social decisions with which they do 
not agree. Republicanism requires this move of us—it requires us to 
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take matters of principle seriously; but because it is a political 
philosophy, it requires each of us as a citizen to loosen a little the 
connection between our own convictions and what we can expect from 
our polity. Though each of us reasonably regards his own moral views 
as tremendously important, we must also (each of us) respect the 
elementary condition of being with others, which is both the essence of 
republican politics and the principle of mutual recognition that lies at 
the heart of the idea of citizenship.  
When one confronts a fellow citizen, one is not just dealing with a 
person entitled (on one’s own favourite moral theory) to liberty, 
justice, sustenance, rights, and protection. One is confronting above 
all a particular intelligence—a mind and consciousness that is not 
one’s own, that is not under one’s intellectual control, that has its own 
view of the world and its own account of the proper basis of relations 
with those whom it too sees as other. The worst thing, then, about 
judicial review from a republican standpoint, is that it tempts us away 
from that recognition, and entices us into a politics that offers a more 
direct vindication of the power and importance of our own moral 
convictions.229 
 
Waldron’s argument is a powerful one, which is that a scholar who calls 
himself republican yet is willing to accept judicial review, compromises the 
faith that republicans are expected to place in their fellow citizens to govern 
ourselves according to the principles of republicanism. We should place our 
faith in democracy rather than to seek to protect democracy through 
counter-majoritarian means. We should resist the temptation to argue that 
courts should be called upon to resolve disagreements with our fellow 
citizens about our respective notions of justice, even if there is a danger that 
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3.5  THE DIVERSITY WITHIN POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM—
DESCRIPTION AND EVALUATION 
 
In one of his more recent works on political constitutionalism, Tomkins casts 
the distinction between political constitutionalism and legal 
constitutionalism in the following terms: 
Constitutional scholarship in the English-speaking world knows many 
schools of thought and accommodates a variety of methods or 
approaches to the subject. In recent years, one of the most significant 
distinctions has been that between political constitutionalism and 
legal constitutionalism (also known as common law constitutionalism 
or legal liberalism). While there are numerous differences of view 
within these two broad categories, it is the difference between political 
and legal constitutionalists that has attracted the most attention. 
That difference is multi-faceted, but one central aspect of it is a basic 
disagreement about the fundamental constitutional question of how 
best to hold the government to account. Political constitutionalists 
privilege political forms and institutions of accountability; legal 
constitutionalists privilege legal forms and institutions of 
accountability. Thus, political constitutionalists tend to think that 
accountability is best secured through political institutions such as 
Parliament, by political actors such as parliamentarians and electors, 
and through political means such as debate, questioning, and 
investigative scrutiny, both in Parliament and through the media. 
Legal constitutionalists tend to think that accountability is best 
secured through the legal institution of the courts, by judges, and 
through the legal means of adjudicative litigation.230 
 
Tomkins’s vision of what he takes to be political constitutionalism suggests a 
similarity with normative positivism insofar as he suggests in the above 
quote that it is important for political constitutionalists that the discretion of 
judges be minimized.  
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But what Tomkins’s definition of political constitutionalism ignores is the 
type of diversity within political constitutionalism to which, in this chapter, I 
have drawn attention. Tomkins sees political constitutionalism as a school of 
thought that seeks to minimize the role of the courts in the constitutional 
system. That makes his political constitutionalism appear to be a form of 
normative positivism. But it is the foundation of his understanding of the 
UK constitution that is so very different from that of normative positivists. 
Normative positivists promote the conceptual separation of law and morality 
for normative reasons. Tomkins, on the other hand, does not seem troubled 
by the idea that his personal views of what counts as a ‘constitutionally 
entrenched’231 norm ought to trump the ‘liberal consensus’232 on the meaning 
of the constitution. 
 
It is that diversity within political constitutionalism that I have tried to 
uncover in this chapter by arguing that among those who are described in 
public law scholarship as political constitutionalists, Tomkins is unique in 
building his republican argument on an understanding of the UK 
constitution that is anti-positivist in character. While the political 
constitutionalism of Griffith, Bellamy, Campbell, and Waldron can be 
located within the fold of normative positivism, we cannot say the same 
about Tomkins. As I demonstrated above, the high level of concern for the 
democratic provenance of law, and for the separability of law and morality, 
that normative positivists express is missing from Tomkins’s work to the 
extent that he endorses a vision of a ‘constitution’ as a repository of abstract 
principles, principles that according to him deserve respect and obedience on 
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moral grounds, when in effect the norms that Tomkins wants us to consider 
as ‘constitutional’ norms may easily be described as his own preferred 
substantive values,233 values whose democratic source is in no way clear. 
When Tomkins claims in his work that a certain republican principle is a 
‘constitutional requirement’ 234  or is ‘constitutionally entrenched’ 235  or is 
‘constitutionally ordained’, 236  a normative positivist who endorses legal 
positivism for democratic reasons—i.e. a democratic positivist—would want 
to know why. A democratic positivist would ask hard questions about the 
democratic source of that norm that Tomkins wants to be regarded as a 
‘constitutionally entrenched’ norm. A democratic positivist would ask 
Tomkins: ‘where and by whom was the decision made that this should be one 
of the norms enforced in this society?’237 A democratic positivist would ask 
Tomkins: ‘Who exactly participated in the decision, and on what terms and 
through what processes did they participate?’238  A democratic positivist 
would ask Tomkins these questions because she ‘has very strong views about 
how decisions like these should be made.’239 She believes that ‘in principle 
everyone who stands to be governed by a given norm if it is adopted has the 
right to participate on equal terms in determining whether it should be 
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adopted.’ 240  She believes that ‘every society should set up political 
institutions that embody this principle and should seek to reform or 
subordinate decision-making institutions that operate on any other basis.’241 
A democratic positivist would also worry about Tomkins’s assertion that a 
certain republican norm is ‘constitutionally ordained’ 242  because a 
democratic positivist is very sensitive to the realities of disagreement.243 A 
democratic positivist would feel very uncomfortable with the idea that 
Tomkins refuses to accept something as a ‘constitutional’ 244  norm and 
believes in attaching the label ‘unconstitutional’245 to norms with which he 
disagrees. These disagreements, for the democratic positivist, about our 
subjective sense of what constitutes a ‘good constitution’, ought to be 
resolved democratically, not by mere assertion. 
 
I said in the introduction that my overall argument will have a descriptive 
as well as an evaluative dimension. If my descriptive argument is that 
Tomkins’s political constitutionalism is different from Griffith’s political 
constitutionalism because of the anti-positivist streak running through 
Tomkins’s political constitutionalism, then my evaluative argument is that I 
believe Bellamy, Griffith, Campbell, and Waldron present a more coherent 
picture than does Tomkins of the concept of political constitutionalism 
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precisely because, unlike Tomkins, they are all normative positivists. If the 
ultimate goal of a political constitutionalist is to minimize the discretion of 
judges and to privilege the role of democratic institutions over judicial 
institutions in the constitutional system for the sake of democracy, then we 
might say that it is a form of democratic ‘apostasy’246 to presuppose the same 
understanding of the constitution as the understanding of legal 
constitutionalists—an understanding according to which the constitution is 
defined as a constitution-of-abstract-principles, principles whose democratic 
source is in no way clear,247 principles that are unearthed through a process 
of moral interpretation, which process of interpretation turns on the moral 
judgment of the particular judge or theorist advocating that particular 
interpretation of the constitution. Thus, in the political constitutionalism of 
Tomkins, we can identify a liberal constitutionalist streak, which makes 
Tomkins’s political constitutionalism very different from the political 
constitutionalism of Griffith, the latter of whose political constitutionalism, 
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4.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter argues that many of the prescriptive arguments that Griffith 
made in ‘The Political Constitution’1—in particular the arguments that I 
described in Chapter 2 as normative positivist arguments—are best 
appreciated from a particular vantage. That vantage is the vantage of the 
citizen.2 We must resist the temptation, I will argue, to try make sense of 
Griffith’s arguments from the standpoint of the judge, in particular the 
appeals court judge, which, as one commentator has recently complained, ‘is 
so often the implicit vantage or viewpoint in legal writing today (and more so 
even in legal education today where students are fed little more than a 
steady diet of highest appeal court cases).’3 This complaint, of course, is not 
new; in a lecture delivered to an American audience in 1977, HLA Hart 
famously noted the concentration of American legal theorists, ‘almost to the 
                                            
1 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1. 
2 In making this argument, I draw upon James Allan's recent work, in which he argues that 
many of the good consequences of keeping separate law and morality and many of the 
negative consequences of having a bill of rights are best appreciated from the vantage of 
what he refers to as the concerned citizen. See generally James Allan, The Vantage of Law 
(Ashgate 2013). 
3 ibid 2. 
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point of obsession’, on the vantage of the judge—‘what courts do and should 
do, how judges reason and should reason in deciding particular cases.’4 
 
The central argument that I hope readers will take from this chapter is that 
the normative positivist arguments Griffith made in ‘The Political 
Constitution’, discussed in detail in previous chapters, are best appreciated 
from the standpoint of a citizen who values ‘the virtues (or good 
consequences) normally emphasized in republican theories, benefits such as 
having an involved citizenry that is responsible for the decisions taken in its 
name—one where people are encouraged to participate in political life, to 
debate key issues, and to play an active role in the polis.’5 In particular, I 
would argue that it would be a mistake to try to view Griffith’s arguments 
from the vantage of the appeals court judge, which happens to be the 
vantage from which, for example, Ronald Dworkin builds his theory of law.6 
Dworkin, as is well-known, builds his theory of law out of a theory of 
adjudication; 7  about Dworkin’s theory of law, Joseph Raz writes that 
Dworkin’s Law’s Empire8 is ‘not so much an explanation of the law as a 
sustained argument about how courts, especially American and British 
courts, should decide cases.’9 Dworkin’s liberal theory of law is, in other 
                                            
4 HLA Hart, ‘American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream’ (1977) 11 Georgia L Rev 969. 
5 Allan, The Vantage of Law (n 2) 55. 
6 See Chapter 3, Section 3.1 for a discussion of Dworkin’s theory of law. 
7 Allan, The Vantage of Law (n 2) 13. 
8 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press 1986). 
9 Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and 
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words, presented as a theory of interpretation—how judges interpret what 
Dworkin believes to be principles that exist underneath the hard positive 
law that judges unearth through a process of legal/moral interpretation. 
 
Griffith’s arguments, on the other hand, relating to his interest in 
minimizing the discretion of judges, his opposition to bills of rights, and his 
belief in placing our faith in the democratic process rather than in judges are 
all arguments that are best appreciated not from the vantage of the judge 
but, as I shall attempt to demonstrate in this chapter, from the vantage of 
the republican citizen. It is the citizen, committed to a republican form of 
government, from whose perspective we will be best able to appreciate the 
good consequences that would flow from the type of political 
constitutionalism advocated in Griffith’s ‘The Political Constitution’.  
 
 
4.2  THE IMPORTANCE OF SWITCHING STANDPOINT 
 
We considered in Chapter 2 the question of whether or not the purely 
conceptual version of legal positivism, with its purely descriptive aims, is 
even possible, and I noted that there is debate among scholars as to whether 
or not purely descriptive jurisprudence of the sort defended by HLA Hart10 
and Jules Coleman11 is even possible.12 How does this debate about the 
                                            
10 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Penelope A. Bulloch, Leslie Green & Joseph Raz eds, 
3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 240. 
11 Jules Coleman, ‘Negative and Positive Positivism’ (1982) 11 The Journal of Legal 
Studies 139. 
12 See Chapter 2, Section 2.3. Prominent examples of those who deny the possibility of 
purely conceptual jurisprudence uninvested in moral or normative concerns are John 
Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press 2011) Ch 1; Ronald 
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possibility of value-neutral jurisprudence relate to the question of normative 
positivism and its desirability? 
 
Schauer has argued that ‘[e]ven if it were possible to discover and describe 
the concept of law in a value-neutral way, it could still be worthwhile to 
consider whether the concept so described should be endorsed or condemned, 
promoted or restricted, changed or perpetuated.’13 He argues that normative 
positivism ‘does not require that descriptive conceptual positivism be 
impossible, and normative positivism’s desirability does not presuppose its 
inevitability.’14 If we accept that the concept of law is a socially-constructed 
concept that is ‘non-eternal’15 in nature (contrast that view from the natural 
law position), then, argues Schauer, ‘it is open to the theorist or citizen to 
consider what attitude to have—and what actions to take on the basis of that 
attitude—about the product of that social construction, even assuming the 
ability to describe what has been constructed at some moment in time.’16 
 
Because it is the case that normative positivism is a normative position, 
Schauer argues that it is important to clarify the vantage from which the 
particular normative argument is being made.17 ‘No particular voice, or 
                                                                                                                                 
Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Harvard University Press 2006) Ch 6. Others willing to allow 
this possibility include Julie Dickson, Evaluation and Legal Theory (Hart Publishing 
2001); Andrei Marmor, ‘Legal Positivism: Still Descriptive and Morally Neutral’ (2006) 26 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 683. 
13 Frederick Schauer, ‘Positivism Before Hart’ in Michael Freeman and Patricia Mindus 
(eds), The Legacy of John Austin’s Jurisprudence (Springer 2013) 281. 
14 ibid 281. 
15 ibid. 
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standpoint,’ argues Schauer, ‘is necessarily superior to any other, but it is 
difficult to understand any normative position, including…normatively-
focused positivisms…, without comprehending the source, the target, and 
the subject of the prescriptions being discussed.’ 18  In discussions of 
normative positivism, it is not always clear, he argues, what vantage it is 
from which a particular normative argument is being made: 
[A]lthough the normative is the domain of the “ought” rather than the 
“is,” the question arises about who it is who ought to do what. 
Waldron, for example, is not entirely explicit about whether in urging 
normative positivism he is urging that law be understood in a 
positivist way, or urging other legal theorists to understand law in a 
positivist way, or describing the fact that legal theorists 
understanding law in a positivist way have good reasons for that 
understanding, or whether he is describing or joining those who 
believe that it would be better for society to understand law in a 
positivist way. Each of these positions is possible, but it is important 
to understand the nature of the normative claims that are being 
advanced.19  
 
Schauer’s argument about the importance of situating the normative voice of 
the various positions within normative positivism is an important one, but it 
is of course not a novel argument in the broader context of jurisprudence in 
general (i.e. not just in the context of a normative positivist jurisprudence). 
William Twining once wrote that ‘in jurisprudence, it is essential to take 
clarification of standpoint seriously.’20 Legal scholarship often invites the 
reader to adopt one or more standpoints from which the author’s argument 
would be best understood, e.g. Oliver Wendell Holmes’s famous argument 
that ‘[i]f you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a 
                                            
18 ibid. 
19 ibid 281. 
20 William Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge University Press 2000) 
133. 
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bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such 
knowledge enables him to predict’.21  
 
Twining has long campaigned for the need to study law from a variety of 
standpoints22 and has written extensively on Holmes’s ‘bad man’.23 In one 
account of the ‘bad man’, he writes about the significance of changing the 
way we generally look at law and shifting our vantage away from the ‘top 
down’ perspective of judges and legislators and towards the ‘bottom up’ 
perspective of the citizen and others who are subject to the law: 
[T]he bad man is a good example of the significance of switching 
standpoint. In particular, he reminds us of the significance of bottom-
up perspectives. Even if broadly interpreted as a metaphor, he cannot 
be taken as fully representative of all legal subjects, such as victims, 
users, women, and the oppressed. But he does draw attention to the 
idea of law as other people’s power and in the process too much that 
tends to be omitted from theories that are exclusively top-down. How 
law is perceived and used by subjects is as significant for the purpose 
of understanding as the motives, aims, and decisions of those who 
control a legal system.24 
 
In other words, there is value, argues Twining, in switching standpoints for 
a better understanding of law, and in particular switching our vantage away 
from top-down perspectives (such as the judicial vantage) and towards 
                                            
21 Oliver Wendell Holmes, ‘The Path of Law’ (1897) 10 Harvard Law Review 457, 459 
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bottom-up perspectives (such as the vantage of the citizen) in order to 
appreciate the impact of law on those who are not directly authors of the law 




4.3  HOW IS THE VANTAGE OF THE CITIZEN DIFFERENT FROM THE 
VANTAGE OF THE JUDGE? 
 
What is crucial to understanding the difference between the vantage of the 
judge versus the vantage of the citizen is that the citizen has no power to 
designate what the law is.25 One may immediately object against this claim 
and say that the citizen’s vantage need not be understood exclusively as a 
bottom-up perspective, and that would, indeed, be a valid objection. The 
citizen’s role in constitutional authorship through the increasing use in the 
UK of the constitutional referendum has meant that the citizen does play a 
vital role in British constitutional authorship,26 and, therefore, the citizen’s 
vantage may also be understood as a top-down perspective. Nevertheless, 
outside the context of such ‘constitutional moments’,27 the citizen does not 
have the same power as does a legislator or a judge to say what the law is. 
The citizen has a vote that determines who the lawmakers will be, but she 
does not have a direct role in designating what the law is. 28  This 
distinction—between the powers of legislators and judges, on the one hand, 
                                            
25 Allan, The Vantage of Law (n 2) 15. 
26  Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Referendums: The Theory and Practice of 
Republican Deliberation (Oxford University Press 2012). 
27 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations v. 1 (Harvard University Press 1991). 
28 Allan, The Vantage of Law (n 2) 16. 
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to designate what the law is, and the citizen, on the other hand, who is 
subject to the law and has the power only to choose who gets to designate the 
law, or to influence through litigation the judges who get to designate the 
law—will be crucial for the purposes of understanding the arguments that 
follow. 
 
Let us, then, compare and contrast the vantages of the citizen and the judge. 
 
The Citizen. HLA Hart and Lon Fuller famously debated the issue of 
whether or not law and morality should be kept separate in the context of 
citizen disobedience to iniquitous law.29 This was a debate that took place on 
consequentialist grounds; their debate was whether a positivist 
understanding of law would facilitate such disobedience (the Hartian 
position) or whether we need to stop iniquitous law from being designated 
‘law’ in the first place, for otherwise citizens would obey government 
directives that achieved the status of ‘law’ (the Fullerian position).30 The 
question before Hart and Fuller was this: 
[W]hat will be most likely to engender an outlook that at least 
considers the possibility of not obeying evil government 
directives….Will it be to insist on having a separate moral platform or 
grounding on which to assess the demands of these directives or laws? 
Or will it be to deny these directives the designation ‘law’?31 
 
                                            
29 HLA Hart, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ 71 Harvard Law Review 
593; Lon L Fuller, ‘Positivism and Fidelity to Law:  A Reply to Professor Hart’ (1958) 71 
Harvard Law Review 630. 
30 For discussion, see Frederick Schauer, The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A 
Reply to Julie Dickson’ (2005) 25 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 493. 
31 Allan, The Vantage of Law (n 2) 15. 
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The key to answering this question is to note, first, as noted above, that the 
citizen has no direct power to designate what the law is, and second that 
when Hart and Fuller debated this issue, they were discussing the issue in 
the context of the Nazi regime, which is to say that they were debating this 
question in the context of a ‘Wicked Legal System’,32 not a reasonably well-
functioning, rights-respecting democracy. 
 
In a wicked legal system, the citizen generally will have no power to 
designate what the law is but, more importantly, the citizen is also, in a 
wicked legal system, not likely to have the power to exercise other tools 
available to citizens a reasonably well-functioning democracy. 33  In that 
scenario, separating law as it is from law as it ought to be provides the 
citizen the tools necessary ‘to rebel against the diktats of the occupying 
Nazis, or the Soviets in Poland, or the Sudanese in Darfur.’34 As Allan 
observes, the ‘fact that the authorities designated something as law did not 
prevent the building up of resistance throughout Europe during World War 
II or the forming of Solidarity unions in Gdansk or the creation of rebel 
armies in parts of Sudan.’35 The governments in wicked legal systems will 
already have labelled these evil directives as law, so it seems that for the 
citizen, it is crucial to keep separate law and morality in order to have a 
separate platform to assess whether or not a particular evil directive that 
the government has called law ought to be rejected or rebelled against.36 
                                            
32 ibid. 
33 ibid 15-18. 
34 ibid 15. 
35 ibid 15-16. 
36 ibid 16. 
 158 
 
From the Fullerian perspective of denying the label law to evil directives, it 
seems that the only option available to the citizen is to argue that what the 
government has designated law does not ‘count as law, or [is] not wholly law 
or fully law or law in anything other than a half-dead sense.’37 But by doing 
so, Allan argues, ‘all the difficult and tricky moral calculations and 
consequentialist weightings, including when and how to disobey, get 
collapsed into the one single issue of whether what the regime calls and 
labels a law is sufficiently moral to retain that label.’38 The Fullerian anti-
separation argument (by ‘anti-separation’, I mean the argument against the 
positivist insistence on keeping law and morality separate) is that if we label 
something as law, citizens will obey it, and therefore, we should attempt to 
prevent evil directives from achieving the status of ‘law’ in the first place. 
This seems to be an empirical question, and although Allan recognizes the 
empirical nature of this question, and although he notes that neither Hart 
nor Fuller offered any empirical data to buttress their respective arguments, 
he still concludes that in his view Hart was right, which is that the citizen 
‘will be better placed to decide whether to flee or to engage in civil 
disobedience or to take up arms and fight by keeping [law and morality] 
separate rather than blending them together.’39  
 
The Judge. When we turn our attention away from the citizen and towards 
the judge, what does the Fullerian anti-separation argument look like? In 
this case, the Fullerian position seems to be a strong one if we think about 






this position in the context not of wicked legal systems but in the context of a 
well-functioning democracy. In the context of a well-functioning democracy, 
the Fullerian anti-separation case is stronger ‘than in any other sort of legal 
system, because there is more scope [in a well-functioning democracy] to 
ensure that what gets officially designated as ‘law’ will be morally good, or at 
least will not be egregiously immoral.’40 That is because a reasonably well-
functioning democracy has ‘all sorts of institutional and legislative checks 
and balances and avenues for grievances.’41 If we accept that citizens in a 
well-functioning democracy are likely, in most cases, to obey what gets 
designated as law, than the Fullerian anti-separation argument seems to be 
a strong one:  ‘the best way to deal with wicked, evil, egregious, odious 
laws’42 is to prevent them from becoming law in the first place. 
 
Notice, however, that this argument implicitly assumes the vantage of 
someone in the legal system, such as the judge, who has the power to 
designate what the law is; it does not assume the vantage of the citizen 
because the citizen is in no position to prevent such designations. The good 
consequences of the anti-separation position are most visible from the 
perspective of those, such as the judge, who are in the authoritative position 
to designate what the law is in the legal system. The judge, using his powers 
of designating what the law is and of denying the label ‘law’ to government 
directives, can deny that label to those laws that he takes to be morally 
iniquitous. 
 
                                            




The Fullerian anti-separation argument may be one that is preferred not 
just by judges but also by citizens. The citizen may prefer a legal system in 
which judges have the power to declare as invalid those laws or government 
directives that the judge and citizen both take to be wicked or morally 
depraved. The danger, however, for the citizen committed to a republican 
form of government is that once we allow judges to have that power, they—
the judges—retain that power even in those instances in which the citizen 
may think that the law in question is not wicked. In other words, ‘the same 
tools that allow the Judge, and only the Judge, what [an external observer to 
the legal system] would characterize as rewriting or nullifying certain laws, 
laws seen to be particularly odious,’43 are tools that are also at the judge’s 
disposal in those cases where some, or even most, people would not deem the 
law to be odious.44 In those cases in which we might say that there is, in a 
Waldronian sense, reasonable disagreement about issues of justice and 
rights,45 giving judges that power to deny the label ‘law’ to particular laws 
when reasonable people would say that the law in question is not wicked 
may appear from the perspective of the citizen invested in republican values 
to be an unattractive proposition: 
[T]he more one is inclined…to see the world in Waldronian terms, 
where reasonable, smart, well-informed, even nice people simply 
disagree on all sorts of (if not all) moral issues…—where dissensus 
and disagreement over where to draw the whole array of lines that 
need drawing in society when it comes to abortion, immigration, how 
to balance criminal procedural entitlements against the need to lessen 
drunk driving, euthanasia, what limits to put on speech and religious 
practices and so much more is simply to be expected and is not a sign 
                                            
43 ibid 25. 
44 ibid. 
45 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press 1999). 
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of pathology—the more one will worry about handing too much power 
to unelected judges.46 
 
For the citizen, with a concern and an interest in promoting the republican 
values that I noted above,47 in other words, there will be a ‘trade-off’—the 
‘more scope judges, and only judges, have to instil or infuse their own moral 
views into law when the latter is egregiously bad (at least according to 
them), the more scope they are likely to have to do so as well when the latter 
is good or okay or not too bad (at least according to plenty of non-judges).’48 
Does our citizen feel comfortable handing over such power to judges even in 
those cases where the law is not egregiously bad and about whose merit or 
demerit reasonable people can disagree? It seems to me, and here I am in 
agreement with Allan,49 that for the citizen invested in the republican values 
of participation in self-government through representative institutions, 
handing over judges these powers at the expense of democracy is an 
unattractive proposition. 
 
Let us now turn our attention away from the Hart-Fuller debate and 
towards the Hart-Dworkin debate and consider how the question of vantage 
pertains to that debate. 
 
Let us take, first, the Hartian legal positivist understanding of law as a 
system of rules. According to the Hartian understanding, there will be 
instances were the judge is left with discretion to make law in what we 
                                            
46 Allan, The Vantage of Law (n 2) 25. 
47 See text to (n 5). 
48 Allan, The Vantage of Law (n 2) 26. 
49 ibid. 
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might describe as a ‘penumbral’ case—a case in which, owing to the 
indeterminate nature of language, a given rule will not clearly apply.50 In 
this situation, the judge is in the unique position of having the ability to 
designate what the law is according to his or her own morality. For the 
judge, his or her view ‘of what is moral, because of her position as 
authoritative resolver of disputes, can become law’,51 and in this instance, it 
may be that the judge has a difficult time separating what the law is from 
what the law ought to be. 
 
We can acknowledge that these cases are only the ones that rarely reach the 
highest court in the legal system; we can concede that most legal disputes in 
a reasonably well-functioning democracy will not reach the courts, much less 
the highest court. But, nevertheless, the fact remains that from the vantage 
of the judge, ‘when deciding one of these exceptional cases that has wound 
its way up to the jurisdiction’s highest court, law and morality seem closely 
intertwined’ and are ‘difficult to separate.’52 In one of these penumbral cases, 
what ‘the outcome should be, according to the [judge’s] own moral sense, can 
become or translate into what the law is.’53  
 
That is not to deny that judges cannot keep the two assessments separate. 
Judges, at least in lower courts, are constrained by stare decisis and are 
expected to follow precedents of higher courts. In those instances, it may 
                                            
50 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 10) 12 (‘[A]ll rules have a penumbra of uncertainty where 
the judge must choose between alternatives.’). 
51 Allan, The Vantage of Law (n 2) 20. 
52 ibid. 
53 ibid 20. 
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well be the case that a judge finds a binding precedent morally questionable 
but is bound nevertheless to apply it, and in those instances, the judge may 
well be able to keep separate law and morality. As Allan notes, there ‘is no 
doubt that for the honest or non-prevaricating judge the common law can 
sometimes produce a body of rules as determinate as any statutory 
rule….And those rules need not in every case align with what some 
particular person thinks is morally good or morally tolerable, even if that 
person is a judge.’54 
 
This ability to separate law and morality is also evident in those instances at 
the highest appellate court level where the judge finds herself in the 
dissenting minority, for in this case, such a dissenting judge ‘can quite easily 
distinguish between what the majority just said the law is, and what she 
said it should be.’55 
 
Having acknowledged the judge’s ability to distinguish between what the 
law is and what it ought to be, it is still true that in a Hartian penumbral 
case, the judge, unlike the citizen, ‘is at times in the authoritative position to 
be able to elide her ‘oughts’ and the legal system’s ‘ises’.’56 
 
How do things change if we adopt not a Hartian legal positivist 
understanding of law but instead a Dworkinian anti-positivist 
understanding? Here, would it be easy for the judge to elide law and 
morality? Allan believes that this would be the case even more so than in the 
                                            
54 ibid 21. 
55 ibid. 
56 ibid 22. 
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case of a Hartian understanding. On a Dworkinian understanding, the judge 
‘finds herself obliged regularly and routinely to blend together law and 
morality’,57 and so the possibility, Allan argues, for a judge to separate law 
and morality becomes more difficult on a Dworkinian understanding of law 
than on a Hartian understanding. Why? 
 
I discussed the Dworkinian notion of law in Chapter 3, from which 
discussion it may be recalled that in what Dworkin termed ‘hard cases’, in 
which existing rules do not clearly apply, judges construct a background fit 
theory that justifies the existing rules of the legal system; underneath the 
rules, as Dworkin argued, the legal system has committed itself to certain 
important principles.58 For Dworkin that background fit theory is, as Allan 
explains, one ‘that best explains and justifies that jurisdiction’s 
constitutional provisions and statutes and precedents and conventions.’59 We 
can say, therefore, that a Dworkinian judge is not necessarily free to rule 
without constraint. The Dworkinian judge is, arguably, constrained the way 
a chain novelist is in Dworkin’s chain novel metaphor; that is to say that the 
Dworkinian judge is constrained ‘by these existing materials, not unlike the 
way a chain novelist asked to write the tenth chapter of a book is 
constrained by the preceding nine chapters written by others.’60 In terms of 
that ‘direct or first-order sense’,61 a Dworkinian judge is constrained by the 
                                            
57 ibid. 
58 See Chapter 3, Section 3.2A. 





existing materials—the right answers that Dworkin believes require to be 
unearthed. 
 
On the other hand, ‘at the second-order or meta level’,62 the Dworkinian 
judge is not truly constrained in coming up with that background fit theory. 
That background theory needs to be constructed on the basis of that 
Dworkinian judge’s own moral views. The Dworkinian judge’s views on what 
this background fit theory might be implicates her own moral views. As 
Allan argues, the Dworkinian judge’s ‘own moral view of what that best 
background fit should be, because of her unique authoritative position, 
becomes or turns into what it is in fact (assuming, for the moment, that our 
Judge is in the majority and not dissenting).’63 The result of this Dworkinian 
understanding of law is that a Dworkinian judge is often found to be 
blending his or her views of what the law ought to be into what the law is: 
In stark terms, the Dworkinian judge is regularly and routinely 
blending together her ‘oughts’ and ‘ises’, or transmogrifying the 
former into the latter. True, she is not simply substituting her own 
first-order moral preferences or judgments for the laid-down legal 
rules. But in a [reasonably well-functioning democracy] there is 
certainly scope, because of the general benevolence of the materials 
with which the Judge is working, to shape her all-encompassing best 
justifying theory, to achieve much of what she might like, had she 
been free simply to substitute her ‘ought’ for the imposed ‘is’.64  
 
Allan’s point is that since a Dworkinian judge takes her job to be ‘to make 
the best she can of the materials before her—to write the very best chapter 
                                            
62 ibid. 
63 ibid. 
64 ibid 23. 
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ten that she can’65 [referring to Dworkin’s chain novel metaphor], it raises 
the question as to just how constrained a Dworkinian judge really is: 
 
On a Dworkinian understanding of law, in the search for those deep 
legal principles that are nowhere laid down in a recognized, source-
based rule, it would appear to be even easier for the Judge to elide law 
and morality than on a Hartian understanding of law. And this claim 
is further buttressed to the extent one suspects, with me, that for 
Dworkinians all cases that reach a judge are in fact potential Hard 
Cases—that the only way to decide if the clear rules apply (or should 
apply) or not is to first build this best background fit that infuses ‘how 
things should be’ into ‘how they are’. Even rules that at first sight 
appear clearly and unambiguously to apply to the case at hand—as in 
[Riggs v. Palmer]—might be held not to apply on a Dworkinian 
understanding. Every case, in other words, is potentially a Hard Case. 
And the Dworkinian judge can only know for sure by first constructing 
her all-encompassing best background fit that elides the ‘ought’ and 
the ‘is’.66  
 
Thus, the fact that a Dworkinian judge ‘can override even the clearest of 
laid-down rules…prompts one to wonder what the difference is…between 
deciding a case retrospectively and deciding it based on rights that the 
parties were unaware existed.’67 
 
4.4  THE NORMATIVE VOICE IN GRIFFITH’S POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
We looked in detail in Chapter 2 at Griffith’s normative positivist 
arguments. These arguments included Griffith’s insistence, for normative 
reasons, on the positivist separation of law and morality, his interest in 
minimizing the discretion of judges, his interest in privileging the role of 
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democratic institutions over the role of judges in the legal system, his 
opposition to bills of rights, and his opposition to the liberal, anti-positivist 
understandings of law that were being advanced by his contemporaries. 
 
My argument in this chapter, which will be used as a foundation for 
arguments made in Chapter 5 below, is that Griffith’s political 
constitutionalism (which as I argued in Chapter 2 is a form of normative 
positivism) is best appreciated from the perspective of a citizen within the 
legal system; a citizen invested in the republican values associated with 
participation in self-government. Indeed, most other normative positivist 
arguments of the sort that Griffith advanced in his lecture are also those 
that are best appreciated from the vantage of the citizen. Consider, for 
example, Waldron’s discussion of the normative positivism advanced by 
Hobbes, Bentham, and Hume: 
[For the normative decisional positivist,] putative cases of moral 
decision-making in law…are unsatisfactory aspects of the law to be 
condemned and minimized. The legal system should be reformed so 
that moral decision-making, by judges or officials, is eliminated as far 
as possible. 
Why? The reason in Hobbes’s, Hume’s, and Bentham’s 
jurisprudence had to do with the desirability of certainty, security of 
expectation, and knowledge of what legally empowered officials were 
likely to require. If the decisions of an official turned on the exercise of 
his moral judgment, there would be no telling what he might come up 
with. From the point of view of the citizen trying to organize his life, 
the official’s decisions would be arbitrary.68 
 
As Waldron notes in the above quotation, Hobbes, Hume, and Bentham all 
advocated a form of normative positivism that promoted minimizing the 
discretion of judges and separating law and morality for the good 
                                            
68 Waldron, Law and Disagreement (n 45) 167. 
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consequences that would result from ‘the point of view of the citizen trying to 
organize his life’.69 
 
Recall, also, that when Waldron was arguing in the early 1990s against the 
adoption of a Bill of Rights in the United Kingdom, he ended his famous 
article in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies with an invitation to the 
reader to adopt the vantage of a citizen invested in the republican ideal of 
participation in self-government through representative institutions: 
 
If we are going to defend the idea of an entrenched Bill of Rights put 
effectively beyond revision by anyone other than the judges, we should 
try and think what we might say to some public-spirited citizen who 
wishes to launch a campaign or lobby her MP on some issue of rights 
about which she feels strongly and on which she has done her best to 
arrive at a considered and impartial view. She is not asking to be a 
dictator; she perfectly accepts that her voice should have no more 
power than that of anyone else who is prepared to participate in 
politics. But—like her suffragette forebears—she wants a vote; she 
wants her voice and her activity to count on matters of high political 
importance.  
In defending a Bill of Rights, we have to imagine ourselves saying 
to her: ‘You may write to the newspaper and get up a petition and 
organize a pressure group to lobby Parliament. But even if you 
succeed, beyond your wildest dreams, and orchestrate the support of a 
large number of like-minded men and women, and manage to prevail 
in the legislature, your measure may be challenged and struck down 
because your view of what rights we have does not accord with the 
judges’ view. When their votes differ from yours, theirs are the votes 
that will prevail.’ It is my submission that saying this does not 
comport with the respect and honour normally accorded to ordinary 
men and women in the context of a theory of rights.70  
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Griffith, like Waldron and other normative positivists, and unlike Dworkin, 
was not interested in building a theory of adjudication—he was not 
interested in instructing judges on how they should or should not decide 
particular cases, except to the extent that he was interested in minimizing 
as far as possible the discretion enjoyed by those judges. Too often, in legal 
scholarship, as Twining has observed, we tend to adopt the vantage of the 
judge, and we tend to think of law from top-down perspectives.71 To adopt 
the vantage of the judge in an attempt to appreciate Griffith’s arguments, 
however, would be a mistake. Griffith’s arguments, like the normative 
positivist arguments of Hobbes, Hume, Bentham, and Waldron noted above, 
are best appreciated from the perspective of the citizen—a citizen who 
values the republican ideal of participation in self-government and who 
believes in placing her faith in democracy and in taking disagreement among 
her fellow citizens seriously, rather than someone who believes in promoting 
a system of government in which we are comfortable with handing over to 
unelected judges the power to protect certain substantive values about which 
values there is bound to be reasonable disagreement among citizens and 
judges alike. 
 
The argument to be taken away, then, from this chapter is that the 
normative voice in Griffith’s political constitutionalism is the voice of the 
republican citizen. In Chapter 5 below, the reader will be asked, in the 
context of a different debate, to remember this argument, as we shift our 
vantage in that chapter, in the context of a different debate, away from the 
judge and, again, make the citizen the focus of our attention. 
  
                                            















5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this final chapter, I want to ask what contribution Griffith’s normative 
positivism, discussed in detail in previous chapters, can make to what I refer 
to in this chapter as the ‘narratives of devolution’. The narratives of 
devolution are the different ways in which the existing scholarship has 
attempted to explain the meaning of the UK constitution in light of the 
Scottish devolutionary settlement, and Section 5.2 below looks in detail at 
these narratives of devolution. Section 5.3 explains what is missing from 
these dominant narratives and how these narratives can benefit from the 
normative positivist arguments that Griffith advanced in his Chorley 
lecture. Drawing on arguments made in Chapter 4 above, this section will 
argue that the dominant narratives of devolution have too often attempted 
to make sense of Scottish devolution from the vantage of the judge rather 
than that of the citizen, and that once we switch our vantage towards the 
citizen, we are better able to appreciate the costs associated with subjecting 
Acts of the Scottish Parliament to rights-based judicial review. Section 5.4 
looks at contemporary debates surrounding parliamentary sovereignty, and 
the purpose of this section is to set the stage for Section 5.5, in which the 
chapter will look at the consequences of the parliamentary sovereignty 
debates for Scottish devolution. In this section, that is Section 5.5, the 
chapter turns to the argument that preserving parliamentary sovereignty as 
a constitutional design feature in a manner that gives ‘subordinate’ status to 
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the Scottish Parliament and other devolved legislatures is an undemocratic 
feature of our constitutional arrangements. In order to remedy this 
undemocratic feature, the chapter closes with a look at three possible 
models, which, if followed, could secure more of a Griffith style of political 
constitutionalism at the devolved level. 
 
Let us begin by considering what the narratives of devolution are. 
 
5.2  THE NARRATIVES OF DEVOLUTION 
 
On 18 September 2014, voters in Scotland responded to the question, ‘Should 
Scotland be an independent country?’1 The majority of those who voted in 
this referendum answered ‘No’ to this question and voted in favour of 
maintaining Scotland’s union with the United Kingdom.2 I mention at the 
beginning of this section the Scottish independence referendum not to 
discuss the ‘lively, if sometimes bad-tempered, debate about the 
implications, and advantages and disadvantages, of independence’3 that the 
referendum generated. Rather, my interest for present purposes is in what 
came to be known during the debates surrounding the Scottish independence 
                                            
1 Scottish Independence Referendum Act 2013, s 1(2) and (4).  
2 See Stephen Tierney, ‘‘And the Winner is…the Referendum’: Scottish Independence and 
the Deliberative Participation of Citizens’ (September 29, 2014). Available at Scottish 




(visited 23 February 2015).  
3 Aileen McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the Contested Constitution and the 
Authorship of Constitutional Change’ (April 17, 2014). Available at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2431050> (visited 21 February 2015) 1. 
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referendum as the narratives of devolution4—that is, the ways in which the 
Union of the various kingdoms of the UK, and attempts to change that 
Union, should be conceived politically and legally.5 
 
What are the narratives of devolution? It became necessary to address this 
question early on in the referendum debates because it was thought at that 
time that a legal challenge might arise at some point during the referendum 
process, namely a challenge to an independence referendum-enabling 
statute to be enacted by the Scottish Parliament.6 The Scottish Government 
argued that the Scottish Parliament enjoyed the competence to enact such a 
statute unilaterally and without need for amendment of the Scotland Act;7 
the UK Government disagreed,8 as did the House of Lords Select Committee 
on the Constitution.9 The significance, as a matter of both law and politics, of 
this disagreement between the two governments was, at the time, difficult to 
overstate. As one commentator observed: 
                                            
4 This phrase is borrowed from McHarg, ibid. See also Gavin Anderson and others, ‘The 
Independence Referendum, Legality and the Contested Constitution: Widening the Debate’ 
(January 31, 2012) UKCLA Blog. Available at 
<http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/31/gavin-anderson-et-al-the-independence-
referendum-legality-and-the-contested-constitution-widening-the-debate/> (visited 23 
February 2015). 
5 My thanks to Professor Christine Bell for the phrasing of this definition. 
6 McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the Contested Constitution and the Authorship 
of Constitutional Change’ (n 3) 2-3. 
7 Scottish Government, Your Scotland, Your Referendum (2012) Edinburgh: The Scottish 
Government. Available at <http://www.gov.scot/Publications/2012/01/1006> (visited 1 
October 2015) 5. 
8  See Select Committee on the Constitution, Report on Referendum on Scottish 
Independence (2012), HL Paper 263. Available at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201012/ldselect/ldconst/263/263.pdf> (visited 1 
October 2015) 6. 
9 ibid 12-13. 
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[T]he location of this authority [to authorize the referendum] has not 
only shaped the capacity of each government to influence the political 
agenda surrounding the referendum, but it also says something 
profound about the distribution of power that presently exists 
between the United Kingdom and Scotland. Nothing less than 
“sovereignty” is at stake in at least two senses: the traditional legal 
sovereignty of the UK Parliament, and the recently asserted political 
sovereignty of the people of Scotland. The location of the authority to 
call a referendum on Scottish independence is accordingly one of the 
most potent indicators of the current state of UK devolution that 
might be imagined. For the question is not only about what the 
United Kingdom might become, but also about what it already is.10 
 
Views on this highly significant question—whether or not the Scottish 
Parliament enjoyed the power to enact an independence referendum-
enabling statute unilaterally and without modification of the Scotland Act—
differed not only between the two governments but also within the academic 
community, with some denying that the Scottish Parliament enjoyed this 
power11 while others suggesting that the matter was less clear.12 It was in 
the argument advanced by the latter group of scholars, that is those 
                                            
10 Nicholas Aroney, ‘Reserved Matters, Legislative Purpose and the Referendum on Scottish 
Independence’ [2014] Public Law 422, 423 (citation omitted). 
11 E.g. Aroney, ‘Reserved Matters, Legislative Purpose and the Referendum on Scottish 
Independence’ (n 10); Adam Tomkins, ‘The Referendum on Separation for Scotland’, Written 
Evidence to the House of Commons, Scottish Affairs Committee (2011). Available at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmscotaf/writev/referendum/
rs04.htm> (visited 1 October 2015); Adam Tomkins, ‘The Scottish Parliament and the 
Independence Referendum’ (January 12, 2012). UKCLA Blog. Available at 
<http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/12/adam-tomkins-the-scottish-parliament-and-the-
independence-referendum/> (visited 1 October 2015); Aidan O’Neill QC, Written Evidence to 
the House of Commons, Scottish Affairs Committee (2012). Available at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmscotaf/1608/1608we16.ht
m> (visited 1 October 2015); Aidan O’Neill, ‘We Need to Talk About the Referendum….’ 
(November 4, 2011). Available at UKSC Blog <http://ukscblog.com/we-need-to-talk-about-
the-referendum> (visited 23 February 2015). 
12  Anderson and others, ‘The Independence Referendum, Legality and the Contested 
Constitution’ (n 4). 
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suggesting that the matter was less clear, that the question ‘What are the 
policy and objects of devolution?’ was addressed, and it is in their argument 
that we will be able to locate the narratives of devolution. 
 
This latter group of scholars published a piece in early 2012 in which 
(responding to the UK Government’s argument that the Scottish Parliament 
lacked the authority to unilaterally authorize an independence referendum) 
they argued that ‘the legality of a referendum Bill passed under the Scotland 
Act as it currently stands is a more open question than has been generally 
acknowledged.’13 This group of commentators believed ‘that a plausible case 
can be made that such a Bill would be lawful’14 and that the case for the 
legality of such a bill ‘rests on a particular reading both of the purposes of a 
referendum Bill, and of the purposes of the Scotland Act.’15 It was, in their 
view, important to address the question ‘What is the purpose of the Scotland 
Act?’ because a purposive interpretation of the Scotland Act—an interpretive 
approach previously endorsed by the House of Lords in the context of 
devolution statutes 16 —would require the courts to address this very 
question.17  
 




16 Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland [2002] UKHL 32. 
17  Anderson and others, ‘The Independence Referendum, Legality and the Contested 
Constitution’ (n 4). 
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What, then, did this group of scholars, that is Gavin Anderson and others, 
determine to be the purpose of the Scotland Act? There are three possible 
ways, they argued, of answering this question: 
There are at least three possibilities.  One is to regard devolution as a 
mere delegation of authority from the UK Parliament.  On this view, 
the Scottish Parliament is politically and legally subordinate to 
Westminster, and the latter remains the sole [front] of sovereign 
authority within the state (the unitary state narrative).  The 
second possibility is that devolution represents a move towards a 
quasi-federal constitution.  On this view, the Scottish Parliament is 
the political equal of Westminster, within its sphere of competence, 
but it is bound by the norms of the UK constitution as a whole (the 
federalist narrative).  The third view sees devolution as a 
renegotiation of the terms of Union on the part of the sovereign 
Scottish people, and hence sees the Scottish Parliament as a 
legitimate representative of the Scottish people in the course of any 
further renegotiation in which the interests of the Union as a whole 
and of its various parts are put at issue (the union state 
narrative).18 
 
These three possibilities of understanding the purpose of Scottish 
devolution—the three possible ways of reading the UK constitution in the 
light of the Scottish devolutionary settlement—these are what I have been 
referring to as the narratives of devolution. These narratives of devolution, 
as Aileen McHarg puts it, are ‘three potential understandings of the 
territorial nature of the British constitution [that] can be found within 




                                            
18 ibid. 
19 McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the Contested Constitution and the Authorship 
of Constitutional Change’ (n 3) 12. 
 
 177 
5.2A  The Unitary State Narrative 
The first of these, that is the unitary state narrative, we may say, represents 
the ‘official view’20 of devolution. The sovereign Westminster Parliament 
may choose, as it does in the case of various other public bodies, to delegate 
its authority to devolved legislatures, the devolved legislatures may only 
exercise the powers that they have been authorized to exercise in the 
devolution statute, and the legislative supremacy of the UK Parliament 
remains unaffected.21 The Scotland Act expressly preserves the sovereignty 
of the Westminster Parliament,22 and included in that sovereign ability is 
the ability, unilaterally, to amend the devolution statutes or bring an end to 
the devolution project.23 
 
The official view of devolution though it may well be, McHarg argues that 
‘the unitary version of the territorial constitution does not do justice to the 
significance of devolution, particularly in Scotland.’24 It does not do justice to 
the meaning of devolution in Scotland in particular because it ‘fails to take 
account of [Scottish devolution’s] political origins in the 1988 Claim of Right, 
the Scottish Constitutional Convention, and the 1997 referendum, which 
were premised on the assertion of a distinct Scottish national identity, and 
the corresponding right of the Scottish people to determine their own 
                                            
20 ibid 13. 
21 ibid. 
22 Scotland Act 1998, s 28(7). 
23 McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the Contested Constitution and the Authorship 
of Constitutional Change’ (n 3) 13. As McHarg reminds us, the Westminster Parliament 
abolished the Northern Irish legislature in 1973 and repeatedly suspended the Northern 
Ireland Assembly between 2000 and 2007. 
24 ibid. 
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constitutional future.’ 25  About this Claim of Right document, Stephen 
Tierney writes: 
What is notable about this paper and others which subsequently 
emerged through this process [i.e. the process of constitutional change 
that began with a campaign for a Scottish Assembly in 1985], is the 
extent to which they would draw upon the notion of ‘union’ as the 
fundamental constitutional principle of the UK. This had three 
implications. First, the Claim of Right asserted the distinctive 
national identity and cultural and institutional specificity of Scotland 
(each of which had to some extent been recognized in the Acts of 
Union 1707), and argued for the on-going constitutional relevance of 
this ‘multinational’ conception of the United Kingdom. Secondly, the 
document aired the grievance that the ‘union state’ pact stemming 
from 1707 had been undermined by subsequent UK constitutional 
practice. Thirdly, the Claim of Right declared an entitlement to 
Scottish self-government based upon the notion that a distinctive 
national identity carries with it a legitimate, indeed inherent, political 
right of self-determination.26 
 
Thus, the unitary state narrative to a great extent ignores the historical and 
political circumstances from which the devolutionary settlement, and the 
present calls for an independence referendum, resulted and, accordingly, 
does not do justice to the meaning of devolution from a Scottish 
perspective.27  
 
Furthermore, while the unitary state narrative may have the positive law on 
its side—positive law that asserts the continuing sovereignty of the UK 
                                            
25 ibid. 
26 Stephen Tierney, ‘‘The Three Hundred and Seven Year Itch’: Scotland and the 2014 
Independence Referendum’ in Matt Qvortrup (ed), The British Constitution:  Continuity 
and Change (Hart Publishing 2013) 145 (citation omitted). 
27 For more on the process of devolution and the independence referendum in a historical 
context, see Tierney, ibid 143-146. 
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Parliament 28 —this narrative is contradicted by the Sewel Convention, 
which, ‘as a matter of political morality rather than constitutional law’,29 
requires the UK Parliament to seek the Scottish Parliament’s consent before 
the former may legislate in devolved areas or amend the Scotland Act.30  
 
The unitary state narrative is also to some extent undermined by judicial 
pronouncements in recent years that have elevated the status of the Scottish 
Parliament, from a status of being considered ‘like any other body set up by 
law’31 to having the status, as a democratically elected parliament, of a body 
whose statutes should only be struck down at common law in the most 
exceptional of circumstances.32 There has, furthermore, been an indication 
from the courts that the Scotland Act, as a ‘constitutional statute’, may be 
protected from implied repeal,33 but recently this ‘constitutional’ status has 
been held to be irrelevant to the question of how the Scotland Act ought to be 
interpreted;34 thus, although the courts have given mixed messages on the 
                                            
28 Scotland Act 1998, s 28(7). 
29 McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the Contested Constitution and the Authorship 
of Constitutional Change’ (n 3) 13. 
30  On the Sewel convention, see Chris Himsworth and CM O’Neill, Scotland’s 
Constitution: Law and Practice (2nd ed, Bloomsbury Professional 2009) 140-142. 
31 Whaley v. Watson 2000 SC 340 at 348 (Lord President Roger). 
32 AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46.  
33 Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] 3 WLR 247; BH v The Lord Advocate 
(Scotland) [2012] UKSC 24. 
34 Imperial Tobacco Ltd v Lord Advocate [2012] UKSC 61.  
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status of the Scottish Parliament and the Scotland Act, ‘the door is clearly 
open to alternative readings of the territorial constitution.’35  
 
5.2B  The Union State Narrative 
The union state narrative is a second possible reading of the UK 
constitution, according to which reading ‘the origins of the UK in the 1707 
Union between Scotland and England is not merely an historical fact, but 
has continuing constitutional relevance in explaining and justifying the 
asymmetrical nature of governance within the state.’36  The union state 
narrative contradicts the unitary state narrative because according to the 
former, sovereignty lies in ‘the people of the UK’s constituent nations, who 
retain the right to exercise their constituent power to redefine the terms of 
Union.’37 The union state narrative ‘has considerable political resonance in 
Scotland, and has been given added impetus by the background to and 
existence of the Scottish Parliament, which provides the Scottish people with 
a clear political voice.’38 
 
This reading of the UK constitution, however, is ‘primarily a political rather 
than a legal’39 reading, notwithstanding Lord President Cooper’s famous 
description of parliamentary sovereignty as a ‘distinctively English principle 
                                            
35 McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the Contested Constitution and the Authorship 
of Constitutional Change’ (n 3) 14. 
36 ibid. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid (citation omitted). 
39 ibid 15. 
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that has no counterpart in Scottish Constitutional Law’.40 As McHarg notes, 
even if Lord Cooper ‘accepted that the Treaty of Union was, in principle, 
binding on the UK Parliament…the Union is almost irrelevant as a 
contemporary source of legal rights and obligations.’41 That is so because the 
courts have never struck down a statute for breaching a provision of the 
Treaty of Union and the Scottish courts have ‘in all other respects accepted 
the orthodox doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty’.42 
 
The union state narrative still has the capacity, however, to operate ‘on the 
symbolic plane to influence the development of the legal constitution’,43 as 
was evident in its invocation by commentators who argued that the Scotland 
Act ought to be read in its constitutional context, purposively and not 
literally.44 This constitutional context was thought to be one in which ‘as the 
legitimate representatives of the Scottish people, the Scottish Parliament 
should be regarded as having the right to ascertain their views by organising 
an advisory referendum on independence’.45  
                                            
40  MacCormick v. Lord Advocate 1953 SC 396, cited in McHarg, ‘The Independence 
Referendum, the Contested Constitution and the Authorship of Constitutional Change’ (n 3) 
15. 
41 McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the Contested Constitution and the Authorship 
of Constitutional Change’ (n 3) 15. 
42 ibid. See also Adam Tomkins, ‘The Constitutional Law in MacCormick v Lord Advocate’ 
(2004) Juridical Review 213, cited in McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the 
Contested Constitution and the Authorship of Constitutional Change’ (n 3) 15. 
43 McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the Contested Constitution and the Authorship 
of Constitutional Change’ (n 3) 15. 
44  Anderson and others, ‘The Independence Referendum, Legality and the Contested 
Constitution’ (n 4). 
45 McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the Contested Constitution and the Authorship 
of Constitutional Change’ (n 3) 15. 
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5.2C  The Federalist Narrative 
Days before the Scottish independence referendum, and with polls indicating 
a close result, the three unionist parties issued what came to be known as 
‘The Vow’, which promised a further increase in the powers of the Scottish 
Parliament in the event of a ‘No’ vote.46 The Smith Commission had been set 
up for deliberation on how such constitutional change ought to be brought 
about, which deliberations took place in November 2014, and the 
Commission’s recommendations were published on 27 November 2014.47 If 
implemented, these recommendations, which will be debated in Parliament 
beginning in early 2015, may result in a further shift of the UK constitution 
towards a quasi-federal arrangement. 
 
My words ‘further shift’ in the previous paragraph, of course, suggest that 
the UK constitution is already best understood as a quasi-federal 
arrangement, and, indeed, it has been argued in recent years that ‘the 
territorial constitution is already best interpreted as being quasi-federal.’48 
What justifies the prefix ‘quasi’ is the ‘asymmetrical and incomplete’49 
nature of the arrangement:  ‘asymmetrical because of the different 
                                            
46  See Stephen Tierney, ‘Solomon Grundy Does Constitutional Change: The Smith 
Commission Timetable to Transform the Scottish Parliament’  (31st October 2014). 
Available at UKCLA Blog:  <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2014/10/31/stephen-tierney-
solomon-grundy-does-constitutional-change-the-smith-commission-timetable-to-transform-
the-scottish-parliament/> (visited 23 February 2015). 
47 See Report of the Smith Commission for further devolution of powers to the Scottish 
Parliament (27 November 2014). Available at <https://www.smith-commission.scot/wp-
content/uploads/2014/11/The_Smith_Commission_Report-1.pdf> (visited 23 February 2015). 
48 McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the Contested Constitution and the Authorship 




devolution arrangements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, and their 
complete absence in England; and incomplete because devolution has not 
been accompanied by any substantial reconfiguration of Westminster’s 
powers, or by arrangements for territorial representation at the centre.’50 
The current quasi-federal structure of course has several problems that 
could be addressed by a move towards a federated system. As Tierney notes, 
the Scottish devolution statute ‘has little to say about…intra-state 
federalism, with a lack of detail on how institutions that coordinate policy 
for the UK as a whole would be set up, far less about how these should be 
designed or how they should operate.’51 The result of this arrangement, 
Tierney continues, is that ‘there is not a formalised, and legally protected, 
set of mechanisms in place for occasions where serious competence disputes 
arise. Instead, institutions operate largely at the behest of the centre, and 
therefore depend upon the goodwill of the central Government and 
Parliament for their continuation.’52 
 
McHarg argues that the federalist narrative is ‘the least well-developed’53 of 
the three readings of the UK territorial constitution, but is by no means an 
insignificant account of the constitution: 
The significance of the [federalist narrative] is that it regards 
sovereignty as resting neither with Westminster nor in Scotland. 
Rather, it sees Scottish identity as nested within British identity, 
neither of which trumps the other, and hence sovereignty as being 
shared between Scotland and the UK. Moreover, both territorial levels 
                                            
50 ibid. 
51 Tierney, ‘‘The Three Hundred and Seven Year Itch” (n 26) 151. 
52 ibid 151-152 (citation omitted). 
53 McHarg, ‘The Independence Referendum, the Contested Constitution and the Authorship 
of Constitutional Change’ (n 3) 16. 
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are located within an overarching constitutional framework, the 
amendment and redefinition of which must be a shared endeavour.54  
 
Each of the three narratives discussed above, then, are plausible accounts or 
readings of the UK constitution in the light of the Scottish devolutionary 
settlement. The plausibility of each is affected by several different factors, as 
outlined above, and which reading we find more compelling depends to a 
large extent on whether or not we approach the question from a strictly legal 
or a historical/political standpoint; from a literal interpretation of the 
devolution statute, or from a more purposive interpretation that takes 
account of the historical/political context of devolution. 
 
5.3  GRIFFITH’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NARRATIVES OF DEVOLUTION 
 
Notice that in conceptualizing the legal dimension of devolution—in thinking 
about what devolution means as a matter of law—we implicitly adopt the 
vantage of the judge. That is to say, in constructing the narratives of 
devolution, the narrator in our story seems more often than not to have 
assumed the standpoint of the judge narrating to us the story of the legal 
dimension of the devolutionary project. Thus, when we consider the 
plausibility of the union state narrative, we qualify our enthusiasm for that 
narrative with the acknowledgment that that reading of the constitution is 
‘primarily a political rather than a legal’55 understanding of the constitution; 
we turn to Lord President Cooper’s obiter dicta in MacCormick to determine 
whether or not the union state narrative has any plausibility as a legal 
understanding of the constitution. Similarly, when we consider the ways in 
                                            
54 ibid. 
55 ibid 15. 
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which the unitary state narrative is undermined to any extent as a matter of 
law by the ‘constitutional’ status of the Scottish Parliament and the Scotland 
Act, we turn to the courts for consideration of that question. 
 
In the context of the Scottish independence referendum debates, it is 
perfectly understandable that the narratives of devolution have often been 
constructed from the vantage of the judge; it is understandable because, in 
the context of the referendum debates, this adoption of the judge’s vantage 
was, in a sense, forced upon us by the demands of the dominant debates at 
the time. The dominant debates at the time were about how a court would 
rule on the legality of the Scottish Parliament’s referendum legislation, and 
so the question ‘What is the best way to conceptualize Scottish devolution’ 
was being framed differently; it was being framed as the question ‘How 
would a court rule on the legality of the Scottish Parliament’s independence 
referendum-enabling legislation?’ In other words, the framing of the 
question in that manner meant that the only vantage that we could adopt 
during those debates was the vantage of the judge. 
 
I also want to make clear that what I am not saying is that the narratives of 
devolution have completely neglected other vantages that are relevant to 
conceptualizing devolution. The union state narrative, for example, does not 
adopt the judge’s vantage when it says that the devolutionary settlement is 
best conceptualized as a ‘renegotiation of the terms of Union on the part of 
the sovereign Scottish people’. 56  Rather, that narrative is one that 
conceptualizes devolution from the perspective of the Scottish people. So, it is 
                                            
56  Anderson and others, ‘The Independence Referendum, Legality and the Contested 
Constitution’ (n 4). 
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certainly not my argument that the vantage of the judge has been the sole 
perspective from which the narratives of devolution have been told. 
 
My claim, instead, is that the legal dimension of devolution—that is, 
devolution as a matter of law—has too often been conceptualized from the 
vantage of the judge at the expense of neglecting other vantages that are 
important for us to consider when conceptualizing the legal dimension of the 
devolutionary project. 
 
As I argued in Chapter 4, and as many others have argued in the past, there 
is value in thinking about law from perspectives other than the perspective 
of the judge. As William Twining has argued about the significance of 
switching our standpoint away from the top-down perspective of the judge 
and towards the bottom-up perspective of the citizen:  ‘How law is perceived 
and used by [those subject to the law] is as significant for the purpose of 
understanding [law] as the motives, aims, and decisions of those who control 
a legal system.’57  
 
What contribution, then, can Griffith make to the narratives of devolution? 
One answer is that the arguments that Griffith made in his Chorley Lecture 
ought to encourage us to think about some aspects of the legal dimension of 
devolution that may escape the judge but are very visible to the citizen (who, 
as I argued in the previous chapter, embodies the normative voice in 
Griffith’s normative positivism). Recall from Chapter 4 that I said that the 
arguments Griffith made in ‘The Political Constitution’ are arguments that 
are best appreciated from the vantage of the citizen who values the 
                                            




republican ideal of participation in self-government through representative 
institutions. 58  For that citizen, there is a sense in which the law of 
devolution, as it stands, has an unsatisfactory element, which is that the 
existing law of devolution allows unelected judges to subject legislation 
enacted by the democratically-elected Scottish Parliament to rights-based 
judicial review. The existing law of devolution, as it stands, empowers 
unelected judges, who ‘have no greater expertise, no superior moral 
perspicacity, no better pipeline to God than the rest of us non-judges, 
otherwise known as voters’,59 to review, and strike-down if necessary, on 
rights-based grounds, legislation enacted by the democratically elected 
Scottish Parliament. 
 
There are available in the existing scholarship a few instances of the 
complaint that I have just made in the previous paragraph. In a report of the 
Joint Committee on Human Rights published in 2008 entitled A Bill of 
Rights for the UK?, it was observed:  ‘We are not in favour of a Bill of Rights 
which confers a power on the courts to strike down legislation. We consider 
this to be fundamentally at odds with this country’s tradition of 
parliamentary democracy.’ 60  To this, Chris Himsworth responded in a 
contribution published in a collection of essays on human rights scepticism: 
What is, of course, so interesting from a Scottish perspective about 
these expressions of opinion [contained in the Committee Report] is 
that they, perhaps unconsciously, rub salt into the wound of the 
differential treatment of the UK and Scottish Parliaments under the 
                                            
58 See Chapter 4, esp. text to (n) 5. 
59 James Allan, ‘The Idea of Human Rights’ (2014) 25 Bond Law Review 1, 1. 
60 Joint Committee on Human Rights, A Bill of Rights for the UK? (2008). Available at 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200708/jtselect/jtrights/165/165i.pdf> (visited 1 
October 2015) para [218]. 
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HRA regime. Not for the Scottish Parliament is the sensitive 
avoidance of a Bill of Rights which ‘confers a power on the courts to 
strike down legislation.’ There has been no problem treating the 
Scottish Parliament in a way which is ‘fundamentally at odds with 
this country’s tradition of parliamentary democracy.’61 
 
Although democratic concerns against rights-based judicial review of Acts of 
the Scottish Parliaments have been expressed by a few scholars, including 
Professor Himsworth62 and Keith Ewing,63 there has in large part been an 
absence among those who have engaged with Griffith’s work to ask whether 
or not the same type of democratic concerns that Griffith expressed against 
bills of rights—concerns that we looked at in detail in Chapter 2—are 
applicable with the same or similar force when the parliament whose 
legislation is being subjected to rights-based judicial review is not the 
Westminster Parliament but the Scottish Parliament. Griffith himself did 
not say much about this at all in his famous essay published following the 
enactment of the Human Rights Act and the Scotland Act.64 What would 
Griffith say about it?  
 
May be the reason Griffith did not say much about this topic is that the 
Scottish Parliament is, in important ways, different from the Westminster 
                                            
61 Chris Himsworth, ‘Human Rights at the Interface of State and Sub-state:  The Case of 
Scotland’ in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing and Adam Tomkins (eds), The Legal Protection 
of Human Rights:  Sceptical Essays (Oxford University Press 2011) 82. 
62 See also Chris Himsworth, ‘Rights versus Devolution’ in Tom Campbell, Keith Ewing and 
Adam Tomkins (eds), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2001). 
63 Keith Ewing, ‘The Parliamentary Protection of Human Rights’ in Katja Ziegler, Denis 
Baranger, and Anthony W Bradley (eds), Constitutionalism and the Role of 
Parliaments (Hart Publishing 2007) 267. 




Parliament. The Scottish Parliament is the creation of a statute enacted by a 
sovereign law-making body; that sovereign body has delegated authority to 
the Scottish Parliament in much the same way that it delegates authority to 
other administrative bodies. Delegation of the sort that has occurred under 
the Scotland Act, from the Westminster Parliament to the Scottish 
Parliament, may be deemed perfectly compatible with democracy if we take 
the view that the Scottish Parliament is like any other statutory body set up 
by law. As Jeffrey Goldsworthy has written, there are various types of 
delegations of authority by a sovereign legislature to delegated bodies that 
may be deemed perfectly compatible with democracy: 
There is clearly a difference between relinquishing or disabling one's 
power to make certain kinds of decisions, and declining—even 
routinely—to exercise it. For example, in constitutional law there is a 
crucial difference between, on the one hand, a legislature irrevocably 
transferring its powers to another body, and on the other, its 
delegating those powers while retaining its ability at any time to 
override its delegate or even cancel the delegation. It is possible to 
distinguish between many different arrangements, including: (1) the 
permanent surrender of power; (2) the indefinite surrender of power, 
subject to the possibility of reclaiming it by onerous means such as a 
constitutional amendment; (3) the temporary surrender of power to a 
delegate for a fixed period, followed by its resumption or fresh 
delegation to the same or some other delegate; and (4) the delegation 
of power, whether indefinite or temporary, subject to the retention of 
power at any time to override the delegate and/or cancel the 
delegation by non-onerous means. 
Democracy is surely compatible with arrangements (3) and (4), 
even if this is doubtful in the case of (2). Indeed, modern 
representative democracies resemble (3): The electorate confers 
legislative power on elected officials for more or less fixed periods, 
retaining only the power occasionally to decide whether to extend 
their terms or replace them. We do not generally regard this as 
undemocratic. Nor do we regard as undemocratic the delegation of 
extensive law-making power to unelected officials, provided that 
elected officials retain the power to override them. Much modern law-
making consists of regulations made by executive governments, which 
elected legislatures can scrutinize before they come into operation, 
and disallow if they see fit. Even if it were the case that legislatures 
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seldom disallow such regulations, that would not in itself demonstrate 
a diminution of democracy.65  
 
HLA Hart, in his Postscript to The Concept of Law, also wrote along similar 
lines. Hart’s comments were made in response to Ronald Dworkin’s charge 
that Hart’s theory of law is undemocratic because it tolerates judicial 
lawmaking, and in response, Hart equated the exercise of discretion by 
judges under his theory as a form of delegated lawmaking that is ‘a no 
greater menace to democracy’ than lawmaking by executive officials: 
[T]he delegation of limited legislative powers to the executive is a 
familiar feature of modern democracies and such delegation to the 
judiciary seems a no greater menace to democracy. In both forms of 
delegation an elected legislature will normally have residual control 
and may repeal or amend any subordinate laws which it finds 
unacceptable.66 
 
However, the argument that rights-based judicial review of legislation of the 
Scottish Parliament is unproblematic from a democratic perspective because 
of the ‘delegated’ character of the Scottish Parliament and its enactments—
is itself a problematic argument. The argument is problematic because it 
equates a democratically elected legislature to other 
executive/administrative bodies, which is a problematic equation. The  
Scottish Parliament is different from other delegated bodies because it is a 
body whose lawmaking is a form of representative lawmaking, which, as 
Jeremy Waldron has argued, is distinguishable in important ways from 
lawmaking by judicial and executive/administrative bodies: not only are 
legislatures democratically elected and accountable bodies, but legislatures 
                                            
65 Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Judicial Review, Legislative Override, and Democracy’ (2003) 38 
Wake Forest Law Review 451, 458-459. 
66 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (Penelope A. Bulloch, Leslie Green & Joseph Raz eds, 
3rd edn, Oxford University Press 2012) 275. 
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also have other distinctive features, including the fact that they are 
institutions ‘publicly dedicated to making and changing law’,67 as well as the 
fact that their membership is generally several orders of magnitude higher 
than the membership of courts (at least in common law systems), the 
membership of the executive branch, and the membership of administrative 
agencies, which difference in size bolsters the representative credentials of 
legislatures.68 Legislatures, in short, are ‘not just democratic institutions, 
not just transparent institutions, not just large assemblies, but large 
representative assemblies’69—and all of these characteristics give the final 
product of their lawmaking activity—i.e. legislation—a democratic gloss that 
is missing from the final product of judicial, executive, and administrative 
lawmaking. 
 
Once we accept that the Scottish Parliament, even if it is the creation of a 
statute enacted by a democratically elected Parliament, is more like a 
legislature and less like any other delegated body, it becomes easier to see 
why there is reason for the normative positivist, such as Griffith—who 
opposes bills of rights because of the high degree of discretion that such 
instruments grant to unelected judges70—to oppose rights-based judicial 
review of legislation even if the legislation that is being subjected to rights-
based judicial review is enacted by a legislature such as the Scottish 
Parliament. 
                                            
67  Jeremy Waldron, ‘Representative Lawmaking’ (2009) 89 Boston University Law 
Review 335, 336. 
68 ibid 340. 
69 ibid 345 (final italics in original; first three italics and all underlines added). 
70 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2 (especially the discussion of normative decisional positivism). 
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However, beyond simply defending the claim that the Scottish Parliament is 
more like a legislature, and less like any other public body, we can say more 
in order to argue that rights-based judicial review of Acts of the Scottish 
Parliament is undemocratic. We can also argue that the question of the 
democratic legitimacy of judicial review is not insensitive to the grounds on 
which judicial review is exercised, which is to say that ‘someone who ponders 
the legitimacy of judicial review and decides on balance that it is legitimate 
may find himself wavering from that position when he considers the way in 
which judges exercise this power.’71 For example, ‘if citizens thought judges 
were simply relying on their substantive moral views or their party-political 
affiliations, then those who had initially been inclined to favor judicial 
review might rethink their position. They might say something like, “Strong 
judicial review is okay in principle, but not when it is exercised like this.”’72 
In other words, it matters not in some instances whether or not a 
democratically elected legislature retains residual power to overturn a 
judicial decision; if a source of law, say a bill of rights, gives too much 
interpretive discretion to judges, then the democratic concern is not whether 
or not the legislature retains the final word and can overturn a judicial 
decision; no, the democratic concern is that the courts have the interpretive 
discretion ‘to modify the effect of a statute to make its application conform 
with individual rights (in ways that the statute itself does not envisage).’73  
 
                                            
71 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Partly Laws Common to All Mankind’: Foreign Law in American 
Courts (Yale University Press 2012) 148. 
72 ibid. 
73 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale Law 
Journal 1346, 1354. 
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The argument, in other words, is that regardless of whether judges exercise 
rights-based judicial review in the context of an Act of the Scottish 
Parliament or an Act of the Westminster Parliament, the same concerns that 
a normative positivist has to oppose the discretion at the ‘point-of-
application’ that judges enjoy in the interpretation of a bill of rights74—
concerns that Griffith expressed in his lecture and were detailed in Chapter 
2—apply equally to judicial review of Acts of both the Westminster and the 
Scottish Parliaments. In both cases, the normative positivist concern is that 
a bill of rights requires unelected judges to ‘embark on the happy and 
fruitful exercise of interpreting woolly principles and even woollier 
exceptions’,75 which interpretive exercise, turning as it does on the moral 
judgment of judges, appears from ‘the point of view of the citizen trying to 
organize his life’ to be ‘arbitrary’.76  
 
Perhaps the reason that there is a dearth of scholarship on the question of 
the democratic legitimacy of rights-based judicial review of Acts of the 
                                            
74 Allan, ‘The Idea of Human Rights’ (n 59) 1 (arguing that bills of rights, whether 
American-style or HRA-style, ‘unduly enhance the point-of-application power of unelected 
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unsatisfactory aspects of the law to be condemned and minimized. The legal system should 
be reformed so that moral decision-making, by judges or officials, is eliminated as far as 
possible. Why? The reason in Hobbes’s, Hume’s, and Bentham’s jurisprudence had to do 
with the desirability of certainty, security of expectation, and knowledge of what legally 
empowered officials were likely to require. If the decisions of an official turned on the 
exercise of his moral judgment, there would be no telling what he might come up with. From 
the point of view of the citizen trying to organize his life, the official’s decisions would be 
arbitrary.’). 
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Scottish Parliament is that much of the existing scholarship on Scottish 
devolution has been concerned, as I observed in the discussion of the 
narratives of devolution, in trying to make sense of the legal dimension of 
devolution from the vantage of the judge. But what Ewing and Himsworth 
are saying in their arguments against rights-based judicial review of ASPs 
quoted above are normative arguments about what they believe the law 
ought to be; they believe that the Scottish Parliament ought not to be 
subjected to strong judicial review for democratic reasons, and that is a 
criticism of the law as it currently exists. Many of the dominant debates 
about Scottish devolution have, however, been concerned with descriptive 
analysis of the case law—e.g. what judges have said about the constitutional 
status of the Scottish Parliament and about the reviewability of Acts of the 
Scottish Parliament at common law.77  
 
But, of course, as Griffith and every other normative positivist would remind 
us, the fact that a court has said that something is the best interpretation of 
the existing positive law (and, for the Dworkinian judge, the best possible 
interpretation of the law in the light of existing principles) does not mean it 
is not open to the citizen to question the desirability of that existing law. In 
order to appreciate Himsworth’s and Ewing’s arguments, we need, in other 
words, to switch our vantage away from the judge interpreting the existing 
law of devolution and towards the citizen, to whom (unlike the judge who is 
entrusted with the task of deciding a case according to the law as it stands) 
it is open to question the desirability of the law as it currently stands, and as 
it has been interpreted by judges; it is open to the citizen to argue that the 
existing law as it stands, and as has been interpreted by judges, is 
undemocratic or is otherwise morally deficient, and it is open to our citizen 
                                            
77 AXA General Insurance Ltd v Lord Advocate [2011] UKSC 46.  
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to argue for its reform. We need, as Bentham the normative positivist 
argued, to separate law as it is from law as it ought to be in order to facilitate 
law reform.78 We need to separate the question of devolution as it is from 
devolution as we think it ought to be, and the way to do that is to 
conceptualize devolution from a vantage other than the vantage of a judge 
interpreting the meaning of the British constitution in the light of 
devolution. Too often, however, the dominant narratives of Scottish 
devolution have been about how best to interpret the UK constitution in the 
light of devolution, which exercise implicitly asks us to adopt the vantage of 
a judge interpreting the law of devolution as it currently stands.  
 
I asked at the start of this chapter the question of what Griffith’s 
contributions might be to the narratives of devolution. The answer to our 
question is that Griffith’s arguments in ‘The Political Constitution’ 
encourage us to think about the law of devolution from a vantage other than 
the vantage of the judge; Griffith’s arguments encourage us to think about 
law from the citizen invested in the republican values of participation in self-
government. Griffith’s arguments encourage us to remember that it is open 
to the citizen to question the desirability of certain aspects of the law of 
devolution that our citizen deems to be morally deficient and to argue for its 
reform; in particular, Griffith reminds us that the democratic arguments 
that normative positivists present for minimizing the discretion of judges at 
the point-of-application under a bill of rights are not concerns that go away 
when the legislation that is being subjected to rights-based judicial review is 
enacted by a legislature of the so-called ‘delegated’ or ‘subordinate’ character 
of the Scottish Parliament. Griffith, perhaps most importantly, reminds us 
                                            
78 See Chapter 2, esp. Section 2.4. 
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that we need to distinguish, when thinking about devolution, between 
normative argument on the one hand and descriptive analysis on the other. 
 
This need to distinguish between normative argument on the one hand and 
descriptive analysis on the other is also important in the context of another 
set of debates that I want to consider in the next section of this chapter, 
namely the debates surrounding the legislative supremacy of the 
Westminster Parliament. The relevance of these debates to the present 
discussion is that the normative arguments that are often made in defence of 
parliamentary sovereignty, from a political constitutionalist perspective, 
require re-evaluation in the light of the current constitutional arrangements 
brought about by devolution. It is often thought to be the case that 
parliamentary sovereignty is ‘a crucial element of political 
constitutionalism’. 79  Parliamentary sovereignty, on this view, is a 
constitutional design feature that best secures the values associated with 
political constitutionalism.80 In the following section, following discussion of 
the dominant debates surrounding parliamentary sovereignty (some of 
which debates involve descriptive analysis, others of which involve 
normative argument), I will demonstrate why I think, from the perspective 
of the citizen who embodies the normative voice in Griffith’s lecture, there is 
reason for the political constitutionalist to oppose the manner in which the 
HRA attempts to protect parliamentary sovereignty as a constitutional 
design feature in a multi-level system of government. 
 
                                            
79  Jeffrey Goldsworthy, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty and Constitutional Change in the 
United Kingdom’ in Richard Rawlings, Peter Leyland and Alison Young (eds), Sovereignty 
and the Law: Domestic, European and International Perspectives (Oxford University 
Press 2013) 55. 
80 For what these values are, see Chapter 1, esp. text to (n 56) – (n 62). 
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5.4  PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY: DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS VERSUS 
NORMATIVE ARGUMENT 
 
Is Parliament sovereign? Should Parliament be sovereign? These are two 
different questions. The first is a question that requires descriptive analysis 
and operates on the ‘is’ plane; the second is a question that requires us to 
make a normative argument and operates on the plane of the ‘ought’. Over 
the course of the latter half of the twentieth century, the dominant debates 
on parliamentary sovereignty were largely concerned with the first of these 
two questions, as the discussion that follows will demonstrate. 
 
5.4A  The Diceyan Account  
The starting point of discussion for modern accounts of parliamentary 
sovereignty is AV Dicey’s Introduction to the Study of the Law of the 
Constitution, first published in 1885.81 Although the doctrine was recognized 
as a constitutional fundamental by English82 lawyers well before Dicey’s 
time, 83  Dicey’s definition of parliamentary sovereignty, stated in the 
following terms, continues to be the starting point of discussion: 
                                            
81 AV Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution: The Oxford 
Edition of Dicey v. 1 (JWF Allison ed., Oxford University Press 2013). 
82 The use of the word ‘English’ is deliberate because it accepts that there is disagreement 
as to whether the pre-1707 Parliament of Scotland was a sovereign parliament in the legal 
sense. Contrast the dicta of Lord Cooper in MacCormick v. Lord Advocate (1953) SC 396 
(cited in Goldsworthy) and the dicta of Lord Hope in Jackson v. Attorney General [2005] 
UKHL 56 (referring to ‘the English principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of 
Parliament’) para [104] (emphasis added) with Goldsworthy’s own position that Lord 
Cooper’s argument in MacCormick ‘rests on a dubious premise….’ Jeffrey Goldsworthy, The 
Sovereignty of Parliament:  History and Philosophy (Oxford University Press 1999) 
166.  
83 See Goldsworthy, The Sovereignty of Parliament (n 82) 236 (‘The historical evidence 
demonstrates that for several centuries, at least, all three branches of government in 
Britain have accepted the doctrine that Parliament has sovereign law-making authority.’). 
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The principle of Parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor 
less than this, namely, that Parliament…has…the right to make or 
unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is 
recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set 
aside the legislation of Parliament.84 
 
This definition makes two points: firstly, that there is no restriction, 
substantive or procedural, on Parliament’s ability to enact legislation, and 
secondly, that no person or body, judicial or non-judicial, has the power to 
invalidate an Act of Parliament. In his discussion of parliamentary 
sovereignty, Dicey was in agreement with Alexis de Tocqueville, who, as 
Dicey quotes him, described the Westminster Parliament as being 
simultaneously a ‘legislative’ and a ‘constituent’ assembly; as a legislative 
assembly, Parliament can enact ordinary legislation, and as a constituent 
assembly, ‘it can make laws which shift the basis of the constitution.’85 For 
Dicey, these two traits of the Westminster Parliament necessarily lead to 
three conclusions. Firstly, changes to fundamental laws under the British 
constitution are brought about by Parliament acting in its ordinary 
legislative capacity.86  Secondly, there is ‘no marked or clear distinction 
between laws which are not fundamental or constitutional and laws which 
are fundamental or constitutional.’87 And thirdly, there is no ‘person or body 
of persons, executive, legislative or judicial, which can pronounce void’ an 
                                            
84 Dicey, The Law of the Constitution (n 81) 27.  
85 ibid 51. 
86 ibid. 
87 ibid 52. 
 
 199 
Act of the Westminster Parliament on any ground unless the statutory 
provision is repealed by Parliament.88 
 
For Dicey, the sovereignty of Parliament was from ‘a legal point of view…the 
dominant characteristic of our political institutions.’89 The emphasis on the 
word ‘legal’ is significant because the term sovereignty is often used to carry 
both legal and political significance, a distinction to which Dicey drew 
attention in the following terms:  
[T]he word ‘sovereignty’ is sometimes employed in a political rather 
than a strictly legal sense. …In [the political] sense of the word the 
electors of Great Britain may be said to be…the body in which 
sovereign power is vested. …But this is a political not a legal fact. 
…The political sense of the word ‘sovereignty’ is, it is true, fully as 
important as the legal sense or more so. But the two significations, 
though intimately connected together, are essentially different….90 
 
That is not to suggest, however, that Dicey’s account of sovereignty was an 
account that included purely descriptive analysis about sovereignty as a 
legal fact. As Paul Craig has observed, Dicey understood full well the need to 
complement his empirical analysis with normative argument:  ‘Times had 
changed and Dicey fashioned a normative argument based on the nature of 
democracy as he saw it at the end of the nineteenth century.’91 What was the 
nature of Dicey’s normative argument? As Craig reports: 
[The] empirical side [of Dicey’s] analysis was…complemented by a 
normative argument, which was designed to show that it was sound, 
                                            
88 ibid 53. 
89 ibid 27 (emphasis added). 
90 ibid 43. 
91 Paul Craig, ‘Public Law, Legal Theory, and Political Theory’ [2000] Public Law 211, 220-
221 (citation omitted). 
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in terms of principle, for Parliament to have this unlimited power. 
Dicey realised, at the very least, that the empirical argument could 
not, by itself, provide a wholly secure foundation for Parliamentary 
sovereignty. He realised also that even though he had quoted from 
Blackstone, he could not simply draw on the species of normative 
argument used by the latter, since it would not have been applicable, 
without substantial modifications, to the changed conditions of the 
nineteenth century in which Dicey was writing. Dicey, therefore, set 
about constructing his own normative argument to justify the 
Parliamentary sovereignty which he had empirically described. It 
must also be acknowledged that Dicey cast this argument in terms of 
political sovereignty as opposed to legal sovereignty, or as political 
fact as opposed to legal fact. …  
The essence of the argument was that a Parliament, duly elected 
on the extended franchise, represented the most authoritative 
expression of the will of the nation. The Parliament thereby elected 
should therefore be able to carry out any action. Moreover, Dicey 
believed that the Parliament would control the executive and that the 
members of Parliament would not pass legislation…which was 
contrary to the interests of those who elected them. Constitutional 
protections against the exercise of parliamentary power were not 
therefore required, since, in the words of Dicey, “the permanent 
wishes of the representative portion of Parliament can hardly in the 
long run differ from the wishes of the English people, or at any rate of 
the electors; that which the majority of the House of Commons 
command, the majority of English people usually desire”.92  
 
Dicey’s normative argument in support of parliamentary sovereignty, in 
other words, was a democratic defence, which was an argument that Craig 
summarizes as follows: 
Our system of democracy was founded upon a channel of authority 
flowing from the bottom upwards. The expanded electorate chose 
representatives. The Parliament thus chosen had legitimacy because 
of the extended franchise and should therefore have all embracing 
powers. The elected MPs articulated the views of those who had 
chosen them, and they controlled the executive. Legislation which was 
constitutionally questionable would not, therefore, be passed, or would 
be repealed expeditiously. A central objective of the Diceyan thesis 
                                            
92 ibid 221-221 (citations omitted). 
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was therefore to show that the existence of Parliamentary sovereignty 
would not place the rights of individual citizens in jeopardy.93 
 
Craig argues that Dicey’s normative justification is problematic because the 
British system of democracy ‘probably never operated in this self-correcting 
way’ 94  and argues that Dicey’s vision of the relationship between 
Parliament, the Executive, and the electorate ‘certainly does not accord with 
present reality’,95  which reality is that ‘Parliament is controlled by the 
executive, rather than vice versa, [a situation] in which it is perfectly 
possible for a government, elected on what might be a minority of the votes 
cast, to promulgate legislation which is deleterious to the rights or interests 
of certain sections of the population….’96 
 
5.4B  The Modern Debate 
In the course of the twentieth century, Diceyan orthodoxy was challenged by 
a number of constitutional scholars, whose views have come to represent the 
‘new view’97 on parliamentary sovereignty. The modern debate is generally 
thought to be a debate that takes place between those who represent the 
new view on the one hand, and Sir William Wade, who represents Diceyan 
orthodoxy, on the other hand. 
 
                                            
93 ibid 222. 
94 ibid. See also Paul Craig, Public Law and Democracy in the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America (Clarendon Press 1990) Ch 2. 
95 Craig, ‘Public Law, Political Theory, and Legal Theory’ (n 91) 222 (citation omitted). 
96 Craig, ‘Public Law, Political Theory, and Legal Theory’ (n 91) 222n54. 
97 RFV Heuston, Essays in Constitutional Law (2nd ed., Stevens 1964) 6. For discussion, 
see CR Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law (2nd ed., Oxford University Press 2003) 
155.  
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Let us take Wade’s position first. For an ‘orthodox English lawyer,’ Wade 
argued, parliamentary sovereignty means that no Act enacted by the Queen-
in-Parliament can be invalidated by a court, that the Queen-in-Parliament 
may always repeal prior legislation, and that, therefore, ‘no Parliament 
could bind its successors.’ 98   For the ‘orthodox English lawyer’, Wade 
continued, the doctrine of implied repeal is ‘an invariable rule’ of the 
constitution.99 Would it be possible for Parliament to entrench legislation, in 
that such legislation could only be repealed by processes specified by a 
previous Parliament? The orthodox English lawyer, according to Wade, 
would respond that such ‘special safeguards [against implied repeal] would 
be legally futile.’100 In Wade’s account of parliamentary sovereignty, ‘there is 
one, and only one, limit to Parliament’s legal power:  it cannot detract from 
its own continuing sovereignty.’101 
 
In contrast to Wade’s position, proponents of the new view on parliamentary 
sovereignty challenged the orthodox view that Parliament may not ‘detract 
from its own continuing sovereignty.’102 This group of scholars argued that 
Parliament may place what are known as ‘manner and form’ limitations on 
the legislative powers of a future Parliament. What are these manner and 
form limitations? 
 
                                            
98 HWR Wade, ‘The Basis of Legal Sovereignty’ [1955] Cambridge Law Journal 172, 174. 
99 ibid. 
100 ibid. 




Consider the following provisions of the recently enacted European Union 
Act 2011 (“EU Act”): 
§2(1):  A treaty which amends or replaces TEU or TFEU is not to be 
ratified unless— 
 (c) [A] referendum condition…is met. 
§2(2):  The referendum condition is that— 
(a)  the Act providing for the approval of the treaty provides that the 
provision approving the treaty is not to come into force until a 
referendum about whether the treaty should be ratified has been held 
throughout the United Kingdom or, where the treaty also affects 
Gibraltar, throughout the United Kingdom and Gibraltar, 
(b)  the referendum has been held, and 
(c)  the majority of those voting in the referendum are in favour of the 
ratification of the treaty.103 
 
The above provisions together represent what is commonly known as a 
‘referendum lock’. The provisions stipulate that the United Kingdom shall 
not ratify treaties making changes in certain areas of EU law absent 
approval of those measures in a national referendum. Proponents of the ‘new 
view’ on parliamentary sovereignty would argue that such a referendum lock 
places a ‘manner and form’ limitation on a future Parliament—the 
referendum lock allows a former Parliament to bind a future Parliament by 
specifying in law the legislative procedure to which the future Parliament 
must adhere. 
  
Sir Ivor Jennings presented the ‘manner and form’ challenge to the orthodox 
view on sovereignty in The Law and the Constitution. 104  In this work, 
Jennings distinguished between two types of authority enjoyed by a prince. 
If the prince ‘grants a constitution, binding himself not to make laws except 
                                            
103 European Union Act 2011, s. 2. 
104 Sir Ivor Jennings, The Law and the Constitution (5th ed., University of London Press 
1963). 
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with the consent of an elected legislature, he has power immediately 
afterwards to abolish the legislature without its consent and to continue 
legislating by his personal decree.’105 This type of power enjoyed by the 
prince (and, by analogy, Parliament) is, Jennings argued, of a continuing 
nature. On the other hand, ‘if the prince has not supreme power, but the rule 
is that the courts accept as law that which is made in the proper legal 
form,’ 106  then the prince must follow the procedure stipulated by the 
constitution. If he fails to do so, he has not enacted the rule ‘according to the 
manner and form required by the law for the time being’, and ‘the courts will 
not admit as law any rule which is not made in that form.’107 Jennings 
argued that it is unclear which type of the two powers noted above is enjoyed 
by the Westminster Parliament, although as Colin Munro notes, Jennings 
seems to support the second alternative, for ‘his example predisposes all 
good democrats to prefer the second hypothesis.’108 
  
The manner and form argument received further elaboration and support 
from a number of constitutional lawyers, including RFV Heuston109 and 
Geoffrey Marshall,110 and writing in 1976, George Winterton described the 
new view as being supported by ‘the great majority of modern constitutional 
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lawyers’.111 But if, as Jennings conceded, the alternative between the two 
types of sovereignty was unclear because of a paucity of case law on the 
matter, what evidence is available to the manner-and-form camp in support 
of their argument? 
 
A case often cited by the manner-and-form group in support of their 
argument is the Privy Council decision of Attorney General for New South 
Wales v. Trethowan.112  The case involved the New South Wales (NSW) 
legislature, which was subject to the following provision of the Colonial Laws 
Validity Act 1865: 
[E]very representative Legislature shall, in respect to the colony 
under its jurisdiction, have, and be deemed at all times to have had, 
full power to make laws respecting the Constitution, Power and 
Procedure of such legislature; provided that such laws shall have been 
passed in such manner and form as may from time to time be required 
by an Act of Parliament, Letters Patent, Order in Council, or Colonial 
law for the time being in force in the said colony.113 
 
In 1929, the NSW legislature passed the Constitution (Legislative Council) 
Amendment Act 1929, which amended NSW’s Constitution Act by providing 
that the NSW Legislative Council (the Upper House of the NSW legislature) 
‘shall not be abolished nor…shall its constitution or powers be altered except 
in the manner provided in this section.’114 The ‘manner’ provided in this 
                                            
111 George Winterton, ‘The British Grundnorm:  Parliamentary Supremacy Re-examined’ 
(1976) 92 Law Quarterly Review 591, 606, cited in Munro, Studies in Constitutional 
Law (n 97) 155 
112 [1932] AC 526, cited in Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law (n 97) 157. 
113 Colonial Laws Validity Act 1865 §5, cited in Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law (n 
97) 157-158. 
114 Constitution Act 1902 §7A, cited in Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Parliamentary Sovereignty: 
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amendment was for such a bill to be approved in a referendum before it 
could be submitted for Royal Assent, and, crucially, the amendment was 
‘double-entrenched’, in that a bill proposing to repeal the referendum lock 
would also have to be approved in a referendum.115 
 
The position of the Legislative Council was secured in this manner for 
political reasons by the party in power at the time because the opposition 
party had signalled its intention to abolish the upper house.116 When the 
opposition party returned to power, it attempted to achieve exactly that. The 
new Government introduced two bills:  the first to repeal the referendum 
lock, and the second to abolish the upper house. Neither bill was put to a 
referendum, and two members of the upper house sought an injunction to 
prevent the bills from being submitted for Royal Assent on the grounds that 
the bills failed to meet their respective referendum requirements. The 
injunction sought was granted by the NSW Supreme Court and affirmed by 
both the High Court of Australia and the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council.117 
 
The manner and form school would argue that the Trethowan case lays down 
a common law rule that applies just as much to the Westminster Parliament 
as it does to the NSW legislature. However, the manner and form school may 
also attempt to rely on a landmark case that actually involves the 
                                            
115  A detailed account of the political and legal significance of this case is found in 
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Westminster Parliament. That decision is the decision of nine members of 
the House of Lords in Jackson v. Attorney General.118 
 
The manner and form requirement to which the House of Lords’ decision in 
Jackson relates is found in two statutes of the Westminster Parliament, 
namely the Parliament Act 1911 and the Parliament Act 1949. The 
Parliament Act 1911 establishes a legislative procedure according to which 
bills that have been approved by the Commons may become law by receiving 
Royal Assent without the consent of the House of Lords. Under this 
procedure, with certain exceptions, a bill that has repeatedly been rejected 
by the Lords may nonetheless be enacted as law after two years have 
elapsed. The Parliament Act 1949, which was enacted under the Parliament 
Act 1911 procedure, reduced this limit from two years to one.119 
 
In Jackson, the appellants, who had an interest in fox hunting, sought to 
challenge the validity of the Hunting Act 2004 (“Hunting Act”), which makes 
an offence the hunting of wild mammals with dogs except in limited 
circumstances. The appellants argued that legislation enacted under the 
Parliament Act 1911 procedure is ‘delegated’120 rather than primary and 
that such legislation is, therefore, subject to common law principles of 
statutory interpretation. Among these principles of statutory interpretation 
is the principle that ‘powers conferred on a body by an enabling Act may not 
be enlarged or modified by that body unless there are express words 
                                            
118 [2005] UKHL 56. 
119 For discussion, see Nick W Barber, ‘The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty’ (2011) 9 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 144, 146-147. 
120 See Aileen McHarg, ‘What is Delegated Legislation?’ [2006] Public Law 539. 
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authorising such enlargement or modification.’121 Applying this principle, 
the appellants argued that the Parliament Act 1911 does not permit the 
Commons to use the 1911 procedure to reduce the delaying power of the 
House of Lords from two years to one, and, therefore, that the Parliament 
Act 1949 is an invalid statute. Because the Hunting Act was passed under 
the allegedly invalid 1949 procedure, the Hunting Act was argued to be an 
invalid Act of Parliament. 
 
The question that the House of Lords was being asked was, in essence, 
whether or not an Act of Parliament was a properly enacted statute. 
Traditionally, when faced with such a question, the courts would rely on the 
enrolled bill rule and refuse to conduct such an investigation.122 However, 
their Lordships distinguished the circumstances in Jackson from the 
traditional case law on the enrolled bill rule on the grounds that the inquiry 
in Jackson was one of statutory interpretation of the Parliament Act 1911 
rather than an investigation into ‘the internal workings and procedures of 
Parliament….’123 
 
The House of Lords rejected the argument that legislation enacted under the 
1911 procedure is delegated legislation. Lord Bingham noted that the 
Parliament Act 1911 provides that an Act enacted under the 1911 procedure 
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shall ‘become an Act of Parliament.’124 The meaning of an ‘Act of Parliament’ 
was, for his Lordship, ‘as clear and well understood as any expression in the 
lexicon of the law. It is used, and used only, to denote primary legislation.’125 
His Lordship further held that the ‘overall object of the 1911 Act was not to 
delegate power: it was to restrict, subject to compliance with the specified 
statutory conditions, the power of the Lords to defeat measures supported by 
a majority of the Commons….’126 The argument that the Commons could not 
enlarge its own powers without the consent of the Lords was also rejected on 
three grounds: firstly, because the Parliament Act 1911, as noted above, did 
not involve a delegation of authority; secondly, the case law relied upon by 
the appellants related to a colonial or a Dominion legislature so ‘as to render 
analogies drawn from [those cases] of little if any value [in Jackson]’; and 
thirdly, the question in this case was ‘one of construction’, and there was no 
suggestion in the language of the Parliament Act 1911 ‘to preclude use of the 
procedure laid down by the Act to amend the Act.’127 
 
A number of their Lordships made remarks, obiter, that specifically 
addressed the question of manner and form limitations on parliamentary 
sovereignty. Lord Steyn said the following of the manner and form question: 
The law and custom of Parliament regulates what the constituent 
elements must do to legislate: all three must signify consent to the 
measure. But, apart from the traditional method of law making, 
Parliament acting as ordinarily constituted may functionally 
redistribute legislative power in different ways. For example, 
Parliament could for specific purposes provide for a two-thirds 
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majority in the House of Commons and the House of Lords. This 
would involve a redefinition of Parliament for a specific purpose. Such 
redefinition could not be disregarded.128 
 
Rather than taking the traditional view that parliamentary sovereignty is of 
a continuing nature, Lord Steyn in the above supports what has come to be 
regarded as the ‘self-embracing’129 conception of sovereignty. Baroness Hale, 
as well, made remarks that suggest endorsement of the self-embracing view: 
[I]f Parliament is required to pass legislation on particular matters in 
a particular way, then Parliament is not permitted to ignore those 
requirements when passing legislation on those matters, nor is it 
permitted to remove or relax those requirements by passing 
legislation in the ordinary way. If the sovereign Parliament can 
redefine itself downwards, to remove or modify the requirement for 
the consent of the Upper House, it may very well be that it can also 
redefine itself upwards, to require a particular Parliamentary 
majority or a popular referendum for particular types of measure. In 
each case, the courts would be respecting the will of the sovereign 
Parliament as constituted when that will had been expressed.130  
 
Lord Hope, on the other hand, supported the continuing sovereignty thesis, 
clearly rejecting the self-embracing theory in the following terms: 
[I]t is a fundamental aspect of the rule of sovereignty that no 
Parliament can bind its successors. There are no means by whereby, 
even with the assistance of the most skilful draftsman, it can entrench 
an Act of Parliament. It is impossible for Parliament to enact 
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something which a subsequent statute dealing with the same subject 
matter cannot repeal.131 
 
What if a future Act of Parliament ignores the referendum requirement in 
Section 2 of the EU Act? Would a court hold that the 2011 statute has placed 
a manner and form limitation on a future Parliament, or would it hold that 
sovereignty is of a continuing nature?  
 
Proponents of the new view may argue on the authority of Trethowan that 
the Westminster Parliament is equally as limited by manner and form 
limitations as the NSW legislature. However, the contrasting view is that 
the Trethowan decision bears little relevance to the questions posed in the 
preceding paragraph because, unlike the NSW legislature, the United 
Kingdom Parliament is not a subordinate legislature. As Professor Munro 
has argued: 
What the Trethowan case shows is merely that some legislatures are 
limited with respect to the procedure by which they may legislate. But 
Dicey, who devoted two chapters of his book to non-sovereign 
legislatures and legislatures in federal countries, would certainly not 
have denied this. Of course, it is a logical possibility that any 
particular legislature may be of that sort, but what we wish to know is 
whether the British Parliament is, and Trethowan seems to advance 
us no further than Jennings’s tale of the two princes. Other cases in 
the same vein, relied on by Heuston, are open to the same objection.132 
 
It may well be that the best evidence that proponents of the new view can 
present for their case is the logical distinction between continuing and self-
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embracing sovereignty offered by Hart.133 But for the manner and form 
school’s argument to be more convincing they would have to rely on 
something more. What might support their argument would be judicial 
decisions that hold that the Westminster Parliament is expressly subject to 
such manner and form limitations. The conflicting obiter dicta in Jackson on 
this question hardly signal a clear rule as to how a future court might decide 
this issue. 
 
Alison Young has suggested that Jackson is, in fact, a case in which the 
Westminster Parliament has been subjected to manner and form 
restrictions.134 This argument is based on what the House of Lords had to 
say about express prohibitions on the use of the Parliament Act 1911 
procedure contained in the Parliament Act 1911. The Parliament Act 1911 
expressly states, for example, that a bill extending the life of Parliament 
beyond five years may not be passed using the 1911 procedure. The House of 
Lords not only confirmed that if an Act extending the life of Parliament was 
enacted using the 1911 procedure, the courts would decline to apply it, but a 
majority of their Lordships also stated that this provision is impliedly 
double-entrenched.135 What this means is that the 1911 procedure cannot be 
used to remove the express prohibitions contained in the Parliament Act 
1911. Young suggests that Section 2(1) of the Parliament Act 1911 ‘binds 
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future Parliaments. Parliaments wishing to overturn its provisions can only 
do so by adopting a specific manner and form—legislation that has the 
consent of the House of Lords as opposed to legislation passed without its 
consent.’136 
 
Young’s argument is subject to the response that it neglects the distinction 
between alternative and restrictive legislative procedures.137 The Parliament 
Acts procedure is best viewed as an alternative, and less restrictive, 
procedure because it makes passing legislation easier rather than difficult, 
whereas a referendum lock may be viewed as a restrictive procedure because 
it partially takes away power from Parliament and vests such power in the 
electorate, making passage of legislation in the latter case more difficult. 
That Parliament must use the ordinary legislative procedure to repeal 
Section 2(1) of the Parliament Act 1911 does not necessarily mean that the 
1911 Parliament has succeeded in binding a future Parliament. The 
ordinary legislative procedure remains available to a future Parliament if it 
wishes to repeal Section 2(1) of the Parliament Act 1911.138 Because the end 
product of the 1911 procedure was declared in Jackson to be subject to the 
limitations contained in the Parliament Act 1911, the impression left by 
Jackson is that Dicey’s assertion that ‘parliament can make or unmake any 
law’ has been qualified.139 However, a different reading of Jackson is that 
the ‘binding’ that has occurred is not of future Parliaments but of all future 
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House of Commons who wish to use ‘a less demanding or easier alternative’ 
to the ordinary law-making procedure.140  Baroness Hale’s suggestion in 
Jackson, that alternative, less restrictive, law-making procedures have the 
same impact on Parliament’s power as more restrictive law-making 
procedures 141  is, therefore, arguably inaccurate. For, as James Allan 
observes, ‘[t]he latter involves some amount of taking certain questions off 
the normal democratic agenda…[whereas] [t]he former does not.’142 
 
Whether or not the inclusion of a referendum requirement in the EU Act has 
bound future parliaments remains to be seen. Jennings, in his prince’s 
tale,143 explicitly defined the manner and form view as dependent on the rule 
that ‘the courts accept as law that which is made in the proper legal 
form….’144 Neither Trethowan nor Jackson offer a definitive argument in 
favour of the view that the Westminster Parliament has been subjected by 
the courts to such limitations. 
 
5.4C  The Modern Debate’s Focus on Descriptive Accuracy Rather Than 
Normative Argument  
 
Notice that this debate between Wade and those representing the new view 
is concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with descriptive accuracy rather 
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than normative argument. As Craig observes, both Wade and proponents of 
the new view conduct the debate in a manner that is apparently uninvested 
in providing any normative justification for parliamentary sovereignty: 
[T]he sovereignty thesis articulated by Sir William Wade by-passes 
discussion of the justification for the sovereign, unlimited, power of 
Parliament. This was, as we have seen, central to earlier discussions 
of the topic. The …[question] as to why Parliament should be regarded 
as legally omnipotent, is not addressed. The issue is conceived of in 
terms of the content of the ultimate legal principle or rule of 
recognition, which might be said to exist within society at any one 
point in time. While it is recognised that there might be a different top 
rule from that which we are presently said to have, there is no 
argument put as to whether the current rule is normatively 
justifiable. This absence of any principled justification for the status 
quo is mirrored by the way in which the courts are said to go about 
their task as interpreters of the content of the top rule. The courts will 
make a political choice at the point where the law “stops”. There is no 
need for the courts to engage in a principled discourse as to the 
answer to this question at any particular point in time, since the issue 
is never perceived in these terms. Academic constitutional lawyers, as 
commentators on judicial decisions, are likewise absolved of 
responsibility in this regard. If the courts are essentially making 
political choices at the point where the law stops, then the academic 
can abnegate responsibility for evaluating whether the particular 
choice was correct, by arguing that the evaluation of such options is 
the preserve of those operating within a different discipline.  
On the other hand, the way in which the argument is presented by 
Sir William Wade has influenced the counter-argument advanced by 
the advocates of the new view. Their counter-arguments are presented 
in a manner which minimises the import of any normative arguments 
for the limitation of sovereign power. They might, or might not, favour 
rights-based limits on governmental power, but this is never the focus 
of their response. Their argument is confined to the manner and form 
issue. The battle between the traditionalist-Wade view, and the new 
view of sovereignty, is fought on terrain marked out by the former. It 
is a battle in which the former has demarcated the terms of the 
engagement. The very labels used to describe the two sides connote an 
acceptance that the Wade view has the more ancient pedigree, and an 
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implicit acceptance also that the ground on which the issue is fought 
is of centrality to the topic as a whole.145 
 
While the earlier discourse on parliamentary sovereignty, at the time of 
Dicey and well before him, took place on both the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’ planes 
and revealed ‘an awareness of the need for principled justifications for the 
existence of sovereign power’,146 that type of normative argument, argues 
Craig, ‘has been largely forgotten’147 in the modern debate between Wade 
and proponents of the new view. 
 
5.4D  Contemporary Challenges: A Blend of Descriptive and Normative  
Claims 
 
Beyond the debate between the new view and the orthodox camp on the 
issue of manner and form limitations, there are three additional potential 
challenges to the question of whether or not Parliament may still be 
described as a sovereign lawmaking body. As the following discussion will 
illustrate, these debates tend to combine both normative and descriptive 
arguments, and it is important to try to keep separate the normative and 
descriptive dimensions of these various debates as we work through these 
debates. 
  
5.4D(i)  Challenges to Parliamentary Sovereignty from EU Membership 
The first of these contemporary challenges to parliamentary sovereignty is 
the challenge posed to parliamentary sovereignty by the United Kingdom’s 
                                            





membership of the European Union. In Factortame (No. 2), the House of 
Lords famously held that in areas governed by the law of the European 
Community (the precursor to the European Union), an interim injunction 
against the Crown would be available—a decision of tremendous significance 
because of its impact on parliamentary sovereignty. As Lord Bridge said in 
that case: 
If the supremacy within the European Community of Community law 
over the national law of member states was not always inherent in the 
E.E.C. Treaty…it was certainly well established in the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Justice long before the United Kingdom 
joined the Community. Thus, whatever limitation of its sovereignty 
Parliament accepted when it enacted the European Communities Act 
1972 was entirely voluntary.148 
 
For Lord Bridge, there was ‘nothing in any way novel in according 
supremacy to rules of Community law in those areas to which they apply’.149 
Any limitations placed on the supremacy of Parliament by EC law, argued 
Lord Bridge, were the result of a conscious acceptance of those limits by 
Parliament when it enacted the European Communities Act 1972. 
 
In the light of the Factortame decision, commentators have offered at least 
three ways of thinking about the impact of this case on parliamentary 
sovereignty.150 
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The first is to regard what the courts have done as establishing a new rule of 
statutory construction, according to which EU law will always prevail over 
national law unless Parliament has expressed in clear and unambiguous 
language that it wishes to derogate from the EU norm in question.151 Craig 
suggests that express language of derogation may not save conflicting 
national law from being disapplied unless Britain formally withdraws from 
the EU because the courts would likely rule that the Government and 
Parliament ‘cannot simply pick and choose which [EU] norms to accept’.152 
Goldsworthy disagrees, arguing that it ‘is the business of the government 
and Parliament, not the courts, to decide whether or not Britain should 
abide by its treaty commitments’ and that ‘the duty of courts is to accept 
their decision, even if they regard it as undesirable on policy grounds.’153 In 
either event, the effect of the statutory construction view is that the 
traditional doctrine of implied repeal appears to have been modified. 
However, it is worth remembering that even before Factortame there were 
exceptions to the general rule of implied repeal, which, as Munro observes, 
‘were not regarded as damaging to parliamentary sovereignty.’154  It is, 
therefore, ‘arguably just as appropriate to regard this wider exception in the 
rules of implied repeal [created by cases like Factortame] as a matter of 
statutory interpretation rather than as affecting parliamentary 
sovereignty’.155 There is, after all, a meaningful distinction between implied 
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and express repeal, and judicial departure from express repeal would be far 
more damaging to sovereignty than a departure from the doctrine of implied 
repeal.156 
 
A second way to conceptualize the impact of Factortame is to regard its 
impact, as Professor Wade did, as a ‘revolution’.157 For Wade, Lord Bridge’s 
judgment in Factortame amounts to something far more serious than a rule 
of construction because incorporating provisions of the EC Act into the later 
enacted MS Act ‘is merely another way of saying that the Parliament of 1972 
has imposed a restriction upon the Parliament of 1988’, something ‘the 
classical doctrine of sovereignty will not permit.’ 158  Furthermore, Wade 
argued, that even if a later statute expressly violated a Community norm, 
the statute would be ruled by the ECJ to be in violation of Community law, 
and the ECJ’s ruling would form part of the ‘Community law to which by the 
Act of 1972 [the later Act] is held to be subject’.159 For Wade, therefore, the 
impact of EU membership has caused a revolution, which has amounted to a 
change in the rule of recognition, defined by Wade as ‘a political fact which 
the judges themselves are able to change when they are confronted with a 
new situation which so demands.’160 
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Finally, Craig’s position is that Lord Bridge’s judgment in Factortame can be 
defended on normative grounds. According to Craig: 
[Lord Bridge] did not approach the matter as if the courts were 
making an unconstrained political choice at the point where the law 
stopped. His reasoning is more accurately represented as being based 
on principle, in the sense of working through the principled 
consequences of the UK’s membership of the European Union. The 
contractarian and functional arguments used by Lord Bridge 
exemplify this style of judicial discourse. They provide sound 
normative arguments as to why the UK should be bound by EU law 
while it remains within the European Union.161 
 
Craig’s argument is one that, unlike that of Wade, requires offering 
normative justification as to whether or not Parliament should be sovereign. 
In the context of the challenges to sovereignty posed by British membership 
of the EU, he argues that the best way to conceptualize the jurisprudence of 
British courts in cases such as Factortame is ‘to regard decisions about 
supremacy as being based on normative arguments of legal principle the 
content of which can and will vary across time.’162 On this view, Craig 
continues:  
[T]here is no a priori inexorable reason why Parliament, merely 
because of its very existence, must be regarded as legally omnipotent. 
The existence of such power, like all power, must be justified by 
arguments of principle that are normatively convincing. Possible 
constraints on Parliamentary omnipotence must similarly be reasoned 
through and defended on normative grounds. ...It may be that those 
who disagree with the courts’ decisions in Factortame…believe that 
they can counter the normative arguments presented by Lord Bridge. 
They should then present such arguments since the discourse must be 
conducted at this level. Debates on such issues are of value.163  
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Craig invites those who continue to defend parliamentary sovereignty to 
present normative arguments that support that defence. He acknowledges, 
for example, that express parliamentary derogation from an EU norm, even 
when Britain remains a member of the EU, may be justified on normative 
grounds, but says that ‘[t]he nature of this argument would...have to be 
explicated clearly and it is by no means self-evidently correct.’164 
 
5.4D(ii)  Challenges to Parliamentary Sovereignty from the Human Rights Act 
The Human Rights Act 1998 (“HRA”) presents another contemporary 
challenge to the traditional understanding of parliamentary sovereignty. 
The HRA incorporates into domestic law most of the rights contained in the 
European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”). Whereas the substance 
of these rights resembles most bills of rights around the world, the manner 
in which these rights are incorporated into domestic law represents a novel 
attempt to preserve the sovereignty of Parliament while authorizing a form 
of judicial review that entails interpretive powers that go beyond ordinary 
statutory interpretation.165 
 
This manner of incorporation is reflected in two sections of the HRA, namely 
Sections 3 and 4, and it is the impact of these two sections on the sovereignty 
of Parliament that has caused much discussion. Section 3 of the HRA 
provides that ‘[s]o far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and 
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way which is 
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compatible with the Convention rights.’166 If a court believes that a statutory 
provision may not be read down, Section 4 authorizes the courts to make a 
‘declaration of incompatibility’, which, importantly from the perspective of 
parliamentary sovereignty, ‘does not affect the validity, continuing operation 
or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given’ and ‘is not 
binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made.’167 Each of 
these two sections has the potential to impact parliamentary sovereignty in 
different ways. Reliance on Section 3 has the potential to change the 
meaning and effect of a statute in contradiction to legislative intent, whereas 
a Section 4 declaration of incompatibility, although not legally the 
equivalent of a judicial ‘strike-down’ power, has the capacity ‘to deliver a 
wound to Parliament’s handiwork that is likely to prove fatal, even though 
life support for it must be switched off by the government or by Parliament, 
not by the courts.’168 
 
In relying on the Section 3 interpretive powers, the courts have fashioned a 
number of important principles. Among these principles is that the use of 
Section 3 is mandatory upon the courts. The section is not an ‘optional canon 
of construction’, and its use is not ‘dependent on the existence of 
ambiguity.’169 In R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte 
Anderson, Lord Bingham famously stressed the importance of drawing a line 
between ‘judicial interpretation’ and ‘judicial vandalism’, the latter of which 
was described as being the equivalent of giving a statutory provision ‘an 
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effect quite different from that which Parliament intended and would [be 
going] well beyond any interpretive process sanctioned by section 3 of the 
1998 Act’.170 
 
Among the more controversial uses of the Section 3 interpretive powers was 
made in Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza.171 In Ghaidan, the leading case on 
Section 3, Lord Nicholls said: 
Section 3 may require a court to depart from the unambiguous 
meaning the legislation would otherwise bear. In the ordinary course 
the interpretation of legislation involves seeking the intention 
reasonably to be attributed to Parliament in using the language in 
question. Section 3 may require the court to depart from this 
legislative intention, that is, depart from the intention of the 
Parliament which enacted the legislation. The question of difficulty is 
how far, and in what circumstances, section 3 requires a court to 
depart from the intention of the enacting Parliament. The answer to 
this question depends upon the intention reasonably to be attributed 
to Parliament in enacting section 3.172 
 
What is striking about the Ghaidan decision is that it overruled a previous 
House of Lords decision, Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association, 173 
which involved interpretation of the same statutory provision but in the 
latter case before the coming into force of the HRA and, therefore, without 
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the benefit of the Section 3 interpretive mandate.174 Nevertheless, Lord 
Nicholls clarified the limits of Section 3 in Ghaidan as follows: 
Parliament, however, cannot have intended that in the discharge of 
this extended interpretive function the courts should adopt a meaning 
inconsistent with a fundamental feature of legislation. That would be 
to cross the constitutional boundary section 3 seeks to demarcate and 
preserve. Parliament has retained the right to enact legislation in 
terms which are not Convention-compliant.175 
 
The impact of Section 3 of the HRA on parliamentary sovereignty has been 
that courts are now able to modify the effect of legislation in ways that 
Parliament arguably did not intend; therefore, regardless of whether or not 
Parliament retains the last word on a judicial decision that makes use of the 
Section 3 power, the interpretive mandate contained in the HRA, Section 3, 
grants courts strong interpretive powers—powers about which there is 
agreement from both sides of the divide in the debate on rights and 
democracy176 that these powers are too strong to sustain the argument that 
parliamentary sovereignty retains the strength that it once had before the 
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5.4D(iii)  Challenges to Parliamentary Sovereignty from Common Law 
Constitutionalism 
 
The United Kingdom Supreme Court’s decision in Axa General Insurance v. 
Lord Advocate177  is of major constitutional importance for a number of 
reasons, some of which are discussed elsewhere. The most important aspect 
of the Axa case for present purposes is part of Lord Hope’s judgment in 
which His Lordship said that ‘the rule of law enforced by the courts is the 
ultimate controlling factor on which our constitution is based.’ 178  As 
authority for these remarks, Lord Hope cited his own opinion in Jackson. In 
recent years, the message conveyed by these remarks, along with the 
remarks of Lord Steyn and Baroness Hale in Jackson, have collectively come 
to represent a challenge to the traditional understanding of parliamentary 
sovereignty. This challenge is the challenge of ‘common law 
constitutionalism’. 
 
Proponents of the theory of ‘common law constitutionalism’, which not only 
has received judicial endorsement in Jackson but has also received support 
from the academy, assert, as I noted in Chapter 3, that the common law 
constitution represents a higher-order law that ‘both constitutes the political 
community and contains the fundamental principles that ought to guide its 
political and legal decision-making.’ 179  The sovereignty of Parliament, 
according to this theory, is itself a creation of the common law. TRS Allan 
has written that ‘the common law is prior to legislative supremacy, which it 
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defines and regulates’.180 Common law constitutionalism, according to one 
critic of the theory, ‘inverts the [traditionally understood] relationship’ 
between courts and Parliament by according the common law a position 
superior to statute.181  
 
Jackson represents the first important case in which senior judges acting in 
their judicial capacity expressed support for common law constitutionalism, 
although it is important to remember that these remarks were made obiter. 
These judges were Baroness Hale, Lord Hope, and Lord Steyn, who have 
together been identified as the ‘Jackson Three’.182  Lord Steyn endorsed 
common law constitutionalism in the following obiter remarks in Jackson: 
The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine of the supremacy of 
Parliament, pure and absolute as it was, can now be seen to be out of 
place in the modern United Kingdom. Nevertheless, the supremacy of 
Parliament is still the general principle of our constitution. It is a 
construct of the common law. The judges created this principle. If that 
is so, it is not unthinkable that circumstances could arise where the 
courts may have to qualify a principle established on a different 
hypothesis of constitutionalism. In exceptional circumstances 
involving an attempt to abolish judicial review or the ordinary role of 
the courts, the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords or a new 
Supreme Court may have to consider whether this is a constitutional 
fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament acting at the behest 
of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish.183  
 
Baroness Hale’s endorsement of common law constitutionalism is found in 
the following passage: 
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The concept of Parliamentary sovereignty which has been 
fundamental to the constitution of England and Wales since the 17th 
century (I appreciate that Scotland may have taken a different view) 
means that Parliament can do anything. The courts will, of course, 
decline to hold that Parliament has interfered with fundamental 
rights unless it has made its intentions crystal clear. The courts will 
treat with particular suspicion (and might even reject) any attempt to 
subvert the rule of law by removing governmental action affecting the 
rights of the individual from all judicial scrutiny.184 
 
Finally, Lord Hope’s opinion, to which he made a return in Axa, on the 
matter was is as follows: 
Our constitution is dominated by the sovereignty of Parliament. But 
Parliamentary sovereignty is no longer, if it ever was, absolute. …It is 
no longer right to say that [Parliament’s] freedom to legislate admits 
of no qualification whatever. Step by step, gradually but surely, the 
English principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament 
which Dicey derived from Coke and Blackstone is being qualified. 
…Nor should we overlook the fact that one of the guiding principles 
that were identified by Dicey…was the universal rule or supremacy 
throughout the constitution of ordinary law. …In its modern form, 
now reinforced by the European Convention on Human Rights and 
the enactment by Parliament of the Human Rights Act 1998, this 
principle protects the individual from arbitrary government. The rule 
of law enforced by the courts is the ultimate controlling factor on 
which our constitution is based.185  
 
The preceding views of the Jackson Three have been variously described as 
‘extravagant’,186 ‘heretical’,187 and representative of a kind of ‘common law 
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radicalism’.188 But why are these dicta regarded as an expression of heresy? 
The answer to this question requires attempting to make sense of 
parliamentary sovereignty from the rival legal theories of Hart and Dworkin 
that have been the subject of previous chapters of this thesis.189 
 
As noted previously in the thesis, in The Concept of Law, Hart, in contrast to 
the legal theory of John Austin, who had argued that a sovereign makes all 
of the rules in a legal system, argued instead that ‘the rules make the 
sovereign.’190 The most important of these rules, according to Hart, was the 
ultimate ‘rule of recognition’191—the fundamental rule that establishes the 
criteria necessary for all other rules in the legal system to be accepted as 
law. Unlike other rules in the legal system, the ultimate rule of recognition 
is authoritative not because a legal rule declares it as such but because the 
ultimate rule of recognition is accepted by a majority of the officials in the 
legal system. For Hart, parliamentary sovereignty, which is the ‘ultimate 
rule of recognition’ of the British constitution, is a ‘an external statement of 
fact’:  
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When we move from saying that a particular enactment is valid, 
because it satisfies the rule that what the Queen in Parliament enacts 
is law, to say that in England this last rule is used by courts, officials, 
and private persons as the ultimate rule of recognition, we have 
moved from an internal statement of law asserting the validity of a 
rule of the system to an external statement of fact which an observer 
of the system might make even if he did not accept it.192 
 
Building on Hart’s theory, Goldsworthy offers a critique of common law 
constitutionalism.193 Goldsworthy argues that ‘the central claims of “common 
law constitutionalism” are false….Most senior legal officials, including 
judges, [in the United Kingdom] still accept the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty.’194 He argues that while Hart’s ultimate rule of recognition 
requires acceptance by judicial officials within the legal system, judicial 
acceptance alone is not sufficient for the existence of such a rule.195 The 
acceptance of the political branches of government is also necessary.196 
 
However, Goldsworthy’s critique of common law constitutionalism is not 
simply concerned with accurately describing the current status of 
parliamentary sovereignty in the British constitution. As the following 
excerpt makes clear, Goldsworthy presents a normative argument in favour 
of maintaining the sovereignty of Parliament as the ultimate rule of 
recognition of the British constitution: 
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Describing the unwritten constitution as a matter of common law…is 
likely to breed confusion. The vast bulk of the common law consists of 
substantive rules and principles, governing property, contracts, torts 
and so on, that are not constituted by a consensus of legal officialdom 
in general, and are therefore able to be changed without such a 
consensus having to change. Judges are now recognized as having 
authority unilaterally to change these rules and principles, or to 
declare that they have changed. They are best conceptualized as 
judicially posited rules, judicial customs, or Dworkinian principles. To 
apply the same label, ‘common law’, to the most fundamental norms of 
the unwritten constitution, is likely to produce confusion, erroneous 
assumptions about the authority of judges to change them, and conflict 
between the branches of government.197 
 
In the italicized text, we find Goldsworthy’s normative argument against 
unilateral modification by a minority of judges of the rule of recognition. 
 
In contrast to Hart’s positivist explanation of parliamentary sovereignty, 
Dworkin’s theory of ‘law as integrity’, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, uses 
different means to explain the meaning of parliamentary sovereignty in the 
British constitution.198 According to Dworkin’s theory of ‘law as integrity, 
propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow from the principles of 
justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best 
constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice.’ 199  For 
Dworkin, when hard cases require judges to engage in interpretation of the 
law, the judge under this theory ‘must choose between eligible 
interpretations by asking which shows the community’s structure of 
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institutions and decisions—its public standards as a whole—in a better light 
from the standpoint of political morality.’200 
 
Drawing on Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity, Craig has argued that the 
‘traditional’ conception of sovereignty, as developed by Sir William Wade, is 
‘simply a statement about the exercise of power.’ 201  The traditional 
conception, according to Craig, does not pass the test of ‘justification’ in the 
Dworkinian sense.202 He argues that parliamentary sovereignty, like all 
other forms of power, requires normative justification, and says that ‘the 
greater the alleged scope of power the more convincing must be the 
justification.’ 203  He notes that defenders of unlimited parliamentary 
sovereignty may present as a normative justification the argument ‘that 
constitutional review is anti-democratic, or that it is inconsistent with 
democracy for there to be any checks on what the current parliamentary 
majority can achieve.’204 Craig believes that the view that does meet the 
Dworkinian test of justification is the view that ‘Parliament has sovereign 
power, provided that there is the requisite normative justification for that 
power.’ 205 He is keen, however, to make clear what adopting this view does 
not necessarily mean: 
Adoption of this view does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that 
there should be constitutional review of statutes policed by the courts. 
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It does firmly deny the charge that those who advocate legal 
limitations on Parliament’s power are somehow guilty of 
constitutional heresy, or of contravening some a priori constitutional 
logic which denies that this would be possible.206 
 
Returning to the remarks made by the Jackson Three, as Bradley notes, ‘[i]t 
must not be assumed from these statements in Jackson that today’s judges 
are anxiously waiting to impose judicial supremacism upon the UK, but they 
indicate a willingness not merely to address the content of parliamentary 
sovereignty, but also to examine the link between that doctrine, the principle 
of democracy, and the Rule of Law.’207 By taking this approach, rather than 
regarding these remarks as an expression of heresy, we can openly debate 
the merits and demerits of parliamentary sovereignty.  
 
Keith Ewing has made a powerful argument in defence of parliamentary 
sovereignty that responds to Craig’s invitation to defend parliamentary 
sovereignty for normative reasons. Ewing has argued that parliamentary 
sovereignty is a principle that, although established before the universal 
franchise, may be regarded as ‘the most democratic of all constitutional 
principles’:  
[I]t is in the principle of parliamentary sovereignty that the principles 
of democracy and constitutional law converge. This is because in the 
democratic era, parliamentary sovereignty is the legal and 
constitutional device which best gives effect to the political principle of 
popular sovereignty, whereby the people in a self-governing 
community are empowered—without restraint—to make the rules by 
which they are to be governed through the medium of elected, 
representative and accountable officials.208  
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We can debate whether attempts by the judges to unilaterally modify the 
rule of recognition pose a sufficient enough threat to the integrity of the legal 
system so as to normatively justify unlimited parliamentary sovereignty. We 
can debate whether judicial review of legislation is justified in those 
instances in which the link between legislative supremacy and popular self-
government is severed. There are arguments on both sides of this debate, 
and the future of parliamentary sovereignty, as Craig rightly argues, ought 
to be debated on this normative plane. 
 
5.5  DELIVERING GRIFFITH-STYLE POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM AT THE 
DEVOLVED LEVEL 
 
I argued above that although parliamentary sovereignty is usually thought 
to be the constitutional design feature that best secures the values 
associated with political constitutionalism, from the perspective of the 
citizen who embodies the normative voice in Griffith’s lecture, there is 
reason for the political constitutionalist to oppose the manner in which the 
HRA attempts to protect parliamentary sovereignty in a multi-level system 
of government.209 To appreciate this argument, let us go back to a quote from 
Jeremy Waldron discussed in Chapter 4 from an article in which Waldron 
was arguing against the adoption of a bill of rights in the UK in the early 
1990s: 
If we are going to defend the idea of an entrenched Bill of Rights put 
effectively beyond revision by anyone other than the judges, we should 
try and think what we might say to some public-spirited citizen who 
wishes to launch a campaign or lobby her MP on some issue of rights 
about which she feels strongly and on which she has done her best to 
arrive at a considered and impartial view. She is not asking to be a 
                                            
209 See final paragraph of Section 5.3 above. 
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dictator; she perfectly accepts that her voice should have no more 
power than that of anyone else who is prepared to participate in 
politics. But—like her suffragette forebears—she wants a vote; she 
wants her voice and her activity to count on matters of high political 
importance.  
In defending a Bill of Rights, we have to imagine ourselves saying 
to her: ‘You may write to the newspaper and get up a petition and 
organize a pressure group to lobby Parliament. But even if you 
succeed, beyond your wildest dreams, and orchestrate the support of a 
large number of like-minded men and women, and manage to prevail 
in the legislature, your measure may be challenged and struck down 
because your view of what rights we have does not accord with the 
judges’ view. When their votes differ from yours, theirs are the votes 
that will prevail.’ It is my submission that saying this does not 
comport with the respect and honour normally accorded to ordinary 
men and women in the context of a theory of rights.210 
 
Now, let us imagine that the citizen in Waldron’s hypothetical above is a 
Scottish citizen. This public-spirited citizen ‘wishes to launch a campaign or 
lobby her [MSP] on some issue of rights about which she feels strongly and 
on which she has done her best to arrive at a considered and impartial 
view.’211 When the courts have the authority to strike-down an Act of the 
Scottish Parliament (ASP), we have to imagine saying to this citizen 
something similar to what Waldron asks us to imagine saying to the public-
spirited citizen in his hypothetical, which may look something like this:  
You may write to the newspaper and get up a petition and organize a 
pressure group to lobby [the Scottish] Parliament. But even if you 
succeed, beyond your wildest dreams, and orchestrate the support of a 
large number of like-minded men and women, and manage to prevail 
in the legislature, your measure may be challenged and struck down 
because your view of what rights we have does not accord with the 
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judges’ view. When their votes differ from yours, theirs are the votes 
that will prevail.212 
 
To that public-spirited citizen, in whose name the Scottish Parliament has 
wide-ranging powers to enact legislation, it seems that the preservation of 
parliamentary sovereignty (of the Westminster Parliament) does not 
actually appear to be an attractive way of securing the principles of 
democracy. That is so because although it may be the case that in a single 
political community, ‘parliamentary sovereignty is the legal and 
constitutional device which best gives effect to the political principle of 
popular sovereignty, whereby the people in a self-governing community are 
empowered—without restraint— to make the rules by which they are to be 
governed through the medium of elected, representative and accountable 
officials’,213 when we have in a state multiple political communities, as we 
now do in the United Kingdom, then the manner in which our current 
constitutional arrangements under the HRA and the Scotland Act preserve 
parliamentary sovereignty is, from the perspective of the public-spirited 
Scottish citizen, rather than being a democratic feature of our constitutional 
arrangements, an undemocratic one. 
 
In what ways, then, can we reform our current constitutional arrangements 
in order to deliver more of a Griffith-style political constitutionalism at the 
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5.5A  The Australian Model 
Constitutional arrangements in Australia offer one example of how a multi-
level system of government can have a division of power among the various 
levels of government while practicing a form of political constitutionalism 
with respect to human rights. The Australian Constitution of 1900 divides 
power among the state and federal parliaments and grants courts the power 
to police these boundaries. Yet, Australia also remains one of the rare 
jurisdictions whose written constitution does not have a judicially 
enforceable bill of rights.214 
 
We must, of course, be cognizant of the fact that, while Australia is a 
federated system of government, the United Kingdom (at least formally) is 
not. Notwithstanding that important difference, it is possible to imagine a 
devolution statute that, like the Australian Constitution, does not have a bill 
of rights. This devolution statute can, in ways similar to the Australian 
Constitution, divide powers between the Westminster and devolved 
parliaments and grant courts the power to police those boundaries of power. 
The Griffith-style political constitutionalist element of these arrangements 
would lie in the fact that courts would not have the power to strike down 
legislation enacted by a democratically elected sub-state legislature on 
rights-related grounds. The Scotland Act 1978, a devolution statute that 
attempted to establish a Scottish Assembly but never came into force 
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because its referendum requirement was not met, 215  also provides an 
example of such an arrangement.216 
 
5.5B  The Canadian Model 
Section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“the Charter”) 
offers an example of how a bill of rights can deviate, at least in theory, from 
the American model of constitutionalism by protecting legislation from being 
struck down by the courts on rights-related grounds. Section 33 of the 
Charter does so by offering legislatures (at both the national and provincial 
level) the power to protect a statute from rights-based judicial review by 
invoking what is known as the “notwithstanding” clause. Section 33 of the 
Charter reads: 
(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare 
in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, 
that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a 
provision included in section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. 
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration 
made under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it 
would have but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the 
declaration.217 
 
Invoking the notwithstanding mechanism, thus, insulates a statute from 
being subject to rights-based judicial review. 
 
Much has been written about the notwithstanding mechanism’s ability, in 
practice, to distinguish itself in a meaningful way from the American model 
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of constitutionalism.218 Indeed, Waldron argues that the notwithstanding 
mechanism is not meaningfully distinguishable from the American model 
because the mechanism is rarely invoked by the Canadian legislatures.219 A 
major problem with the notwithstanding mechanism is that the manner in 
which it is worded ‘requires the legislature to misrepresent its position on 
rights. To legislate notwithstanding the Charter is a way of saying that you 
do not think Charter rights have the importance that the Charter says they 
have.’220 Thus, the notwithstanding clause paints a picture of one group of 
people (judges) that cares about rights and another group (legislators) that 
does not, whereas what the political constitutionalist believes is that in a 
reasonably well-functioning democratic system, both groups think rights are 
important but they ‘disagree about how the relevant rights are to be 
interpreted.’221  
 
Thus, although in theory the Canadian arrangements offer an appealing 
alternative to the American model of constitutionalism for the political 
constitutionalist, there are practical concerns associated with the Canadian 
model that suggest that its adoption would not necessarily alleviate Griffith-
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5.5C  The HRA Model—Declarations of Incompatibility 
A final possibility is the replication at the devolved level of the Section 4 
‘declaration of incompatibility’ mechanism contained in the HRA. Chris 
Himsworth argued along these lines in an essay published shortly after the 
enactment of the HRA: 
[T]he Scottish Parliament (and the Northern Ireland Assembly) 
should, in principle, have been treated not like a parish council, 
quango, or minister but in a manner much more closely resembling 
that granted by the UK Parliament to itself. The [declaration of] 
incompatibility principle and procedure have been conceived narrowly 
as a protection for parliamentary sovereignty and, therefore, 
applicable only to UK Acts. More positively, they may be seen as 
readily and appropriately extendable to any parliament and any form 
of parliamentary legislation. The reason why the Scottish Parliament 
should be protected from the summary nullification of its Acts is not 
because of any claim to sovereignty but because there should be an 
opportunity for any parliament to reflect, to consider options, without 
the pressure of immediate chaos and to produce a viable solution. 
These are conditions reasonably claimed by a parliament, whether 
devolved or not.222 
 
The argument being made here is that just as the HRA avoids giving judges 
the power to strike down legislation enacted by the Westminster Parliament 
(by giving them instead the power only to declare such Acts as being 
incompatible with human rights223), such an incompatibility procedure ought 
also to be introduced to protect from nullification Acts of the Scottish 
Parliament and other democratically elected devolved legislatures. 
 
As is the case with the Canadian ‘notwithstanding’ mechanism discussed 
above, some political constitutionalists express doubts as to whether the 
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incompatibility procedure makes the HRA meaningfully different from the 
American model of constitutionalism.224 One reason for these concerns is 
that although the HRA allows Parliament to preserve its own interpretation 
of a statute even after a judicial declaration of incompatibility, there has so 
far only been one occasion on which Parliament has chosen not to amend 
legislation that has been declared incompatible with the ECHR by the 
courts.225 It is thought that there are political costs associated with routinely 
ignoring a judicial declaration, and, therefore, that a declaration of 
incompatibility is at least in some ways like a strike-down power. As 
Anthony Bradley puts it, a declaration of incompatibility, though not the 
same as a strike-down power, does offer the courts the power to ‘deliver a 
wound to Parliament’s handiwork that is likely to prove fatal, even though 
life support for it must be switched off by the government or by Parliament, 
not by the courts.’226 
 
Another reason that the HRA arrangements are thought not to deviate too 
far from the American model of constitutionalism is that the interpretive 
powers that courts enjoy under Section 3 mean that courts can significantly 
modify the effect of a statute, even in ways in which Parliament arguably did 
not intend. This was most clearly evident in the well-known Ghaidan 
decision discussed above.227 Thus, Aileen Kavanagh has argued that the 
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HRA ‘seem[s] to give Parliament the last word, whilst nonetheless giving the 
courts powers of constitutional review, not hugely dissimilar from those 
possessed by the US Supreme Court.’228  
 
We discussed at length in Chapter 2 of this thesis the reasons that Griffith 
and other normative positivists would oppose giving judges such strong 
powers of interpretation as those enjoyed by judges under Section 3 of the 
HRA.229 Thus, although formally the HRA may be seen as an instantiation of 
Griffith-style political constitutionalism, in practice, like the Canadian 
arrangements, the HRA ‘declaration of incompatibility’ mechanism, if 
replicated at the devolved level, would not entirely alleviate the concerns of 
political constitutionalists if the incompatibility mechanism is accompanied 
by Section 3-style strong interpretive powers.230 
 
Out of the three models discussed in this section, the Australian model offers 
the possibility of being most attractive in terms of delivering more of a 
Griffith style of political constitutionalism at the devolved level. The other 
two models, while offering attractive alternatives in theory, both have 
practical difficulties. It is an empirical question as to whether those practical 
difficulties would manifest themselves if these models were adopted at the 
devolved level in the United Kingdom. 
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5.6  CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter has sought to describe the contributions that Griffith’s 
normative positivism, discussed at length in previous chapters, can make to 
the narratives of devolution, that is, the different ways of conceiving the 
policy and objects of the Scottish devolutionary settlement. In answering 
that question, I have argued that while the dominant narratives of 
devolution have too often attempted to make sense of devolution from the 
standpoint of the judge, Griffith’s normative positivism encourages us to 
think about devolution from the standpoint of the citizen. When we turn our 
vantage away from the judge and towards the citizen, we are better able to 
appreciate the democratic concerns associated with subjecting Acts of the 
Scottish Parliament to rights-based judicial review. I have argued that 
preserving parliamentary sovereignty in the way that the Human Rights Act 
does, by according subordinate status to the Scottish Parliament and by 
subjecting Acts of the Scottish Parliament to rights-based judicial review, 
has undemocratic consequences. I have, in conclusion to the chapter, 
followed that argument by describing three possible models of 
constitutionalism, which, if followed, could better deliver more of a Griffith 
style of political constitutionalism at the devolved level than the current 







The Argument. The principal argument that I have presented in this 
thesis is that J.A.G. Griffith was a normative positivist. He argued in his 
famous lecture ‘The Political Constitution’1 for the positivist separation of 
law and morality for normative reasons. As I argued in Chapter 2, unlike the 
purely conceptual positivist, who urges the positivist separation of law and 
morality for the purposes of accurately describing the nature of a legal 
system and accurately describing the concept of law, 2  Griffith was a 
normative positivist who urged the separation of law and morality for 
normative reasons.3 These normative concerns running through Griffith’s 
lecture were the same as those of Hobbes, Hume, Bentham, and other 
‘normative decisional positivists’,4 namely an interest in minimizing the 
discretion enjoyed by judges in order to avoid the arbitrariness that would 
result if legal decisions turned on the moral judgment of judges and other 
officials entrusted with the task of interpreting and applying the law. His 
normative decisional positivist views were evident in his opposition to bills of 
rights, which instruments he opposed owing to the strong interpretive 
powers that they grant to unelected judges.5 
 
                                            
1 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1. 
2 See Chapter 2, esp. Section 2.2A. 
3 See Chapter 2, esp. Sections 2.5 and 2.6. 
4 See Chapter 2, Section 2.2C. 
5 See Chapter 2, Sections 2.5 and 2.6. 
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I argued in Chapter 2 that Griffith’s famous definition of the UK 
constitution as being ‘no more and no less than what happens’6 is explained 
by his commitment to democracy, as well as by his commitment to the meta-
ethical theory known as moral anti-realism.7 In order to do so, I drew a 
connection between democracy and legal positivism on the one hand, and 
moral anti-realism and legal positivism on the other, and in both cases, I 
presented reasons why legal positivism would be an attractive theory for 
someone committed, as Griffith was, to both democracy and moral anti-
realism. Griffith’s definition of the UK constitution as ‘no more and no less 
than what happens’ was a normative positivist attempt to counter the anti-
positivist notions of the UK constitution that were being advanced by his 
contemporaries. 
 
The reader might wonder why it is important to identify Griffith as a 
normative positivist. What turns on my discovery? Am I the first to do so? In 
these concluding remarks, I want to provide the reader answers to these 
questions and a sense of why it is that I chose this subject matter and how it 
is that my journey in identifying a particular gap in the literature has 
played out. 
 
I am certainly not the first one to identify Griffith as a normative positivist. 
Among contemporary scholars who have carefully assessed Griffith’s work, 
Thomas Poole makes brief mention of Griffith’s connection to normative 
positivism: 
[T]he positivist position [Griffith] espouses has an explicit political 
point. He defends positivism as the best method for uncovering the 
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reality beneath the layers of illusion and rhetoric. A ‘solid, positivist, 
unmetaphysical, non-natural foundation for analytical jurisprudence’, 
he insists, was essential for peering beneath the ‘elaborate façades’ and 
‘out of date pieces of stage paraphernalia’ in order to find the levers of 
power, and the identity of those who manipulated those levers. 
Intellectual honesty, then, has a moral and political purpose. In this, 
Griffith shares H.L.A. Hart’s conviction that only positivism could 
make ‘men clear sighted in confronting the official abuse of power’, was 
most likely ‘to lead to a stiffening of resistance to evil’.8 
 
We find in the above quotation a connection that Poole draws between 
Griffith’s positivism and the positivism of HLA Hart (I addressed in Chapter 
2 the question of whether or not Hart may appropriately be described as a 
normative positivist9). 
 
However, although Poole does briefly draw attention to Griffith’s normative 
positivism in the article quoted above, there is a need to provide a more 
detailed account of Griffith’s commitment to normative positivism than 
Poole’s account manages. By providing a more thorough account (as I have 
attempted to do in this thesis) of Griffith’s normative positivism, we clarify a 
set of debates surrounding Griffith’s lecture that still remain, to this day, in 
need of clarification.  
 
The Descriptivism Debate.  One debate surrounding Griffith’s lecture that 
remains in need of clarification is what I referred to in the introductory 
chapter of the thesis as ‘the descriptivism debate’.10 This debate relates to 
the use of the word ‘descriptive’ that has surfaced in recent years to describe 
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Griffith’s vision of the UK constitution as expressed in ‘The Political 
Constitution’ and relates to the suggestion by some scholars that Griffith’s 
arguments are irrelevant to normative constitutional theory. Dawn Oliver, 
for example, has written that Griffith ‘argued from and for a highly positivist 
interpretation of the Constitution, with no ‘oughts’ or moral content’;11 JWF 
Allison has written that Griffith’s ‘notion of the constitution [was] purely 
descriptive—neither legally prescriptive nor morally normative’;12 and Adam 
Tomkins has written that ‘[w]hen it came to discussing constitutional 
questions, Griffith only ever described—he never prescribed.’13 Together, 
Oliver, Allison and Tomkins represent one side of the descriptivism debate; 
for ease of reference, let us refer to these three scholars as belonging to 
Group A for the purposes of this debate. 
 
The other side of the descriptivism debate are those who come to Griffith’s 
defence by suggesting that what scholars belonging to Group A are 
suggesting in the above quotes is wrong because, they argue, Group A 
neglects Griffith’s normative arguments in ‘The Political Constitution’. For 
ease of reference, let us refer to those who come to Griffith’s defence in this 
manner as Group B. Martin Loughlin, one member of Group B, has recently 
argued in response to Tomkins’s claim quoted in the previous paragraph 
that ‘it is easy—but wrong—to state that Griffith’s work is purely 
descriptive’. 14  Similarly, Poole has written in response to Tomkins’s 
                                            
11 Dawn Oliver, Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom (Oxford University 
Press 2003) 380. 
12  JWF Allison, The English Historical Constitution: Continuity, Change and 
European Effects (Cambridge University Press 2007) 34. 
13 Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing 2005) 37. 
14 Martin Loughlin, ‘Modernism in British Public Law:  1919-79’ [2014] Public Law 56, 66. 
 
 247 
argument that Tomkins’s description of Griffith’s analysis as wholly 
descriptive ‘underestimates the polemical dimension of Griffith’s work.’15 ‘We 
misunderstand Griffith’, argues Poole, ‘if we see him as simply presenting a 
descriptive analysis.’16 And Graham Gee welcomes this clarification by Poole 
of what Gee takes to be ‘a familiar mischaracterisation’17 of Griffith’s work. 
 
What I offered in Chapter 3 was a response to Group A that is different from 
the type of responses to Group A that Group B has hitherto provided. I 
argued in Chapter 3 that although scholars in Group B are correct to come to 
Griffith’s defence, they do so in a manner that actually misunderstands 
Group A. Whereas Group B believes that what Group A is saying is that 
Griffith’s work or that his analysis was completely devoid of normative 
argument, what I sought to show is that Group A actually expressly 
recognizes the normative dimension of Griffith’s work. The better way to 
defend Griffith against the criticism of Group A, I argued, is not to suggest 
that Group A completely neglects the normative arguments present in 
Griffith’s lecture (which members of Group A do not) but rather the more 
appropriate response to scholars belonging to Group A is to expose the 
Dworkinian anti-positivist bias that is present in their critique of Griffith. It 
is a mistake, I argued, to arrive at Griffith’s lecture carrying, as Group A 
does, Dworkinian anti-positivist presuppositions; rather, the better way to 
appreciate Griffith’s arguments is to look at them through a normative 
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positivist lens. Doing so, I argued, is fairer to Griffith and provides a more 
accurate assessment of Griffith’s work.18 
 
The Political Constitutionalism Debate.  Identifying Griffith as a normative 
positivist also helps to clarify our understanding of the concept that has 
come to be known in recent years in public law scholarship as ‘political 
constitutionalism’. I analysed in Chapter 3 the account of ‘political 
constitutionalism’ presented by Tomkins, one of Griffith’s critics, and I drew 
attention to a key difference between Tomkins’s and Griffith’s political 
constitutionalism that is not brought out in the scholarship. That difference 
is that whereas Tomkins’s version of political constitutionalism is based on 
an anti-positivist understanding of the UK constitution, Griffith’s political 
constitutionalism is best understood as a form of normative positivism. I 
argued that those who enlist Griffith as an ally of the political 
constitutionalist school of thought must bear in mind the diversity that 
exists within the concept of political constitutionalism and argued that 
Griffith’s political constitutionalism is best understood as a form of 
normative positivism—a form of political constitutionalism that, unlike the 
modern defence of political constitutionalism provided by Tomkins, is not 
built upon Dworkinian anti-positivist foundations.19 I further argued that by 
building his republican programme on a Dworkinian anti-positivist 
foundation, Tomkins’s modern defence of political constitutionalism has lost 
the affinity that is normally thought to exist between republicanism and 
normative positivism.20 
                                            
18 See Chapter 3, esp. Section 3.3 
19 See Chapter 3, esp. Sections 3.3B and 3.5. 





Motivation.  Why was I drawn to Griffith’s lecture for the purposes of this 
project? Apart from my motivation to clarify the various debates just noted, 
which I came across in the course of my research, I also believed, and 
continue to do so, that a better understanding of Griffith’s lecture can help 
us make better sense of the big constitutional questions of the age, such as 
those relating to bills of rights and devolution. I asked the question of what 
contribution, if any, Griffith’s normative positivism can make to what I 
referred to, borrowing a phrase from Aileen McHarg, as ‘the narratives of 
devolution’.21 I argued that among the things that Griffith can teach us 
about the narratives of devolution is that in conceptualizing the legal 
dimension of Scottish devolution—that is, in thinking about what devolution 
means as a matter of law—there is value in switching our standpoint away 
from the judge and towards the citizen.22 I argued that the arguments 
Griffith made in ‘The Political Constitution’ can encourage us to think about 
the fact that no matter what judges say is the best interpretation of the law 
of devolution as it currently exists, it will always be open to our citizen to 
question the desirability of the law as it currently stands; it will always be 
open to our citizen to argue that the law as it currently stands is morally 
deficient and ought to be reformed. 23  In particular, I argued that the 
normative positivist concerns that Griffith expressed against bills of rights—
his argument that these instruments grant judges the power to interpret 
                                            
21 See Chapter 5. 
22 See, on the value of switching standpoint and on the normative voice in Griffith’s 
normative positivism, Chapter 4. 
23 See Chapter 5, esp. Section 5.3. 
 250 
‘woolly principles and even woollier exceptions’24—do not go away when the 
parliament whose legislation is being subjected to review by the courts is the 
Scottish Parliament. It is easy to miss this point, I demonstrated, when we 
think about devolution, as we so often have, far too much from the vantage 
of the judge and less so from the vantage of the citizen.25 For the citizen, the 
most obvious characteristic of the Scottish Parliament is that it is a body 
engaged in representative lawmaking,26 and it matters not so much to the 
citizen whether that representative lawmaking body is, in the eyes of a 
court, more like a parliament or like a delegated body. 
 
The constitutional questions of the age—should we withdraw from the 
European Convention on Human Rights and adopt a British bill of rights? 
How should a bill of rights apply across the various jurisdictions within the 
UK? How should the law of devolution be reformed?—are all questions about 
which Griffith’s lecture encourages us to think differently. Griffith’s lecture 
reminds us of the dangers of granting unelected judges the power to 
interpret vague provisions of a bill of rights, about whose interpretation 
reasonable people may disagree. Griffith’s lecture, as I argued in Chapters 4 
and 5, encourages us to think about bills of rights and about devolution less 
so from the standpoint of the judge and more so from the standpoint of the 
citizen. 
                                            
24 Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (n 1) 14. 
25 See Chapter 5, esp. Section 5.3. 
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